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ABSTRACT 
Developing country producers face several constraints related to food safety 
standards imposed by developed countries. This study identifies factors affecting export 
flows with respect to food safety standards and measures the effects of food safety 
standards on exports. The investigation uses data for processed food exports from 15 
countries over 17 years.  
The empirical results show that a one percent increase in food safety standards 
decreases exports by approximately one-half percent. Yet economic development in 
exporting countries can overcome higher food safety standards and will have a dominant 
effect over time as GDP increases for exporting countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
International trade in food and processed food products has expanded enormously over 
the last ten years. World exports of processed food increased at the rate of 8.5% per year 
during 1970-2003, and the share of processed products in agricultural exports increased from 
42% in 1990-91 to 48% in 2001-02 (Mohanty, 2006). The reason behind this upward trend in 
processed food exports is developed countries’ changing food consumption patterns and the 
growing demand for “ready to eat” food. 
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While the growth in demand for ready to eat food creates exciting opportunities for food 
processing industries, developed countries’ environmental and health related requirements act 
as important non-tariff barriers to exports. Developing country producers face several 
constraints related to increasingly more stringent food safety standards imposed by developed 
countries. The U.S., the E.U., and Japan have strict requirements on food and processed food 
products. Differing standards across markets are another constraint. For example, chlorine is 
used in many countries to destroy pathogenic bacteria in food but in other countries it is 
completely forbidden in food contact applications.  
The food safety concerns by developed countries are not without merit. A wide range of 
chemical substances including pesticides and additives are commonly used in food production 
and processing, and residues of these chemicals may remain in the end products. These 
residues can be harmful for humans, animals and plants, and the environment in which they 
live. So, consumers in developed countries have exhibited a high level of food safety concern 
related to their processed food supply, though their growing demand for “ready to eat” food 
has increased. Developed countries have increasingly called for assurances that food is free 
from substances such as pesticides, chemical additives, hormones, and antibiotics. However, 
the economic nature of the food safety issue in developing countries is somewhat different 
from developed countries. Their concern is about food safety regulations enforced by 
developed countries that act as important non-tariff barriers: these standards increase 
compliance costs of suppliers and thus reduce their export competitiveness. 
Despite the concern of the term “food safety” in both national and global forums, little 
attention has been paid to examining its empirical relationship with international 
competitiveness. This study aims at reviewing challenges Asia-Pacific food exporters are 
facing in exporting to developed countries because of food safety standards. The purpose of 
this study is twofold: first is to identify factors affecting export flows with respect to food 
safety standards; and second is to measure the effects of food safety standards on exports 
from selected countries. The results of this study provide evidence on the impacts of 
important factors on food exports by less developed countries. 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
There are a considerable number of studies regarding food safety and international trade 
that range from theoretical and policy analyses to empirical analyses. However, empirical 
analyses of the impact of standards and technical regulations, in particular food safety 
standards, on export flows in the food and food manufacturing in Asia-Pacific countries are 
relatively sparse. The literature includes two types of studies; some perform case studies or 
surveys for policy analysis on food safety standards and the challenges exporting firms face 
due to increasingly more stringent food safety standards. Others employ econometric models 
to determine how domestic policies impact bilateral trade flows. The econometric approach 
which is most often used in the literature is the gravity model. Some investigators use the 
number of food standards in a country as a proxy for the severity of standards in the gravity 
model. Other investigators use more direct measures of food safety standards, but aggregating 
widely varying standards for a given importing country is difficult.  
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THE GRAVITY MODEL 
The gravity model (Tinbergen (1962) and Linneman (1966)) is commonly used to 
determine whether a domestic policy positively or negatively influences the competitiveness 
of international trade. A number of authors set up domestic standards and technical 
regulations as proxies for their impact (environmental stringency) or severity (food safety 
standards) in the gravity model. Among the noteworthy works are Harris et al. (2002) for 
environmental policy impacts, and Jayasuriya et al. (2006), Wilson and Otsuki (2001), Otsuki 
et al. (2001), and Lacovone (2003) for food safety regulations. 
Harris et al. (2002) investigated the relationship between environmental regulations and 
international competitiveness using the following gravity equation: 
 
ijt it it j i
ijt ijt ijt ij ij
jt it jt it ijt
u SC SC LAND LAND
NAFTA EFTA EEC ADJ DIST
POP POP GDP GDP IMP
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
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ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln ln
13 12 11 10
9 8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β β
 
 
where, ln represents natural logarithm; IPMijt is the imports of country i from country j in year 
t; GDPit, GDPjt, the GDPs of country i and j, respectively, in year t; POPit, POPjt, the 
population of country i and j, respectively, in year t; DISTij, the distance between country i 
and j; ADJij, , EECijt, , EFTAijt, and NAFTAijt, are dummy variables identifying adjacency 
and trade agreements; LANDi, LANDj, the land areas of country i and j, respectively; SCit, 
SCjt, are scores measuring the relative strictness of environmental regulations in country i and 
j, respectively, in year t; and Uijt denotes the error term. They examined the effect of 
environmental stringency by six different indicators based on energy consumption or energy 
supply.  
Jayasuriya et al. (2006) investigated the impact of increasingly stringent and differing 
standards set by developed countries on exports by India’s food processing industries using a 
gravity model. They constructed an index to measure food safety standards through a survey 
of processed food industries. Their index was a weighted value of different groups of 
standards (including microbial hazards, pesticides, antibiotics, and toxic chemicals) in the 
importing countries relative to the Codex standard. Among the exporting countries, they 
found that food exported to EU countries, Australia and the US faced extremely restrictive 
standards, while exports of food to Canada and Japan faced moderately restrictive standards. 
They estimated that compliance costs averaged 5% of sales revenue, though they range from 
10-15% for some food products. Based on their empirical results, they concluded that 
stringent food safety standards limit Indian processed food exports. 
Using such an aggregated index for technical standards to determine impacts on trade 
flows has been found to have serious limitations. The aggregated index constructed from 
different standards has often produced empirical results inconsistent with conceptual 
expectations. For example, Swann (1996) and Moenius (1999) worked with two different 
standards -- as shared standards (where various standards were used as separate variables), 
and unilateral standards (where a number of standards are aggregated and formed into an 
index). Swann’s findings suggest that shared standards positively impact exports, but had a Ashfaqul Babool, Michael Reed, Sayed Saghaian et al.  4 
little impact on imports; unilateral standards positively influence imports but negatively 
influence exports. Moenius found that shared standards have a positive impact on trade and 
unilateral standards enhance manufacturing trade, but limit trade in non-manufacturing 
sectors (Lacovone, 2003). Unfortunately, their proxy for the stringency of food regulations 
was the number of specific standards imposed by the importing country. 
Lacovone’s investigation suggests a way to overcome these shortcomings. He used 
maximum tolerated levels of aflatoxin B1, the most common and most toxic aflatoxin found 
in food, as a direct measure of the severity of the aflatoxin standard. He developed an 
extended gravity model to explain Latin American nut exports to Europe and found that there 
were substantial export losses to Latin-America from the tightening of the aflatoxin standards 
set by Europe. 
Two other studies are supportive of using this direct measurement method. Wilson and 
Otsuki (2001) used a gravity model in their investigation on import flows of cereals and nuts. 
They concluded that these imports are negatively affected by the aflatoxin standard. Otsuki et 
al. (2001) also utilized a gravity model with the maximum aflatoxin level allowed measuring 
food safety standards in their analysis of African food product exports to EU counties. They 
concluded that tightening the aflatoxin level by EU countries reduces African food exports to 
the EU by 64 percent or US$ 670 million. They also found that the health risk in EU countries 
was reduced by approximately 1.4 deaths per billion a year due to these stiffer food safety 
standards. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
This study follows a gravity model approach which is derived from demand and supply 
functions of importing and exporting countries under general equilibrium conditions as 
reflected in Anderson and Wincoop (2003). The model assumes a CES (Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution) utility function for consumers in the importing country that is constrained by 
income. It is assumed that each country produces only one good and the supply of the good is 
fixed.  
The consumers’ demand equation for the imported good is derived by maximizing the 
consumers’ utility function subject to the income constraint. The market clearing condition 
(aggregate import demand equals aggregate supply) is used to derive the profit function for 
the exporting country. Trade barriers and trade (transportation) costs ( ij C
) are assumed to be 
a log linear function of bilateral distance (D) and adjacency or border (B) between importing 
and exporting countries. 
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where  ij X
 is exports from country i to j; Ii and Ij is total income of country i and j, 
respectively; Dij is the distance from country i to j; Bij is whether there is a shared border 
between i and j;  i P is the price in the exporting country and  j P
is the price in the importing 
country; andρ  is the elasticity of substitution between all goods 
Taking logs and appending error terms, we can write the following empirical form of the 
gravity model: 
 
ij j i ij ij j i ij P P B D I I k X μ ρ ρ ρ ρ + − − + + + + = ln ln ln ln ln ln ln 1 1 1 1
   (2) 
 
In this empirical analysis, we incorporate a food safety standard variable with the 
expectation that this standard reduces a country’s export competitiveness. The two price 
terms in the above equation (so called multilateral resistance variables) are not observable and 
difficult to measure so we did not use the terms but instead incorporate export and import 
price indices (Bergstrand, 1989). Including all these factors that explain bilateral exports, the 
extended gravity equation for this study has the following form: 
 
ijt i jt it
ij jt ti ijt
FSS IPI EPI
Dis GDP GDP EX
ε β β β
β β β β
+ + + +
+ + + =
ln ln ln
ln ln ln ln
6 5 4
3 2 1 0
 (3) 
 
where,  ti GDP is per capita GDP of country i at time t;  jt GDP
 is per capita GDP of country j 
at time t;  ij Dis
 is distance between country i and j;  it EPI  is export price index of country i 
at time t;  jt IPI
 is import price index of country j at time t;  i FSS  is the food safety standards 
in terms of aflatoxin with maximum allowable level imposed on imports by country i; and ijt ε
 
is an error term assumed to be normally distributed. 
Equation (3) is the classical double-log specification, and the explanatory variables used 
in this model have a direct relationship to bilateral export flows. In this model, GDPi 
measures the potential demand of the importing country, while GDPj represents the potential 
supply of the exporting country. Therefore, the corresponding slope parameters,  1 β  and 2 β , 
are expected to be positive. The rational for geographical distance is that a higher distance 
between trading partners leads to higher transportation costs and increased differences in 
preferences. Disij is a proxy for resistance to trade, thus it is anticipated that  3 β  will be 
negative. The slope parameter  4 β  is expected to be negative because exporter’s high prices 
reduce outward trade flows. On the other hand, it is anticipated that  5 β  will be positive 
because importer’s increased prices may cause foreign goods to be more competitive so 
inward trade flows rise (Bergstrand, 1989). Finally, FSSi measures how strict the food safety 
standards are in importing countries; in line with the assumption that strict standards lead to Ashfaqul Babool, Michael Reed, Sayed Saghaian et al.  6 
relatively lower exports. In this model, the strictness of the standards depends on the tolerable 
level of aflatoxin B1: a lower level of aflatoxin standard indicates a more restrictive standard. 
Therefore, we anticipate that  6 β will be positive, which implies stiffer standard impact 
exports negatively. 
DATA SOURCES AND DESCRIPTIONS 
This study focuses on the factors affecting bilateral trade with special attention on the 
impact of food safety standards for different importing countries. The gravity model used in 
this study requires the following data for each country: exports of food and food products as 
dependent variables, country’s total GDP, per capital GDP, population, geographical distance, 
export price index, import price index, membership in European Union (EU) and food safety 
regulations in terms of aflatoxin standards. The data utilized in this model are collected for 
seventeen years, 1988-2005, on 15 countries that include OECD and Asia-Pacific countries. 
The exporters are China, Fiji, Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam; the importers are 
Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United 
States. 
Data for bilateral trade, in particular the value of exports and imports of food and food 
products in US dollars under the classification of SITC Rev.3, are collected from United 
Nations Statistics division available online at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade/ 
Each country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and per capita GDP (both in constant 
2000 US dollars) are collected from World Bank Development Indicator (WDI) available 
online at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/. Each country’s population is collected 
from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United 
Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization 
Prospects: The 2003 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp  
Data for geographical distances are collected on the basis of the average distance between 
the major sea ports of the two countries. Since there are no waterways in Nepal we used the 
distance to Calcutta (including road distance in miles from Calcutta to Katmandu) for the 
country, Nepal. The data for distance are measured in nautical miles, and collected online at 
http://www.distances.com/ . The export price index of the exporting countries and the import 
price index of the importing countries are collected from World Bank Development Indicator 
(WDI) available online at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/ 
To measure the effect of food safety standards on trade flows we use aflatoxin standards 
as an explanatory variable. This is not a perfect measure for food safety standards, but it is a 
ratio-measured variable that is available for many countries. The data for maximum allowable 
levels of aflatoxins in parts per billion (ppb) appear in Table 1. These data are obtained from 
the FAO publication, “Worldwide Regulations for Mycotoxins 1995: A Compendium.” 
Aflatoxins are present in foods as natural contaminants and cannot be completely excluded 
from the food chain. The most potentially toxic aflatoxin is designated as aflatoxin B1, and 
causes acute toxicity in animals and humans (Otsuki et al., 2001). In this context, the 
maximum allowable level of aflatoxin B1 imposed for food and food products is considered 
to determine the level of food safety standards in a country: the greater values of aflatoxin B1 
in foods implies a more lax standard. Food Safety Standards and Export Competitiveness …  7
Table 1. Maximum tolerated levels of aflatoxins in food and food products. 
 
Country  Maximum tolerated levels 
of aflatoxins (ppb) 
Country  Maximum tolerated levels of 
aflatoxins (ppb) 
Australia  5  For all foods  India   30  For all foods 
Austria  1  For all foods  Italy   5  For all foods 
Canada  15  For nuts  Japan  10  For all foods 
France  10    UK   4  For nuts and figs 
Germany  2  For all foods  USA   20  For all foods 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1997 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We use data for bilateral exports of all food and processed food products, and data for 
factors affecting bilateral export flows for 17 years on 15 OECD and Asia-Pacific countries. 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Q statistics and Lagrange multiplier tests were used 
to determine the optimal model structure. Using AIC, the import price index variable was 
dropped from the model because it added virtually no explanatory power and was correlated 
with other independent variables. This model estimated with ordinary least squares had a high 
R2 (0.57), but was found to suffer from heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. The 
heteroskedasticity problem was associated with the exporting country’s GDP and a second-
order autocorrelation process was found for the error terms. The Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) method in SAS was used to correct these problems 
and to obtain the model parameters. 
 
Table 2. Regression results of bilateral exports in the food and food product sector. 
 
Variable  Paramete restimates  Standard Error  t Value  Pr > |t| 
Intercept -20.64  1.57  -13.16  <0.0001 
Exporter' s per capita GDP (GDPX)  1.96  0.05  38.57  <0.0001 
Importer' s per capita GDP (GDPM)  0.44  0.13  3.31  0.0009 
Distances (DIST)  -0.53  0.15  -3.62  0.0003 
Exporter’s export price index (EPIX)  0.98  0.01  74.29  <0.0001 
Food Safety Standard (FSS)  0.52  0.16  3.30  0.0001 
        
All variables are in logs. All coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero at the 1% 
level. 
 
The estimation results are reported in Table 2. The parameter estimate on the policy 
variable (aflatoxin B1) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Since a larger Ashfaqul Babool, Michael Reed, Sayed Saghaian et al.  8 
coefficient for aflatoxin B1 implies relaxation of aflatoxin contamination, the positive sign of 
the coefficient implies that the bilateral trade increases with relaxation of the standard. 
Because a double-log specification is used in the model, the coefficient is the elasticity, 
suggesting that a 1% tightening of the standard reduces bilateral exports by 0.52%. Jayasuriya 
et al. (2006) found that Indian food exporters received significant losses from stringent food 
safety regulations. This result is also consistent with the findings of Lacovone (2003) and 
Otsuki et al. (2001). 
The coefficient for the exporter’s per capita GDP is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. A 1 per cent increase in per capita GDP for the exporting country increases their 
exports by 1.96%; indicating that higher GDP in the exporting country results in markedly 
higher exports – possibly from better infrastructure to support exports, higher quality 
products, and a better image for the country as a whole. Developing countries that grow 
rapidly will have faster export growth for food products.  The coefficient for the importing 
country’s per capita GDP is significantly positive at the 1% level. A 1 per cent increase in the 
per capita GDP in the importing country is associated with 0.44% increase in exports. 
Economic growth in the more developed importing countries will increase food imports, but 
the elasticity is less than unity.  
The other important coefficient from the gravity model is for distance (DIST), which had 
the expected negative sign (-0.53) and was significant at the 1% level. The coefficient 
indicates that a 1 percent increase in distance reduces food exports by 0.53%; not a large 
amount, but still an important deterrent to increased food exports.  
The exporter price index (EPIX) is positively and significantly related to exports, which 
was not expected. It is likely that the exporter price index is picking up the development 
process of the exporter where higher prices reflect improved product quality and a better 
reputation for the country’s products. Because of the aggregate nature of food exports there 
was no variable available to measure accurately the price for specific food products, so the 
unexpected sign for this coefficient is not surprising. It is likely picking up the positive 
impacts of development on prices and exports. 
The effects of food safety regulations seem rather small, but one must remember that 
food standards can change drastically for a country. Moving the aflatoxin tolerance from 20 
(the US’s standard) to 4 (the UK’s standard) is a 500% increase in the standard. Thus, if the 
US adopted the UK’s food safety standards, exports to the US by the countries in this analysis 
would be only 45% of what they were before – a tremendous decrease. This would seriously 
impair developing country food exporters. 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, we estimate a model based on an extended gravity model to determine the 
possible influence of food safety standards on export flows of six Asia-Pacific countries to 
nine importing countries. The major question that surfaces from imposing food safety 
regulations in importing countries is whether and what extent are exports in the food and 
processed food industry influenced by the food safety regulations?  
The empirical results show that the value of exports in food and food products is 
negatively affected by aflatoxin standards: the greater the food safety standards, the lower its 
restrictiveness, and higher the bilateral export flows. A one percent increase in food safety Food Safety Standards and Export Competitiveness …  9
standards decrease exports by approximately one-half percent. This means that large changes 
in food standards (which are common these days) will have salutary, deleterious impacts on 
food exports by developing countries. Yet economic development in exporting countries can 
overcome higher food safety standards and will have a dominant effect over time as GDP 
increases for exporting countries. 
Policies that will increase economic activity in the exporting and importing countries 
(specifically their GDPs) will increase food exports by developing countries in the years 
ahead. Despite all of the contraints and challenges Asia-Pacific exporters face in meeting food 
safety regulations, exports of food and processed food products have grown for the region and 
they are set to increase further in the future as incomes grow. So despite increased food safety 
standards, less developed countries that can improve infrastructure, product quality, and 
supplier reputation can find good markets for their food exports to more developed countries. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper quantifies the increase in wheat production in Mexico’s Yaqui Valley 
from CIMMYT’s breeding and development of semi-dwarf wheat varieties for the period 
1990-2002. The costs and benefits of the wheat research program are estimated and 
evaluated using a two-region model of the world wheat market. The economic rate of 
return of the wheat breeding program at CIMMYT is calculated, and policy implications 
are derived. Estimates of the Internal Rate of Return of the CIMMYT breeding program 
were 51.4% during the 1990-2002 period, with a benefit cost ratio of 14.97, implying that 
for each dollar of public funds invested in CIMMYT wheat breeding research over the 
time period, 15 dollars of benefits result. 
 
Key words: Public wheat breeding, benefit/cost analysis, agricultural research, wheat 
varieties. 
JEL classification codes: Q17, O19 
INTRODUCTION  
The Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo (CIMMYT) is a nonprofit 
maize and wheat breeding research center based in El Batan, Mexico. CIMMYT was created 
to establish international networks to improve wheat and maize varieties in low-income 
countries.  
CIMMYT research in wheat breeding has resulted in higher yields for global wheat 
producers over the past several decades.
 The sources of this investment in research include 
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federal governments, nonprofit organizations, and grants from organizations such as the Gates 
Foundation. This study addresses the question, what are the welfare economic impacts of this 
research effort? Specifically, we determine whether the public investment in CIMMYT wheat 
breeding has resulted in a socially worthwhile use of limited public funds, and how the 
economic benefits of the research program are distributed across consumers and producers 
both in Mexico and throughout the world. The results of this study are particularly important 
in an era of declining public funds for public agricultural research (Fuglie et al., 1996; USDA 
Cooperative State Research Service, 1993). CIMMYT, a public breeder, has experienced a 
substantial decrease in funding from roughly 12 million (2002) USD in 1990 to 
approximately 6 million USD in 2002 (CIMMYT 2002). Careful measurement of the 
economic rate of return of the investment in wheat breeding research provides crucial 
information to administrators and policy makers, whose decisions on the allocation of 
research funding will determine the future size and scope of publicly funded agricultural 
research. 
This paper extends previous research by Lantican et al. (2005) and Heisey et al. (2002), 
who estimated the cost-benefit analysis of the CIMMYT breeding program. By incorporating 
a more encompassing production function when estimating genetic yield growth, this paper 
extends and updates these earlier works. Estimation of the annual genetic yield growth 
attributed to CIMMYT is the basis for the cost-benefit analysis in both the Lantican et al. 
(2005) and Heisey et al. (2002) studies as well as this paper. This study uses a Just-Pope 
production function coupled with daily climatic data such as temperature, solar radiation, 
various planting methods, and specific species to provide a more precise estimation of the 
annual genetic improvement attributed to CIMMYT. The flexible Just-Pope production 
function is advantageous in this study for its ability to correct for multiplicative 
heteroscedasticity, which is important when using data obtained through varietal trials dealing 
with multiple varieties. This flexible production function is preferred to existing OLS models 
in varietal trials because of the variations in both the species and breeding goals across 
cultivars. Since cultivars are intended to be sown worldwide and are specifically bred for 
different pathogen resistance and agronomic conditions, the error terms across cultivars may 
be heteroscedastic.  
The Just-Pope production function was estimated to obtain the annual genetic gain. Yield 
gains were measured for all semidwarf varieties tested by CIMMYT in their experiment 
station in Mexico’s Yaqui Valley. From the Just-Pope model an increase in yield is estimated 
representing an increase in the supply of wheat produced in Mexico, and this estimate is the 
foundation of the economic impacts of the wheat breeding program. 
The Just-Pope yield growth estimates are then incorporated in an economic model of the 
world wheat market measuring the impact of the CIMMYT wheat breeding program on: (1) 
Mexican wheat producers; (2) Mexican consumers of wheat (flour millers); (3) wheat 
producers outside of Mexico, including significant foreign producers such as the United 
States (USA), European Union (EU), Canada, Argentina and Australia; and (4) all wheat 
consumers outside of Mexico, including major wheat importers such as China and Japan.  
From the economic model of the world wheat market annual benefits to specific groups 
resulting from the increased wheat yields, calculated in the Just-Pope production function, 
were derived. Several measures (cost-benefit, internal rate of return, and net present value) of 
the outcome of the investment in wheat breeding were likewise calculated. The Global Impact of the CIMMYT Wheat Breeding Program  13
FUNDING OF CIMMYT WHEAT BREEDING RESEARCH 
CIMMYT, a non-profit organization, distributes improved germplasm to National 
Agricultural Research Systems (NARS) for worldwide utilization. Through the release of 
modern wheat varieties, CIMMYT has generated substantial increases in grain yields, 
improved grain quality, reduced yield variability, and reduced environmental degradation in 
low-income countries since the Green Revolution. On average, 65–77% of these international 
nurseries samples were sent to developing countries. CIMMYT germplasm is present in 
roughly 24% of all wheat types using the cross rule, 38% using the cross or parent rule, 64% 
using the any ancestor rule, and approximately 80% of the total spring wheat area in 
developing countries (Lantican et al. 2005).
1 Private wheat breeders have little incentive to 
breed in most low-income countries. CIMMYT fills this gap, and as a result, approximately 
62% of the total wheat area in low-income countries is planted to CIMMYT-related varieties 
(Heisey et al. 2002). 
Roughly 33% of CIMMYT’s funding in 2002 was from governments and agencies 
including, United States (23%), The World Bank (23%), Switzerland (10%), the European 
Commission (9%), and the Rockefeller Foundation (8%). Japan, The UK, France, Australia, 
and other foundations made up the remaining 27% of the funding from governments. Nearly 
two thirds of CIMMYT’s funding is obtained from grants and targeted funding from 
institutions like the Gates Foundation. The 2002 CIMMYT annual report disaggregated the 
budget into spending by individual divisions within CIMMYT. Approximately 33% of 
CIMMYT’s budget went to germplasm improvement (breeding), 26% to sustainable 
production, 23% to enhancing national agricultural research systems, 14% to germplasm 
collection, and 4% to policy. While breeding expenditures received the largest share of the 
budget, most of CIMMYT’s budget went to enhancing other goals.  
CIMMYT conducts research in both wheat and maize and with the recent advances in 
maize breeding and the comparatively large increases in yield, money is being shifted from 
the wheat to the maize sector of CIMMYT. While overall funding at CIMMYT has been 
decreasing, wheat has experienced the largest loss. In 1990, the wheat breeding budget at 
CIMMYT was approximately $12 million (2002 USD), compared to just 6 million in 2002, 
and down from a high of $15 million (2002 USD) in 1988 (Lantican et al. 2005). The 
importance of public funding, coupled with the current political climate of decreasing public 
sector support (Acker, 1993), have resulted in a situation where continuation of public 
funding for the wheat-breeding research program is dependent on how well the program is 
serving the public.  
                                                        
1 The term “CIMMYT cross” refers to a cross made at CIMMYT and the selections to obtain fixed lines that 
were either made at CIMMYT or by a non-CIMMYT breeding program. The term “CIMMYT parent” 
refers to a cross made by a non-CIMMYT breeding program using one of the parents coming directly from 
CIMMYT. Lastly, the term “CIMMYT ancestor” means that there is CIMMYT pedigree somewhere in 
the wheat, so CIMMYT wheat is not used directly in the cross, but was used in developing one of the 
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MEASUREMENT OF THE SOCIAL BENEFITS  
OF CIMMYT WHEAT BREEDING 
The methodology used to calculate the economic consequences of the CIMMYT wheat 
breeding program follows a rich literature in the welfare economics of agricultural research 
initiated by Schultz (1953) and further developed by Ayer and Schuh (1972) and Akino and 
Hayami (1975). More recently, the economic evaluation of agricultural research has been 
summarized by Huffman and Evenson (1993) and Alston et al. (1995).  
The first step in evaluating the economic impact of the CIMMYT wheat breeding 
program was to measure the increase in yields from the genetic improvement of wheat, 
holding all other production parameters constant. Gains in wheat yield can be attributed to 
two factors: genetic and agronomic. Agronomic gains are attributed to improvements in 
fertilizer, pesticides, fungicides or other factors that are not embodied within the seed. 
Genetic gains are associated with improved wheat breeding, technology that is embodied 
within the seed. This study will focus on the estimation of genetic gains attributed to 
CIMMYT. This was accomplished by applying the methodology of Traxler et al. (1995) to 
calculate the relative yields for each variety with data from CIMMYT wheat variety 
performance tests in Mexico’s Yaqui Valley experiment station from 1990-2002. A total of 
33 lines were analyzed with release years ranging from 1962-2001, including the variety Siete 
Cerros, the most popular semidwarf wheat of the Green Revolution. Thus, the test period for 
this data set is 1990-2002 but includes lines released prior to 1990. Using relative yield 
performance data from nurseries implicitly assumes that actual producer yields are equivalent 
to test plot yields in CIMMYT experiments. Although the absolute level of producer yields 
may be overstated by experimental yield data, the relative yields between varieties are likely 
to be similar in both experimental and producer fields. Brennan (1984) reported, “The only 
reliable sources of relative yields are variety trials” (p. 182). 
The present study follows previous evaluations of wheat breeding programs conducted by 
Traxler et al. (1995) who analyzed ten wheat lines released in Mexico from 1950-1985. Their 
goal was to analyze if CIMMYT released lines had progressively increased yield, improved 
yield stability, or both over time. Traxler et al. implemented a Just and Pope (1979) 
production function that estimates both output and output variance. The Just and Pope 
production function was chosen due to its ability to account for multiplicative 
heteroscedasticity. The multiplicative heteroscedastic correction is of importance to this data 
set because of the variations in both the species (durum, bread wheat, and triticale) and 
breeding goals across CIMMYT wheat varieties.
2 That is, since CIMMYT varieties are 
intended to be sown worldwide and are specifically bred for different climatic, physical, and 
agronomic conditions, the error terms across varieties may be heteroscedastic in nature. By 
accounting for this multiplicative heteroscedastic error term, comparisons across varieties are 
more statistically appropriate. 
The Just and Pope production function can be described as such: 
 
                                                        
2 The goals for breeding a specific wheat variety vary and can target a specific certain climatic conditions 
(drought tolerance, heat stress, etc.) or target a specific physical attribute (increased biomass, increased 
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is yield of the ith variety , the i X
are explanatory variables (weather, species, 
planting methods, year variety i was released, etc.) , β and α are parameter vectors, and i ε  is a 
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the explanatory variables to the variance in output. The Just and Pope production function is a 
multiplicative heteroscedasticity model, which is estimated using a three-stage procedure. If 
variance is an exponential function of K explanatory variables, the general model with 
heteroscedastic errors can be written as:  
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i σ is unknown, but using the least squared residuals from equation (2) the marginal 
effects of the explanatory variables on the variance of production can be estimated such that:  
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The predicted values from equation (5) are used as weights for generating generalized 
least squares (GLS) estimators for the mean output equation (2). That is, the estimates from 
equation (5) can be viewed as the effects of the independent variables on yield variability. 
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(2). The results from the re-estimation of equation (2) with the weights from equation (5), 
give the effects of the independent variables on yield.  
In the Just and Pope production function the yield mean is specified as a function of the 
release year of each variety tested, which can be interpreted as the “vintage” of the wheat 
breeding technology (Traxler et al. 1995). The year each variety was released to the public 
captures the progression of wheat breeding technology across time forming the main variable 
for measurement and analysis of the impact of the CIMMYT wheat breeding program on 
wheat yields in performance fields. As such, the coefficient on release year represents the 
average increase in yield due to genetic gains attributable to the CIMMYT wheat breeding 
program.  
Release year is not a time trend variable but is modeled similar to the way that Arrow’s 
(1962) growth model denoted embodied technology (Traxler et al. 1995). Arrow (1962) 
assigned “serial numbers” of ordinal magnitude to the embodied technology in capital. In the 
Just and Pope model the variable release year, represents the embodied technology for a given 
year of release by the CIMMYT breeding program. Therefore, the coefficient on release year 
possesses both a cardinal and ordinal significance in defining the spacing as well as the 
sequencing of releases (Traxler et al. 1995). The estimated equations for yield (Yi) in kg/ha 
and the log variance of yield ( )
2
i e  using the Just and Pope production function are modeled in 
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Here mean and variance of yield were modeled as a function of their planting method: 
melgas with fungicide (MelgasPlus), beds with fungicide (BedsPlus), beds without fungicide 
(BedsMinus), and melgas with fungicide and nets (Nets). MelgasPlus was chosen as the 
default because it is the traditional planting method in the Yaqui Valley. Yield mean and 
variance were also modeled as a function of the species of wheat; bread (Bread), durum 
(Durum), and triticale (Triticale). The species were represented by binary variables with 
Bread used as the default.  
Yield was modeled as a function of specific climatic variables because Fischer (1985) 
found that both solar radiation (Solar) and temperature (Temp) are important in determining 
the number of kernels per square meter. The theory is that just before and after anthesis is a 
sensitive period in wheat production, and both radiation and temperature have an effect on 
kernels per square meter and thus yield. High radiation results in increased photosynthesis, 
which is advantageous for yield. A high temperature has negative impacts on yield, as it 
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A heat stress (Stress) variable was used to indicate the number of days in the growing 
season (January – April) when the temperature was at or exceeded 36o C (96.8 o F). This heat 
stress variable is included because in the maturation months of March and April, if the 
temperature is too hot, the wheat kernel can scorch, negatively impacting yield. Lastly, the 
interaction variable (HeatTemp) was created by multiplying (Stress) by the average 
temperature during the same growing season (January – April). This was included to capture 
the potential of a growing season where temperature is well below average, implying that heat 
stress may adversely affect yield more under these conditions than a growing season with an 
average temperature well above average. The interaction between RLYR and the weather 
attributes was included because a priori it can be assumed that the various types of varietal 
improvements, and thus lines, may have been targeted towards certain weather conditions 
(drought tolerance, heat stress, etc.).
3 The interaction between certain weather characteristics 
and RLYR can be seen as slope shifters. 
The Just and Pope regression results come from Nalley et al. (2007) who used the same 
data set to determine the annual genetic improvements attributed to CIMMYT. The shift in 
wheat production (Jt), which is equivalent to the coefficient on release year in the Just and 
Pope model, is the foundation for the analysis of the economic impacts of wheat breeding 
research.  
An important aspect of a breeding program is its cumulative benefits over a specific 
period. That is, the genetic enhancement received in time period t are those observed in t plus 
those seen in t-1 as well. Therefore in this data set, the additional genetic benefits for 2002 
(J2002) would be the genetic gain from 2001 to 2002 plus the genetic gain from 1990 to 
2001. Thus the shift in wheat production in 2002 would be a cumulative shift from 1990 to 
2002.  
Previous work by Echeverria et al. (1989) also used experimental yields to measure 
research-induced industry supply curve shifts for rice in Uruguay. Alston et al. (1995) 
demonstrated how to convert an annual shift in the quantity of wheat produced (Jt) into a 
percentage shift in cost savings (Kt): the formula is Kt = Jt/ε, where ε is the elasticity of 
supply of wheat (page 339). 
A global analysis for total acres planted to CIMMYT varieties is possible since 
CIMMYT publishes rough estimates on regional acres planted to CIMMYT varieties. A 
precise measure of the benefits of the CIMMYT breeding program would include all global 
acres planted to CIMMYT lines. CIMMYT’s regional acreage groupings (North Africa, West 
Asia, etc.) tend to be rough estimates for areas and in most instances are not disaggregated on 
a country level, making a precise international trade model difficult to implement. Because of 
this, the current study will only analyze the effects of CIMMYT varieties planted in the Yaqui 
Valley of Mexico rather than global acres planted to CIMMYT varieties. The reason for this 
is the precision of the data collected within the Yaqui Valley (varieties planted, hectares 
planted, hectares harvested, hectares planted to CIMMYT varieties, yield, etc.) and the 
unreliability of the data from outside the Valley.  
Since CIMMYT has their principal experiment station in the Yaqui Valley, it has a 
longstanding working relationship with the local farmers who are willing to exchange 
                                                        
3 An example of this would be if a specific breeding period focused on one attribute more than others. 
Breeding for heat stress may have been a more pronounced goal of the breeding program in the last ten 
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information regarding their yields, varieties planted, etc. for modern varieties of wheat bred 
by CIMMYT. CIMMYT varieties are planted outside of the Yaqui Valley in Mexico as well. 
However the data for other regions of Mexico is much less reliable. Therefore, this study only 
includes CIMMYT varieties planted in the Yaqui Valley and excludes non-CIMMYT 
varieties planted within the Yaqui Valley as well as CIMMYT varieties in other regions of 
Mexico. In that sense, this study provides very a conservative estimate of the effects of the 
CIMMYT breeding program on Mexican farmers and consumers because of the exclusion of 
CIMMYT varieties planted in other regions of Mexico.  
Since the Yaqui Valley only accounts for approximately 15-20% of the wheat produced 
in Mexico with approximately 65-80% of these wheat varieties being of CIMMYT 
germplasm, the effects of the CIMMYT breeding program on increasing Mexican yield (Jt) 
need to be adjusted (CIMMYT, 2007). Equation (9) is calculated to accurately account for the 
effects of the CIMMYT breeding program on the Mexican supply curve. The new (Jt') is 
equal to  
 
(9)  Jt' = Jt * Θt* ψt 
 
where (Jt) is the shift in wheat production associated with the use of CIMMYT varieties in 
percent increase in yield annually.
4 The variable Θt is the percentage of Mexico’s wheat 
production that takes place in the Yaqui Valley, and ψt is the percentage of the wheat in the 
Yaqui Valley that is planted to CIMMYT varieties. The modified Jt' represents the Mexican 
shift in wheat supply based solely on increased yields in the Yaqui Valley attributed to 
CIMMYT’s breeding program. From here forward when the model refers to Mexican 
producers, losses will be experienced by all producers in Mexico, gains however will only be 
experienced by those farmers who adopted CIMMYT varieties within the Yaqui Valley. That 
is, the supply curve represents all of Mexico but positive changes in producer surplus will 
only be experienced by Mexican producers in the Yaqui Valley who use CIMMYT varieties. 
Consumer gains/losses will be attributed to all consumers in Mexico.  
AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF THE IMPACTS OF  
CIMMYT WHEAT-BREEDING RESEARCH 
Edwards and Freebairn (1984) pioneered an economic model to measure the impact of 
productivity gains from research into a tradable commodity such as wheat. The model was 
applied to Australian wool research by Alston and Mullen (1992). This simple two-country 
model of supply and demand is adopted here to estimate the impact of the research-induced 
supply shift on producer and consumer surpluses in (A) Mexico, and (B) the rest of the world 
(ROW, defined as all areas outside of Mexico). Alston et al. (1995) reported explicit formulas 
for the calculation of changes in economic surplus to producers and consumers in two 
countries, and their model is modified below to the case of CIMMYT wheat research. The 
supply (Qsi) and demand (Qdi) curves of wheat are assumed to be linear functions of the 
world price of wheat (P), as modeled in equations (10) through (14). The subscript i = M 
                                                        
4 The Nalley et al. (2007) Just and Pope production results indicated that CIMMYT contributed 
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denotes Mexico and i = R for the ROW. (denoted by subscript R) are assumed to be linear 
functions of the world price of wheat (P), as modeled in equations (10) through (14), where k 
is the percentage downward shift in supply (k = KP, where K is the percent shift in cost 
savings, Jt/ε, where ε is the elasticity of supply of wheat). The downward shift in the supply 
curve is calculated using the release year estimate from the Just and Pope production 
function, equation (7) from above. The release year coefficient from the Just and Pope model 
represents the annual genetic gain attributable to the CIMMYT breeding program and thus 
can be viewed as a shift in the supply curve. Time subscripts have been omitted for notational 
simplicity. 
 
(10) QsM  =  αM + βM(P + k) 
 
(11) QdM  =  γM+ δMP 
 
(12) QsR  =  αR + βRP 
 
(13) QdR  =  γR + δRP 
(14)  QsM + QsR = QdM + QdR (market-clearing). 
 
Thus, based upon the above system, we compare the actual state of Mexican and ROW 
wheat supplies given the existence of CIMMYT germplasm (k > 0) with the counterfactual 
case in which CIMMYT varieties would be absent (k = 0). To simplify, we assume no 
transportation costs, resulting in a constant price in both regions, and a system of five 
equations (10 through 14) to solve for five unknowns: P, QsM, QsR, QdM, and QdR. The 
solution to this system of equations results in the changes in price and quantities of wheat 
produced and consumed as a result of the supply shift, as in equations (15) and (16): 
 
(15)  ΔP = -kβM/(βM + βR - δM - δR) < 0 
 
(16)  ΔQsM = βM(ΔP + k); ΔQdM = δMΔP; ΔQsR = βRΔP; ΔQdR = δRΔP. 
 
The welfare changes for producers and consumers in Mexico and ROW are given in 
equations (17) through (21), where PS is producer surplus, CS is consumer surplus, and TS is 
total surplus: 
 
(17)   ΔPSM = (k +ΔP)(QsM + 0.5ΔQsM) 
 
(18)   ΔCSM = -ΔP(QdM + 0.5ΔQdM) 
 
(19)   ΔPSR = ΔP(QsR + 0.5ΔQsR) 
 
(20)  ΔCSR = -ΔP(QdR + 0.5ΔQdr) 
 
(21)  ΔTS = ΔPSM + ΔCSM + ΔPSR + ΔCSR  
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To solve this model, price and quantity data, together with elasticity estimates of supply 
and demand and a measure of research-induced productivity change (k), are necessary. Using 
supply and demand estimates from the 2020 IMPACT model (Rosegrant et al., 1995) a 
supply elasticity of wheat in Mexico (εM) of 0.17 was used along with a demand elasticity 
(ηM) of -0.54. Using individual country estimates from the 2020 IMPACT report a weighted 
(by production and consumption, respectively) global supply and demand estimate for wheat 
could be calculated (εR =0.13 and ηR = -0.53). Further, given the importance of the 
magnitude of the wheat supply elasticity in the model, sensitivity analyses were conducted for 
elasticity estimates ranging from ε = 0.075 to ε = 1.0. The price of wheat (P) is the season 
average price received by farmers (USDA Agricultural Outlook), deflated by the PCE (US 
Department of Commerce). The quantity of wheat supplied in Mexico (QsM) was taken from 
FAOSTAT (2007a), and the Mexican quantity demanded (QdM) is the number of metric tons 
for food, feed, and seed (FAOSTAT 2007b). Wheat production in ROW (QsR) was found by 
subtracting Mexican production from the world wheat production reported by FAOSTAT 
(FAOSTATa,b 2007). The market-clearing equation (14) was then used to calculate ROW 
demand (QdR). 
MODEL RESULTS: RESEARCH-INDUCED 
CHANGES IN ECONOMIC SURPLUS 
The results of the model appear in table 1: Mexican wheat producers gained an average 
of $1.88 million (2002USD) per year from 1990 to 2002 by growing wheat varieties 
developed and released by CIMMYT. Not all producers benefited: only those producers who 
adopted the high-yielding varieties from CIMMYT earned these higher levels of economic 
surplus. Consumers of wheat in Mexico on average benefited by $0.004 million per year 
thorough the breeding efforts at CIMMYT from 1990 to 2002. This relatively small benefit 
resulted from the relatively small research-induced shift in the world supply of wheat: Mexico 
produced only approximately 0.64% of the world's wheat over this time period (FAO 2007a). 
An even smaller portion, 0.10%, of the world’s wheat is of CIMMYT germplasm and grown 
in the Yaqui Valley. This fact allows for large gains for producers who adopted CIMMYT 
varieties in the Yaqui Valley, with only a negligible decrease in the world price of wheat due 
to CIMMYT varieties being developed. 
Yaqui Valley only accounts for 0.38% of the total global CIMMYT breeding cost.  
Wheat producers who resided outside of the Yaqui Valley were made worse off by the 
decrease in the price of wheat, with an average annual loss of $0.478 million (2002 USD, 
table 1). Non-Mexican consumers benefited from the research-induced shift in the supply of 
wheat by an annual average of $0.477 million (2002 USD). The ROW producer losses were 
approximately equal to the ROW consumer gains. This outcome, together with the relatively 
large gains to Mexican wheat producers and small Mexican consumer gains, resulted in an 
annual average change in total economic surplus (ΔTS) of $1.88 million (table 1). These 
annual benefits were large relative to the annual average costs of the research program of 
approximately $10.1 million when accounting for the ratio of acres of wheat planted to 
CIMMYT varieties in the Yaqui Valley to the global CIMMYT acres planted. Since 
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CIMMYT acres in the Yaqui to global acres planted to CIMMYT crosses is calculated. From 
1990 through 2002 there was an average of 56.56 million acres planted to CIMMYT crosses 
worldwide compared to an average of just 0.216 million acres of CIMMYT germplasm 
planted in the Yaqui Valley (Lantican et al. 2005). Thus if it is assumed that the breeding 
costs are constant globally then the Yaqui Valley only accounts for 0.38% of the total global 
CIMMYT breeding costs.  
 
Table 1. Changes in Economic Surplus from the CIMMYT Wheat Breeding Program, 









a ΔPSm ΔCSm ΔPSr ΔCSr ΔTS
1990 290098 220.05 0.90 3,525,331 8,100 -894,055 893,381 3,532,757
1991 199171 138.16 0.35 1,404,043 3,632 -355,866 355,393 1,407,202
1992 214967 152.32 0.45 1,609,335 3,535 -408,690 407,816 1,611,996
1993 214825 153.23 0.47 1,945,337 4,471 -493,670 492,852 1,948,990
1994 188071 138.51 0.32 1,334,782 3,371 -338,561 337,877 1,337,468
1995 191693 157.36 0.41 1,421,093 3,371 -360,897 360,007 1,423,416
1996 156347 236.77 0.61 2,060,935 4,728 -523,652 521,965 2,063,976
1997 198826 205.46 0.68 2,467,597 5,160 -626,920 625,524 2,471,361
1998 207845 156.64 0.57 1,848,034 4,245 -469,719 468,054 1,850,613
1999 217679 128.07 0.58 1,751,108 4,181 -445,229 443,351 1,753,411
2000 301399 113.46 0.59 2,074,135 5,105 -527048 525,098 2,077,289
2001 190861 118.36 0.41 1,329,925 3,336 -337,998 336,549 1,331,812
2002 211722 128.60 0.53 1,723,423 4,413 -437,994 436,072 1,725,913
Mean 214116 157.46 0.53 1,884,237 4,434 -478,484 477,226 1,887,400
Mexico ROW
 
akt = KtPt, where Kt = Jt'/ε and Pt is the wheat price. 
 
The final step in the evaluation of the impacts of the CIMMYT wheat breeding program 
was to calculate the rate of return to the public investment in the genetic improvement of 
wheat varieties. Proper measurement of the rate of return requires consideration of the timing 
of varietal development and the discounting procedure. Input from CIMMYT agronomists led 
to the assumption that 10 years are required to develop a variety from the initial variety cross 
to the release date (Ammar 2006).
5 Because of the nature of the data set, the economic 
benefits of CIMMYT semi-dwarf varieties began in 1990. To capture the lag between initially 
crossing a variety and releasing it, costs from the period of 1981 to 2002 were included in the 








                                                        
5 Interviewed CIMMYT breeders stated that on average there is a 5-year breeding and testing period at 
CIMMYT followed by a 3 to 4 year testing period at experiment stations within Mexico, such as the Yaqui 
Valley station. The last step is a 2 year seed production stage before its release.  Lawton Lanier Nalley, Andrew P. Barkley, John M. Crespi et al.  22















1981 13,400,000 49,911 0
1982 14,200,000 62,791 0
1983 14,500,000 51,482 0
1984 14,900,000 45,978 0
1985 14,600,000 54,333 0
1986 14,400,000 67,186 0
1987 13,700,000 42,377 0
1988 15,000,000 59,226 0
1989 13,300,000 60,690 0
1990 13,100,000 62,264 3,532,757
1991 13,200,000 43,451 1,407,202
1992 13,500,000 48,385 1,611,996
1993 13,300,000 48,060 1,948,990
1994 10,900,000 34,791 1,337,468
1995 9,500,000 31,186 1,423,416
1996 9,900,000 26,749 2,063,976
1997 9,600,000 35,433 2,471,361
1998 9,600,000 37,407 1,850,613
1999 10,100,000 41,629 1,753,411
2000 7,000,000 40,352 2,077,289
2001 7,000,000 25,814 1,331,812
2002 6,000,000 23,053 1,725,913
2003 0 0 1,573,027
2004 0 0 1,398,246
2005 0 0 1,223,465
2006 0 0 1,048,685
2007 0 0 873,904
2008 0 0 699,123
2009 0 0 524,342
2010 0 0 349,562
2011 0 0 174,781  
aCosts for the period 1981-2002 are the deflated annual program costs of the CIMMYT breeding 
program.  
bSince CIMMYT only releases global breeding costs a ratio was used to determine the portion of 
the global cost associated with the Yaqui Valley. Costs attributed to the Yaqui are calculated 






 where global CIMMYT acres are the number 
of acres in a respective year planted to CIMMYT crosses globally.  
cBenefits for the period 1990-2002 are the deflated total economic surplus derived from the 
CIMMYT wheat breeding program ( in table 1). Program benefits after 2002 are the 5-year 
average benefit level from 1998 to 2002 ($1.75 million) assumed to decrease at 10 % per 
year, until all benefits are depleted in year 2012 
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CIMMYT breeds for 12 specific “mega-environments” throughout the world, but does 
not disaggregate their breeding budget between environments.
6 Mega-environment 1, of 
which the Yaqui Valley is a part, is the largest, with 18.2% of the world’s wheat production 
occurring in this mega-environment (Lantican et al. 2005). Since CIMMYT does not 
disaggregate breeding costs into specific mega-environments, the following calculations 
attribute all breeding costs to mega-environment 1. The resulting benefit- cost ratios will be 
conservative since the costs have been overstated. 
The economic benefits (ΔTS) reported in table 1 were used for the period 1990 to 2002. 
After 2002, the 5-year average benefit level from 1998 to 2002 ($1.75 million) was assumed 
to decrease at 10% per year, until all research program benefits are depleted in year 2011. 
Cost and benefit data are reported in table. 





















where Bt is the total economic surplus in year t (ΔTS from table 1), Ct represents annual 
program costs just in the Yaqui valley, and r is the assumed rate of discount. The BCR for 
CIMMYT wheat varieties, assuming a 10% rate of discount, equals 14.97 (table 4): for each 
dollar of public funds invested in wheat breeding research, nearly 15 dollars of benefits result, 
with over 99% (1.88/1.89) of the benefit received by Mexican wheat producers in the Yaqui 
valley who used CIMMYT varieties. 
The Net Present Value (NPV) of the program may also be estimated using equation (23): 
 
(23)   NPV = Σt[(Bt -Ct)/(1+r)t]. 
 
The NPV of the program for the period 1981 to 2011, with an assumed discount rate of 
10% equals $6.12 million 2002 USD (table 4). 
A third measure of economic performance is the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), computed 
as the discount rate that results in a value of zero for the NPV as in equation (24):  
 
(24)   0 = Σt[(Bt -Ct)/(1+IRR)t]. 
 
The IRR for the wheat breeding program equaled 51.4% (table 4). The BCR, NPV, and 
IRR provide evidence that the economic rate of return to CIMMYT wheat breeding is high, 
although assessing these measures further is difficult without comparable values for other 
public investments (the opportunity cost of funds). 
                                                        
6 Mega-environment 1 is classified as low latitude (35
o N-35
oS), irrigated land, temperate climate, with the 
major constraints being rust and lodging. It consists of 35% of the wheat production in South and East 
Asia, 33% in West Asia and North Africa, 28% in South and East Asia, and 7% in Latin America. It 
accounts for 42.9% of the worlds total durum wheat acres and 16.5% of its total bread wheat acres 
(Lantican et al. 2005)  Lawton Lanier Nalley, Andrew P. Barkley, John M. Crespi et al.  24
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The results of the two-region wheat model reported here are contingent upon numerous 
assumptions.
7 To determine how robust the model results are to changes in elasticity 
parameters, a sensitivity analysis was conducted by altering the assumed values of the four 
elasticities: εM, εR, ηM, ηR. Table 3 reports the model results for a range of elasticity values 
for the average annual changes in producer, consumer, and total economic surpluses for the 
period 1990 to 2002. The model was estimated for both relatively inelastic supply (ε= 0.1) 
and relatively elastic supply (ε= 0.5) for both Mexico and the ROW. 
 
Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis of Elasticity Assumptions in World Wheat Model, 1990 to 
2002 
 
Mexico ROW  Mexico  ROW   
εM  ηM  εR  ηR  ΔPSm  ΔCSm  ΔPSR  ΔCSR  ΔTS 
0.17 -0.54 0.12 -0.53 1,884,237 4,434  -478,484  477,226  1,887,400 
0.1
a -0.54 0.12 -0.53 3,205,414 4,437  -478,815  477,555  3,208,580 
0.5
a -0.54 0.12 -0.53  638,564  4,420  -476,933  475,678  641,717 
0.17 -0.1
a 0.12 -0.53 1,884,217 4,462  -481,403  480,137  1,887,400 
0.17 -1.0
a 0.12 -0.53 1,884,257 4,406  -475,471  474,221  1,887,400 
0.17 -0.54 0.1
a -0.53 1,884,090 4,640  -500,688  499,371  1,887,400 
0.17 -0.54 0.5
a -0.53 1,885,361 2,857  -308,306  307,495  1,887,400 
0.17 -0.54 0.12 -0.1
a 1,877,992  13,189  -1,423,413  1,419,670 1,887,402 
0.17 -0.54 0.12 -1.0
a 1,885,510 2,648  -285,771  285,019  1,887,400 
a Elasticity values designated with a superscript 'a' differ from the baseline elasticities in the first 
row 
 
Changes in the value of the Mexican supply elasticity (εM) resulted in large changes in 
Mexican producer surplus from higher-yielding wheat varieties: an inelastic Mexican wheat 
supply (εM = 0.1) resulted in an increase in the annual average producer surplus from $1.884 
to $3.205 million (2002 USD). Conversely, when the elasticity of Mexican wheat supply was 
relatively elastic (εM = 0.5), the average annual change in producer surplus decreased from 
                                                        
7 Selection of the correct functional form of supply and demand curves in welfare analyses has received a 
great deal of attention by previous researchers. Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) summarized this 
extensive discussion: "It turns out, empirically, that measures of total research benefits and their 
distribution between producers and consumers are quite insensitive to choices of functional form" (page 
63). After summarizing the extensive debate over functional form and the nature of the supply shift 
(parallel vs. pivotal), Alston, Norton, and Pardey concluded, "Our preference -- in the absence of the 
information required to choose a particular type of shift -- is to follow Rose's (1980) suggestion and 
employ a parallel shift… Under this assumption, the functional forms of supply or demand are 
unimportant" (page 64). Following this line of reasoning, this study assumes a parallel supply shift and 
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$1.884 to $0.638 million. These large changes in producer surplus arose because only 0.1% of 
world wheat production occurred in Mexico’s Yaqui Valley. If Mexican wheat supply is 
inelastic, an increase in Mexican wheat production results in large cost savings for Mexican 
wheat producers, accompanied by a relatively small decrease in the world price of wheat, 
because the Yaqui Valley is such a small part of the world wheat market. Likewise, if 
Mexican wheat supply is relatively elastic, then supply increases resulting from enhanced 
wheat varieties require larger price decreases for the market to clear, causing lower levels of 
surplus for Mexican wheat producers. 
Changes in the value of the ROW supply elasticity only marginally alter Mexican 
producer surplus. Mexican consumers, ROW producers, and ROW consumers are affected: a 
larger elasticity of wheat supply outside of Mexico results in smaller losses for ROW 
producers and smaller gains for consumers in both Mexico and the ROW. 
Demand elasticities also were altered over a broad range of values, from relatively 
inelastic  (η = −0.1) to unitary elastic (η = −1.0).  Because Mexican wheat consumers 
represent only 0.93% of the world wheat market, the elasticity of Mexican wheat demand 
(ηΜ) ηad an insignificant impact on the model results (table 3). However, the elasticity of 
demand in the ROW (ηR) did affect ROW producers and all wheat consumers. A relatively 
elastic ROW demand decreased consumer surplus gains in both Mexico and the ROW but 
also decreased losses to ROW producers from technological change in Mexico. When world 
demand is elastic, a supply shift causes a large increase in the quantity of wheat, accompanied 
by a small decrease in price. 
The changes in annual averages of total economic surplus (ΔΤΣ) in table 3 reveal that the 
model results were affected most strongly by Mexico’s supply elasticity (εM). Total 
economic surplus was not affected by changes in the other supply and demand elasticity 
values. As a result, further calculations were made of the rate of return to the Mexican wheat 
breeding program under a range of Mexican supply elasticities (εM) and discount rate (r) 
values (table 4). 
The BCRs reported in table 4 demonstrate a range of results under differing assumptions 
for Mexico’s supply elasticity (εM) and discount rate (r). The baseline BCR is 14.97 (r = 
0.10,  εM = 0.17). Smaller supply elasticities and lower discount rates increase the total 
benefits to society resulting from higher-yielding CIMMYT wheat varieties. When varying 
the discount rate from 0.05 to 0.20 and maintaining the baseline supply elasticity the BCR 
was 21.95 and 7.22, respectively. Similarly, the NPV is centered around 6.122 million 2002 
USD (r = 0.10, εM = 0.17) but ranges from $0.532 (r = 0.20, εM = 0.4) to $30.690 (r = 0.05, 
εM = 0.075) million (2002 USD). The IRR ranged from 0.369 (εM = 0.4) to 0.667 (εM = 
0.075), indicating high social returns to investments in wheat breeding research in CIMMYT. 
The results of the sensitivity analysis reported in table 3 are wide-ranging, because the 
parameter values for the supply elasticities and the discount rate were selected purposefully to 
cover a broad range of possible values. The baseline parameter values represent the most 
likely scenario. The major conclusion from the model that the economic returns to the 
CIMMYT wheat-breeding program are high, with a baseline result on the order of $15 in 
additional surplus generated for every $1 of program cost. That the benefits exceed the cost is 
verified across the entire range of elasticity and discount parameters selected in our analysis 
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Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis of the Rate of Return  




   Discount Rate 
Elasticity of Mexican 
Wheat Supply (εM) 0.05  0.10  0.15  0.20 
0.075  49.75 33.95 23.43  16.37 
0.1  37.31 25.46 17.57  12.28 
0.17 21.95  14.97
b 10.34 7.22 
0.2 18.66  12.73  8.79  6.14 
0.4 9.33  6.37  4.39  3.07 
NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) in 2002 USD
 c 
   Discount Rate 
Elasticity of Mexican 
Wheat Supply (εM) 0.05  0.10  0.15  0.20 
0.075 30,690,507  14,433,194  7,332,595  3,953,569 
0.1 22,860,499  10,715,394  5,417,707  2,900,877 
0.17 13,188,136  6,122,818
b 3,052,258  1,600,492 
0.2 11,115,486  5,138,694  2,545,376  1,321,838 
0.4 5,242,980  2,350,344  1,109,211  532,319 
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN (IRR)
 d 







aThe calculation for the Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) is from equation 22. 
bThe values designated by the superscript “b” are the baseline model values. 
cThe calculation for the Net Present Value (NPV) is from equation 23.
  
dThe calculation for the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is from equation 24. 
 
(tables 4 and 5). Although the rate of return varied with the selected elasticity of supply 
and the discount rate, in all cases the benefits exceeded the costs–with a low estimate of an 
order of 3:1 and a high estimate on the order of 50:1. 
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CONCLUSION 
Results of the two-region economic model of the CIMMYT research-induced wheat 
supply increase in Mexico provide empirical evidence that the wheat producers who adopt the 
modern CIMMYT varieties are the major beneficiaries of the technological advance. Mexican 
consumers are made better off, but by only a small fraction of the value of wheat purchased. 
A transfer of economic surplus from non-Mexican producers to ROW consumers of 
approximately $0.478 million (2002 USD) occurs annually because of the decrease in the 
world price of wheat induced by the enhanced yields of CIMMYT wheat varieties in 
Mexico’s Yaqui Valley.  
CIMMYT, a nonprofit organization, competes with other nonprofits for limited public 
funds. Given relatively large increases in CIMMYT maize yields, CIMMYT cut its wheat 
breeding program budget during the period 1990-2002. Continued public funding for wheat 
breeding research depends on how well the program is serving the public. A solid measure of 
the effectiveness of a breeding program is a benefit-cost analysis. This research found that 
during the period 1990-2002, CIMMYT generated a benefit-cost ratio of 15:1, implying that 
for each dollar of public funds invested that 15 dollars of benefits resulted. This corresponds 
to an internal rate of return of some 51% over the entire period.  
One implication for wheat breeders is that any decrease in the long development time (10 
years) of a variety would result in large economic benefits to society. An example of this is 
greenhouse breeding, which allows for two generations of winter wheat to be grown in one 
year. A major implication of this research is that more resources could be allocated 
advantageously to the wheat breeding program at CIMMYT. While resources committed to 
the CIMMYT wheat breeding program have declined in real terms in recent years, the 
information presented here provides compelling evidence that there are large returns to the 
wheat improvement research conducted at CIMMYT.  
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ABSTRACT 
Korea, a large net-food importing country, is rapidly opening its doors to agricultural 
imports. In this study, we investigate the nature and extent of competition between two 
major exporters, China and the United States, in the Korean food market. We first 
employ the un-centered correlation distance approach to investigate the similarities in the 
export structures of major exporters to the Korean market. Results show that the similar 
export structures of China and the United States have made the latter vulnerable to 
competition. Secondly, the concept of competitive threat is used to determine which 
country faces a possible decline in food exports to Korea. Here, we show that China 
poses a threat to the United States in virtually every agricultural product exported to 
Korea. It appears that economic integration, especially that of China into world markets, 
has magnified agricultural trade gains from geographical and cultural proximity. 
 
Key words: Agricultural trade, Korea, Trade competition 
JEL codes: F14, Q17 
INTRODUCTION 
Korea is a large importer of agricultural goods in the global economy and a significant 
market to numerous agricultural exporters. The Korean market for foreign agricultural goods 
is considered to be a growing opportunity, with the current trend towards globalization. Until 
the early 1990s, the United States was the largest exporter of agricultural goods to Korea. In 
1989 alone, U.S agricultural products accounted for about 60 percent of the Korean food 
imports. However, the emergence of China’s economy in the last two decades has 
significantly altered the Korean-US food trade as well as Korea’s trade with other major food 
exporters. Although Korea imported agricultural products from China prior to 1990, the 
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limited volume and infrequent trade did not have much impact on the Korean food market. 
Following the Amity Treaty of 1992, China’s agricultural products began to have a significant 
impact on the Korean food market. In addition, the obligations under the Uruguay Round and 
China’s accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO) have accelerated the inflow of 
the latter’s agricultural products into the Korean food market. Other than the obvious price 
advantage over other exporters, China possesses similar agricultural varieties and breeds that 
easily fulfill the needs of the Korean consumer, and also is geographically adjacent to the 
Korean peninsula, saving transport costs on bulky food products. The recent increase in 
China’s food exports to Korea has been a serious concern to major agricultural exporters, 
especially the United States (Elwell, Labonte, and Morrison 2007; Im 2002).  
The objective of this article to investigate the nature and extent of competition between 
China and the United States in the Korean food market. Previous literature has focused on the 
competitive threat of China in the low-end manufacturing sector, and more recently in the 
cutting-edge technology sector (Castro, Olarreaga, and Saslavsky 2006; Lall and Albaladejo 
2004 and 2002; Chae and Han 2002; Carolan, Singh, and Talati 1998). However, few studies 
directly address China’s role on global food markets, where Korea is a major importer. In 
particular, we examine China’s impact on the Korean food market, which will help 
understand the changing relationship between Korea and its trade partners, especially the 
United States (Moreira 2007; Wall 2006; Li 2002). In the empirical trade-literature context, 
this study will identify the nature of trade substitution among major trading partners, with 
insights on factors contributing to competitiveness.  
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN THE KOREAN FOOD MARKET 
Table 1a and 1b show Korean imports, in current and constant (2005) dollar, of 
agricultural products which are under the coverage of the WTO’s Agricultural negotiations. 
Throughout the study, these 33 items selected under the two-digit HS code will be our 
analytical categories. Moreover, our analysis is based on market shares using current dollar 
imports since deflating appears not to affect trends and results.
1 Several agricultural items 
previously included in non-agricultural categories were discerned and used in our analysis. 
2Although we have data on these products at the four-digit HS code, we have presented data 
on two-digit HS products due to space limitations.  
As can be seen from table 1, Korean agricultural imports are increasing over the past 15 
years with the exception of cotton (HS52). The general downward trend between 1994 and 
2001 reflects the effects of the financial crisis in the East Asian region during the late 1990s. 
Cereal (HS10) is the largest imported item in the Korean food market, followed by Meat and 
Edible Offal (HS02) in the distant second. Organic chemicals (HS29), i.e., acyclic alcohols 
and their derivatives, and Oilseeds (HS12) are respectively the third and fourth largest import 
                                                        
1 For instance, acyclic alcohols and their derivatives, which fall under the four-digit code HS2905, was previously 
listed as non-agricultural product. In our study, HS20905 is the sole representative of the organic chemicals 
category (HS29), i.e., the value for category HS29 is, in fact, the value for HS2905. 
2 For instance, acyclic alcohols and their derivatives, which fall under the four-digit code HS2905, was previously 
listed as non-agricultural product.  In our study, HS20905 is the sole representative of the organic chemicals 
category (HS29), i.e., the value for category HS29 is, in fact, the value for HS2905 Competition Between China and the United States in the Korean Food Market 
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items in terms of value during 2002-2005. The growth of total (real) imports in table 1b 
points to the increasing demand for foreign foods in the domestic Korean market. 
 
Table 1a. Korean Agricultural Import Values (in millions of US Dollars) 
 
HS Code  1990-1993  1994-1997  1998-2001 
2002-
2005 
01－ Live animals  77.90 143.28 103.83    153.09 
02－ Meat and edible meat offal  2,050.44 3,198.49 4,221.43    5,694.75 
04－ Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; 
edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere 
specified or included 
185.79 559.52 683.56    900.58 
05－ Products of animal origin, not elsewhere 
specified or included 
627.97 606.73 466.68    429.17 
06－ Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and 
the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage 
97.30 169.49 162.21    191.07 
07－ Edible vegetables and certain roots and 
tubers 
416.24 562.04 655.68    991.20 
08－ Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or 
melons 
603.25 558.73 876.55    1,603.61 
09－ Coffee, tea, maté and spices  407.94 770.18 731.31    577.21 
10－ Cereal  5,978.23 6,920.46 7,378.61    7,943.33 
11－ Products of the milling industry; malt; 
starches; inulin; wheat gluten 
131.29 234.92 290.55    419.70 
12－ Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; 
miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or 
medicinal plants; straw and fodder 
1,937.04 2,722.84 3,003.09    3,296.61 
13－ Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps 
and extracts 
179.94 200.24 231.32    320.31 
14－ Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable 
products not elsewhere specified or included 
37.19 58.03  67.21    58.41 
15－ Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their 
cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or 
vegetable waxes 
952.88 1,469.56  1,510.33    1,981.30 
16－ Preparations of meat, of fish or of 
crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates 
81.44 105.22 140.29    210.99 
17－ Sugars and sugar confectionery  1,836.12 2,052.73 1,934.18    1,993.70 
18－ Cocoa and cocoa preparations  314.71 360.11 378.68    596.50 
19－ Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; 
pastrycooks' products 
187.81 308.73 433.57    775.73 
20－ Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other 
parts of plants 
815.38 1,109.52 1,148.22    1,582.77 
21－ Miscellaneous edible preparations  565.09 878.82  1,202.55    1,948.25 
22－ Beverages, spirits and vinegar  403.67 945.62  1,203.09    1,883.58 
23－ Residues and waste from the food industries; 
prepared animal fodder 
1,501.11 2,160.47 2,283.96    3,101.63 Hanho Kim, Munisamy Gopinath, and Jae-Kyung Kim 
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Table 1a. Korean Agricultural Import Values (in millions of US Dollars) (Continued) 
 
HS Code  1990-1993  1994-1997  1998-2001  2002-2005 
24－ Tobacco and manufactured tobacco 
substitutes 
813.14 1,382.56 1,080.49    1,026.69 
29－ Organic chemicals  1,239.20 2,518.70 2,554.83    4,258.42 
33－ Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, 
cosmetic or toilet preparations 
63.03 68.16 51.08    60.29 
35－ Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; 
glues; enzymes 
369.94 470.62 454.61    565.07 
38－ Miscellaneous chemical products  169.41 208.14 217.56    250.90 
40－ Rubber and articles thereof  2,208.75 2,931.16 1,983.91    2,873.01 
43－ Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures 
thereof 
466.17 958.64 294.33    287.46 
50－ Silk  395.94 312.32 171.16    124.24 
51－ Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair 
yarn and woven fabric 
872.45 803.53 441.51    336.07 
52－ Cotton  2,583.54 2,385.25 1,959.36    1,588.21 
53－ Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and 
woven fabrics of paper yarn 
18.90 143.28  14.20    8.00 
Total  26,005.67 35,771.11 36,370.58    46,443.62 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division, Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) 
 
Table 1b. Korean Agricultural Import Values (in millions of 2005 US Dollars) 
 
HS  Code  1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 
01－ Live animals  77.90 143.28 103.83    153.09 
02－ Meat and edible meat offal  2,050.44 3,198.49 4,221.43    5,694.75 
04－ Dairy produce; birds' eggs; natural honey; 
edible products of animal origin, not elsewhere 
specified or included 
185.79 559.52 683.56    900.58 
05－ Products of animal origin, not elsewhere 
specified or included 
627.97 606.73 466.68    429.17 
06－ Live trees and other plants; bulbs, roots and 
the like; cut flowers and ornamental foliage 
97.30 169.49 162.21    191.07 
07－ Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers  416.24 562.04 655.68    991.20 
08－ Edible fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruit or 
melons 
603.25 558.73 876.55    1,603.61 
09－ Coffee, tea, maté and spices  407.94 770.18 731.31    577.21 
10－ Cereal  5,978.23 6,920.46 7,378.61    7,943.33 
11－ Products of the milling industry; malt; 
starches; inulin; wheat gluten 
131.29 234.92 290.55    419.70 
12－ Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous 
grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medicinal 
plants; straw and fodder 
1,937.04 2,722.84 3,003.09    3,296.61 Competition Between China and the United States in the Korean Food Market 
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13－ Lac; gums, resins and other vegetable saps 
and extracts 
179.94 200.24 231.32    320.31 
14－ Vegetable plaiting materials; vegetable 
products not elsewhere specified or included 
37.19 58.03 67.21    58.41 
15－ Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their 
cleavage products; prepared edible fats; animal or 
vegetable waxes 
952.88 1,469.56 1,510.33    1,981.30 
16－ Preparations of meat, of fish or of crustaceans, 
molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates 
81.44 105.22 140.29    210.99 
17－ Sugars and sugar confectionery  1,836.12 2,052.73 1,934.18    1,993.70 
18－ Cocoa and cocoa preparations  314.71 360.11 378.68    596.50 
19－ Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; 
pastrycooks' products 
187.81 308.73 433.57    775.73 
20－ Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other 
parts of plants 
815.38 1,109.52 1,148.22    1,582.77 
21－ Miscellaneous edible preparations  565.09 878.82  1,202.55    1,948.25 
22－ Beverages, spirits and vinegar  403.67 945.62  1,203.09    1,883.58 
23－ Residues and waste from the food industries; 
prepared animal fodder 
1,501.11 2,160.47 2,283.96    3,101.63 
24－ Tobacco and manufactured tobacco 
substitutes 
813.14 1,382.56 1,080.49    1,026.69 
29－ Organic chemicals  1,239.20 2,518.70 2,554.83    4,258.42 
33－ Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, 
cosmetic or toilet preparations 
63.03 68.16 51.08    60.29 
35－ Albuminoidal substances; modified starches; 
glues; enzymes 
369.94 470.62 454.61    565.07 
38－ Miscellaneous chemical products  169.41 208.14 217.56    250.90 
40－ Rubber and articles thereof  2,208.75 2,931.16 1,983.91    2,873.01 
43－ Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures 
thereof 
466.17 958.64 294.33    287.46 
50－ Silk  395.94 312.32 171.16    124.24 
51－ Wool, fine or coarse animal hair; horsehair 
yarn and woven fabric 
872.45 803.53 441.51    336.07 
52－ Cotton  2,583.54 2,385.25 1,959.36    1,588.21 
53－ Other vegetable textile fibres;  paper yarn and 
woven fabrics of paper yarn 
18.90 143.28  14.20    8.00 
Total  26,005.67 35,771.11 36,370.58    46,443.62 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division, Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) Price 
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Table 2. China’s Agricultural Export to World (in millions of US Dollars) 
 
HS  Code  1992-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2001-2005 
01  931.873 1933.063 1555.465 1329.472 
02  718.957 3711.471 3125.052 2760.058 
04  302.161 679.111 718.544 917.057 
05  768.758 2593.419 2680.171 3377.893 
06  34.173 113.073 127.224 233.795 
07  2186.917 6355.517 6291.944 9652.193 
08  627.755 1819.296 1712.207 3290.058 
09  927.609 1964.655 2057.161 2967.365 
10  2958.228 2971.803 5306.676 6391.689 
11  110.922 585.151 385.756 630.219 
12  1646.891 4375.109 3347.372 4643.811 
13  61.998 189.777 214.240 336.243 
14  96.266 216.148 170.445 182.659 
15  342.929 2018.533  713.080  676.844 
16  502.481 1256.594 1773.734 3537.268 
17  1325.830 1095.127  651.321 1093.084 
18  81.097 182.040 139.776 270.098 
19  249.300 882.643  1325.217  2393.448 
20  1371.159 3991.030 4967.943 9597.703 
21  233.344 930.920  1424.236  2334.822 
22  628.047 1630.227 1967.447 2681.000 
23  935.811 1410.910  951.235 1771.475 
24  1081.608 3318.656 1602.398 1976.570 
29  30.267 195.431 191.422 635.133 
33  149.585 343.427 253.496 292.792 
35  19.429 90.816  148.557  653.748 
38  9.042 56.440  167.323  280.674 
40  37.624 210.750 197.351 476.774 
43  19.281 26.082 22.079 26.277 
50  569.258 1382.368 1144.077 1018.275 
51  2.122 6.876 6.476  13.700 
51  221.326 332.002  80.719 160.490 
52  440.468 228.589 733.662 333.469 
53  11.276 21.188 19.267 10.931 
Total  19633.79 47118.24 46173.07 66947.09
Source: United Nations Statistics Division, Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) 
 
Table 2 shows the rapidly increasing trade value of China’s agricultural exports to the 
world. Exponential growth is seen in the last 5 years, especially in HS codes 07 (Edible 
vegetables), 10 (Cereal) and 12 (Oil seed), which coincidentally are the top 3 items imported 
by Korea. Table 3 shows the growth of China’s exports to the Korean market. They show that 
China’s export growth to Korea in several products match the latter’s overall import growth.  Competition Between China and the United States in the Korean Food Market 
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Table 3. China’s Agricultural Exports to Korea (in millions of US Dollars) 
 
HS  Code  1992-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 
01  1.18 3.77 0.96 1.86 
02  6.58 69.60 21.28 21.54 
04  8.24 10.29 7.89  16.23 
05  16.53 76.61 82.44  107.53 
06  14.10 2.92 4.41  18.25 
07  71.55 291.77 317.94 674.97 
08  83.39 47.50 33.20 93.67 
09  21.37 63.96 67.99  137.20 
10  925.70 907.67 1513.10 2733.11 
11  924.52 51.51 59.77  111.01 
12  115.12 453.68 359.04 546.70 
13  108.82 10.18 13.18 23.48 
14  9.31 18.66 5.09 7.55 
15  14.87 22.63 21.30 69.93 
16  9.68 10.62 8.12  71.44 
17  4.06 2.94 18.47 55.81 
18  2.11 0.42 3.22  21.23 
19  22.25 80.48 114.88 235.44 
20  44.56 137.99 155.65 368.12 
21  28.10 61.57 130.45 232.96 
22  34.04 60.62 63.58 86.22 
23  170.63 369.41 202.37 285.01 
24  154.58 282.80 19.67 57.09 
29  16.90 62.59 19.98 70.95 
33  4.25 0.31 0.45 1.75 
35  0.16 5.25 8.03  34.33 
38  0.32 1.47 9.47  20.53 
40  14.75 14.63 21.57 45.45 
43  15.11 0.67 0.25 0.06 
50  19.95 115.51 103.22  81.86 
51  31.20 34.90 13.89 17.79 
52  56.77 9.90 217.50  66.90 
53  45.10 0.96 0.34 0.54 
Total  2995.8 3283.79 3618.7  6316.51 
Source: United Nations Statistics Division, Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) 
 
For instance, Cereal (HS10) is not only the largest, but also the fastest growing product 
imported by Korea. Some of the reasons cited for this match in growth include low costs, Hanho Kim, Munisamy Gopinath, and Jae-Kyung Kim 
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similar breeds of crop, and geographical intimacy (McKibbin and Woo 2003). The largest 
export of China to Korea and the second-most imported good in the Korean market, 
vegetables, has shown steady growth after a major decline during 1994-1997. Similarly, 
Oilseeds imports from China are growing at a rate similar to overall Korean imports of that 
category. 
 
Table 4. U.S. Agricultural Exports to the World (in millions of USD) 
 
HS  Code  1991-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2001-2005 
01  1852.64 2364.01 3103.03 2623.83 
02  11463.13 23888.85 25709.84 23514.28 
04  1771.31 2716.16 3030.76 3959.62 
05  955.75 1556.45 1773.58 2460.56 
06  684.03 1006.85 1176.46 1210.51 
07  4320.67 6831.06 7425.11 8557.51 
08  9451.04 15840.56 15499.90 20758.80 
09  648.42 1634.42 1671.00 1687.25 
10  32138.09 53366.55 39938.16 45425.06 
11  1308.09 2021.33 1944.74 2728.75 
12  16083.75 29904.82 26066.15 34047.90 
13  529.62  760.19 1001.07 1258.69 
14  64.00 136.95 116.00 111.26 
15  4131.12 8335.14 7535.59 7804.88 
16  812.63 1800.42 2067.71 2353.41 
17  1406.84 2377.65 2681.56 2899.23 
18  1061.19 1817.41 2275.89 2992.65 
19  2460.20 4434.16 5594.15 6782.10 
20  4786.70 8059.32 8752.91 8851.79 
21  4180.00  8540.64 10244.48 13237.93 
22  3051.94 6801.65 6869.59 8324.47 
23  9948.72 15282.77 15086.32 14429.77 
24  17788.66 26659.96 20817.07 10934.87 
29  1884.64 3750.10 3601.45 5614.94 
33  586.88 1050.81 1166.57 1286.83 
35  833.72 2067.09 3077.45 3037.02 
38  341.35 837.68 989.64  1119.59 
40  2850.91 4945.01 5188.07 7151.48 
43  307.26 620.56 584.05 642.46 
50  3.65 3.69 7.25  10.29 
51  67.92 146.74  95.72 132.85 
52  6153.16 11950.58  7795.47 13880.16 
53  4.71 3.83 3.09 7.21 
Total  143932.7 251513.4 232889.8 259837.9
Source: United Nations Statistics Division, Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) 
 
U.S. agricultural exports to the world for the 33 products are shown in table 4. For the 
United States, the three largest global exports are cereal, meat and oilseeds as in the case of 
China. Although the growth rate of agricultural exports is not as dramatic as that of China, the 
total value for U.S. agricultural exports is more than twice of that of China. However, table 5 
also shows that the trend of U.S. agricultural exports to the Korean market is the opposite of Competition Between China and the United States in the Korean Food Market 
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China. In the case of cereals, China has witnessed exponential growth while U.S. exports to 
the Korean market have declined. Note also that China has been successful with Cereal 
exports not only in the Korean market, but also in the world market since 1994. The 
simultaneous surge in China’s exports and decline in U.S. exports imply that the competition 
between the two countries has been favorable to the former in the Korean market. 
 
Table 5. U.S. Agricultural Exports to Korea (in millions of US Dollars) 
 
HS Code  1991-1993  1994-1997  1998-2001  2002-2005 
1  16.04 31.30 23.88 30.21 
2  622.57 1324.84 1724.50 1941.23 
4  19.07 85.05 85.24  137.22 
5  38.68 43.62 36.14 56.99 
6  0.70 1.15 1.25 3.47 
7  13.56 55.13 28.41 84.50 
8  72.34 184.41 228.26 586.52 
9  12.62 34.62 21.12 25.30 
10  1113.78 4153.16 2340.98 1805.77 
11  6.44 19.30 30.82 12.74 
12  759.26 1452.60 1210.06 1454.71 
13  43.99 31.29 30.82 66.11 
14  0.40 2.27 0.86 0.94 
15  139.58 287.87 310.35 165.58 
16  28.26 49.40 43.56 67.45 
17  39.52 79.32 82.73 71.62 
18  26.86 60.85 48.14  128.14 
19  28.08 63.52 92.83 97.95 
20  194.61 399.47 387.97 394.65 
21  144.94 294.45 341.53 565.56 
22  20.90 100.45  69.75 119.94 
23  100.65 107.53 214.52 185.89 
24  350.84 719.17 460.71 192.31 
29  108.68 404.00 380.72 565.91 
33  14.85 28.40 13.29 19.39 
35  38.26 76.69 58.62 52.42 
38  13.65 14.75 17.72 16.40 
40  77.09 139.35  97.42 145.68 
43  64.12 194.76  87.48  97.17 
50  0.40 0.03 0.01 0.29 
51  0.29 4.39 3.90 1.01 
52  1003.42 1160.34  593.85  567.56 
53  0.18 0.04 0.10 0.22 
Total  5114.63 11603.52  9067.54  9660.85
Source: United Nations Statistics Division, Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) Hanho Kim, Munisamy Gopinath, and Jae-Kyung Kim 
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SIMILARITIES OF EXPORT STRUCTURE  
BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 
Few studies have addressed how to measure the degree of competition between two 
exporters in a third-country market (Lall and Albaladejo 2004). The more similar the 
exporting structures of the two countries, the stronger is their likely competition in the third 
market. In the following, we first graphically compare export structural similarities among 
China, the United States and other countries serving the Korean market to better understand 
the nature of competition in the latter. Second, a quantitative method is used to compare the 
similarities of the export structure between China and other significant players in the Korean 
market with emphasis on the United States.  
The structure of China’s agricultural exports to Korea during 1990-2005 is first shown in 
Figure 1. Value of China’s Cereal exports (HS10) has steadily increased and remained its 
largest agricultural product exported to Korea as in Table 3. However, Cereal’s relative share 
of exports has been falling as in the case of products of animal origin (HS05), residues/wastes 
of food industry (HS23) and other processed goods (HS50, HS51, HS52). In contrast, export 
shares in value terms have increased for HS19, which contains cereal, flour, starch, milk 
preparations and products, HS20 (vegetable, fruit, nut and other food preparations), and HS22 
(beverages, spirits, and vinegar). Overall, China’s exports to Korea have become increasingly 
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Figure 2. Export Structure of Major Suppliers to the Korean Food Market (1990-2005) 
Figure 2 presents a comparison of the export structure of the United States, China and two 
other exporters - Australia and Argentina- to Korea. The horizontal axis of figure 2 shows the 
selected agricultural category in two-digit HS codes, while the height of each of the lines in 
figure 2 indicate the percentage of the particular item in a country’s total exports to Korea. 
For instance, Cereal (HS10) accounts for the largest share of both U.S. and China’s exports to 
Korea. Comparing the importance of each export item for these 4 countries, we find 
significant overlap in exports of several agricultural products. Most notable is Cereal (HS10), 
which accounts for a significant share of Australian, Chinese and U.S. exports to Korea. 
China appears to be directly competing with the United States in categories HS10 (cereal), 
HS12 (Oil seed), HS20 (vegetable preparations) and HS21 (miscellaneous preparations). 
Australia also appears to compete with the United States and China in the Korean Cereal 
import market. We have included Argentina for a comparison with the three large exporters to 
the Korean market. Argentina seems to have an export structure similar to that of China, but 
lacks comparable trade volumes. 
SIMILARITY INDEX OF EXPORT STRUCTURE 
The next step is to measure observed similarities of export structure among China, the 
United States and other exporters to Korea through quantitative methods. Although several 
approaches to calculate the relative similarity of export structure between China and other 
countries are available, we draw on the un-centered correlation distance approach of Jaffe 
(1986). In the latter study, the technological similarity of firms is measured by the correlation 
in their research and development (R&D) portfolios. We have adapted Jaffe’s (1986) 
approach to quantify the similarities of export structure among major foreign suppliers to the 
Korean food market.  
To illustrate the un-centered correlation distance approach, we first introduce the 
commodity composition vector of each exporting country in space 
k   : 
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where Fi is country i’s export commodity vector in which Fik denotes its export value of 
commodity k to Korea. Equation (1) is rewritten in share form as follows: 
 
) , , ( ) 2 ( 1 ik i i f f f L = , 
 
where fik is the share of i-th country in the total Korean imports of the k-th commodity. Note 
that the shares sum to one, i.e.,  1 ik
i
f = ∑  for each k. With the export share vector in 
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where the term ║f║ indicates the vector norm. When ωij =1, the countries are said to coincide 
on the commodity space. That is, a similar export structure between two countries will result 
in a value of ωij near unity. In contrast, ωij will take value or approach zero if the two 
countries in comparison have perfectly different exporting structures, i.e., export different sets 
of commodities to Korea.  
 
Table 6. Similarity Index of Agricultural Export Structure Compared with China 
 
Top-20 Exporters 
to Korea  1990-2005 1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 
USA  0.54 0.37 0.60 0.57 0.18 
Australia  0.05 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.08 
Canada  0.05 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 
Brazil  0.39 0.05 0.14 0.36 0.71 
Japan  0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.04 
United  Kingdom 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Thailand  0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Netherlands  0.03 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.02 
India  0.13 0.13 0.23 0.03 0.07 
Philippines  0.04 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.02 
Malaysia  0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Germany  0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Indonesia  0.05 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.04 
France  0.03 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 
Argentina  0.68 0.08 0.88 0.73 0.87 
Guatemala  0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Spain  0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Viet  Nam  0.04 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.02 
South Africa  -  -  -  0.06  0.01 
 
We apply the un-centered correlation distance approach to the top 20 exporters to Korea 
during 1990 to 2005. Since the range and scale of items used in the analysis will significantly Competition Between China and the United States in the Korean Food Market 
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affect the measurement of the correlation distance, we employ data disaggregated to four-
digit HS code in our analysis. Thus, we have 211 import items,      k = 1, ….., 211, for each of 
which we have value data and cif price in US dollars.
3 
Table 6 presents five sets of results on ωij corresponding to the entire sample and four 
sub-samples of our study. Our base country for computing correlation distance is China. In 
the following, we focus first on the results from the entire sample. Only 3 out of the 20 
countries investigated have values of ωij exceeding 0.30 - Argentina, US and Brazil. The 
above results show that China’s export structure appears similar to that of the above 3 
countries. As noted earlier, the value of Argentina’s or Brazil’s exports to Korea are relatively 
small and hence, the similarity index, observed in the case of the United States, is of 
significance. It appears that China’s exports, under 211 four-digit HS commodities, are in 
direct competition with the United States during 1990-2005. The only other country with 
some export similarities with China in Korean markets is India.  
The trend in the similarity index during 1990-2005, in columns 2 through 5 of table 6, 
reveals the changing nature of competition in the Korean market. From 1990 to 2001, China’s 
export structure was increasingly similar to that of the United States, but the similarity index 
drops to 0.18 during 2002-2005. The latter result implies that either an export replacement or 
some deviation in the export structure has occurred between the two major exporters.
4 Recall 
from table 3 and 5 that Cereal (HS10) is an important group of export for both countries. 
Thus, any change in export quantities of Cereal between these two countries will have a larger 
effect on the similarity index. Since the exports of Cereal from China and the United States to 
Korea show opposite trends, it is reasonable to expect a drop in the similarity index. During 
2002-2005, Cereal has lost its long-standing position as the United States’ top export item to 
Korea, with meat products and vegetables becoming relatively more important.  However, the 
United States still has a relatively high similarity index with China during 2002-2005 
compared with other top 20 exporters except Brazil and Argentina. Again, the larger and 
increasing similarity indexes of Brazil and Argentina should be viewed in the context of their 
relatively lower share of Korean imports. Table 6 also implies that China’s exports likely 
focus on products which are also primary exports of the United States. Hence, we can 
anticipate intense competition between the United States and China in certain product 
categories in the Korean food market, and that China’s products may be a substitute for U.S. 
exports. 
The similarity indexes of Canada and Australia are relatively lower, indicating that their 
export structure does not compare well with that of China. India, shows an opposite drift in 
export structure relative to that of China. From 1990-1997, India’s similarity index increased 
from 0.13 to 0.23, but sharply declined in the following years, which confirms the divergence 
of its export structure from that of China.  
                                                        
3 The applicability of the index to processed products may be tenous because of consumers’ preference for variety.  
Our disaggregation to four-digit HS codes alleviates some of this problem, but the trade literature generally 
assumes fairly large elasticities of substitution among varieties (Feenstra 2003). 
4 As a reviewer noted, exchange rate effects are likely to be a key part of the answer.  The U.S. dollar has shown a 
mixed pattern against Korean Won since 2000, unlike its depreciation episode with major currencies.   
However, such exchange-rate effects on U.S.-Korean trade can be discerned only using an analytical or 
econometric model, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Hanho Kim, Munisamy Gopinath, and Jae-Kyung Kim 
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EXPORTERS’ RELATIVE SHARE OF KOREAN MARKET 
In figure 3, Korean market shares of China and the United States appear to be the 
opposite of each other. The horizontal axis represents the change in export share during 1990-
2005, while the vertical axis denotes the average annual growth rate of exports in the same 
period for all major exporters to Korea. The radius of each colored circle represents 
respective country’s export volume, i.e., the larger the circle for a country, the larger is its 
export value to Korea. If a country appears in the first quadrant, it means that its exports have 
grown on average during 1990-2005 and market share has increased. On the other hand, if the 
country is plotted on the third quadrant, its export growth has been negative along with a fall 
in market shares.  
China’s trade volume is lower relative to the United States, as seen in the size differences 
of respective circles, but the former’s share of Korean import market and annual average 
growth are higher than those of the latter. From 1990 to 2005, the United States has lost about 
19% of market share in the Korean import market, while China has increased its share by 
approximately 13%. Whereas the American exports, in value terms, to Korea are generally on 
the decline, China’s exports have shown significant growth of nearly 20 percent per annum. 
Thus, the possible substitution of China’s exports for that of the United States seen the 
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Table 7 depicts the exporters’ change in market share and its annual growth rate for four 
sub-samples as in table 6. During 1990-1993, China’s exports to Korea registered dramatic 
increases with an average annual growth rate of over 63%, which partly reflects the lower 
base exports in 1990. At the same time, China’s market share has grown at an average 12% 
per year. Caught off-guard, as it appears, the United States’ exports to Korea declined at an 
average rate of 6.92% per year along with an annual 15.12% rate of decline in it share of 
Korea’s total imports. On average over 1994-1997, China’s impressive growth in the Korean 
market continued at 150% per year, but its market share declined at a rate of 3% per year. The 
latter is a result of robust growth in U.S. exports to Korea averaging 64% per year during 
1990-1997. The lower growth rate of U.S. and China’s exports to Korea during 1998-2001 
should be seen in light of the East Asian Financial Crisis, which led to a significant 
depreciation of Won, the Korean currency, with respect to that of major trading nations. 
However, the U.S.-China competitive trend observed during 1990-1993 reappears in 2002-
2005, when China’s market share gain and export growth are accompanied by the losses in 
both indicators for the United States. 
 
Table 7. Changes in Exporters’ Share of the Korean Market 
 
Export-Share Change  Annual Growth Rate of Export  Top-20 
Exporters  1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 1990-1993 1994-1997 1998-2001 2002-2005 
USA -15.12%  2.06%  -4.71%  -6.26% -6.92% 64.37% -5.81% -2.96% 
China  12.38% -3.19%  3.21%  3.51% 63.31% 150.4% -3.05% 16.58% 
Australia -0.80%  -3.22%  1.60%  -0.11% 0.53% 5.95% 0.14%  13.42% 
Canada -0.68%  0.60%  -1.14%  -0.28%  8.54% -2.10% -8.91% 14.07% 
Brazil -0.37%  1.27%  -0.06%  1.78% 0.60%  11.96% 4.51% 9.46% 
Japan 0.47%  0.55%  -0.40%  -0.22% 10.84% -6.03% -3.34%  2.35% 
UK  0.08% 0.63% 0.28% 1.80% 2.42% 13.50%  1.80% -1.15% 
Thailand  -0.13% -1.22% -1.19%  0.02% -1.01% 47.05%  -12.01% -3.22% 
Netherlands  1.20% -0.54% -0.27% -0.72% 23.95% 44.86%  -14.40%  9.14% 
India  0.63% 0.34% 0.05% 0.39% 26.33% 65.88%  0.22% -4.26% 
Philippines  0.88% -0.21%  0.46% -0.09% 23.55% 12.57%  4.17% 15.72% 
Malaysia 0.14%  0.09%  -0.12%  -0.28% 6.60%  15.50%  -11.40%  17.30% 
Germany 0.91%  0.90%  -0.12%  0.13% 451.41% -19.13%  -3.23%  7.85% 
Indonesia  -0.10% 0.70% 0.06%  -0.27% 4.34% 6.41%  -14.95%  14.65% 
France  0.25% 0.26% 0.43%  -0.14%  15.25%  13.51% 4.82%  16.07% 
Argentina  0.02% 0.64% 0.26% 0.68% -42.76% 143.96%  0.85%  9.55% 
Guatemala  -0.03% 0.02% 1.00% 0.21% -43.55% -16.61%  63.65% -15.59% 
Spain  0.12% 0.06% 0.01% 0.00% 17.84%  2.29% -6.16% 39.69% 
Vietnam  0.17% 0.27% 0.23%  -0.21%  420.10% 0.51% 3.92% 8.08% 
South  Africa 0.00% 0.00% 0.44% 0.06% 0.00% 0.00%  454.07%  -11.43% 
 
With regard to other countries, Australia has witnessed export growth to Korean markets, 
but its market share gains are limited. Several countries appear to have had a dramatic 
increase in exports to Korea especially during 1990-1997 for at least two reasons. The first is 
that most of these countries’ base exports are small and hence, a small increase in exports 
may result in large growth rates. Furthermore, the implementation of minimum market access 
requirements of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture may have resulted in more 
countries experiencing some increase in exports to Korea.  Hanho Kim, Munisamy Gopinath, and Jae-Kyung Kim 
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INDEX OF CHINA’S COMPETITIVE THREAT  
TO OTHER EXPORTERS TO KOREA 
The next step is to an derive index which represents the pattern of competitive threat from 
China to the United States and other exporters based on the relative market shares in table 7. 
The analysis of the pattern of competitive threat after 1990 will follow the conceptual 
framework of Lall and Albaladejo (2004). For an in-depth evaluation, we have categorized 
the threat of China to other exporters in the Korean market into 5 types: Direct Threat, Partial 
Threat, No Threat, China under threat, and Mutual Withdrawal. The definitions of each type 
are as follows. 
 
•  Direct Threat (5): China gains market share while its competing country loses market 
share in the Korean food market, implying that China’s export is a direct substitute 
for that from its competitor. 
•  Partial Threat (4): Both China and its competitor gain market share, but China shows 
a higher growth rate of exports.  
•  No Threat (3): Both China and its competitor gain market share, but China shows 
lower growth rate. 
•  China under threat (2): China loses market share, while the competing country shows 
share growth in the Korean market.  
•  Mutual Withdrawal (1): The competitor and China both lose market share, which 
implies that both countries have lost their competitiveness as a whole in the Korean 
market.  
•  No export (0): No exports from the competitor. 
 
Table 8. Competitive Threat of China to Top-20 Exporters to Korea 
 
Period USA    Australia   Canada   Brazil   Japan  UK  Thailand   Nether
-lands   India   Mala
ysia  
1990-1993  5  5 5 5  4  4  5 4  4  4 
1994-1997  2  1 2 2  2  2  1 1  2  4 
1998-2001  5  3 5 0  5  3  5 5  3  5 
2002-2005  5  5 5 4  5  4  4 5  4  5 
1990-2005  5 5  5  4 4  4  5  4 4  4 
1990-1993  3  5 4 4  5  4  3 0  4   
1994-1997  3  4 4 4  3  4  4 0  1   
1998-2001  5  4 3 3  3  4  3 0  3   
2002-2005  4  5 5 4  4  3  5 4  5   
1990-2005  3  4 4 4  3  4  4 3  4   
Note: (0) No export, (1) Mutual Withdrawal, (2) China under threat, (3) No Threat, (4) Partial 
Threat, (5) Direct Threat. 
 
Tables 8, 9 and 10 present the results from the application of the concept of competitive 
threat with China as the base against the United States and other exporters.  The first of the 
three tables confirms that China’s exports are a Direct Threat to the United States, Australia, 
Canada, Brazil, Thailand, Indonesia and Guatemala. With the exemption of Germany, 
Guatemala, and the Republic of South Africa, table 8 shows that a total of 16 countries face 
either Direct or Partial Threat from China when exporting to the Korean market. There are Competition Between China and the United States in the Korean Food Market 
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some variations in the trend of these indexes during 1990-2005, but generally the results show 
that China has been a competitive threat to most, if not all, major agricultural exporters to 
Korea (Im 2002). 
Table 9 presents the percent of commodity lines facing various degrees of competitive 
threat from China. About 52.6% of the 173 U.S. products are subject to Direct Threat from 
China. No other country faces similar Direct Threat levels from China. In total, about 83.8% 
of U.S. product lines face either Direct or Partial Threat from China in Korean markets. A 
number of developing countries such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand face Partial 
Threat from China in about half of their product lines exported to Korea (Shafaeddin 2004).  
 
Table 9. Number of Products by Type of Competitive Threat from China 












Withdrawal  Total 
91 54 25  0  3  173  USA  
(52.60) (31.20) (14.50)  (0.00)  (1.70)   
24 71 51 12  5  163  Australia   (14.70) (43.60) (31.30)  (7.40)  (3.10)   
30 55 40 12  2  139  Canada   (21.60) (39.60) (28.80)  (8.60)  (1.40)   
16 39 24  4  1  84  Brazil   (19.00) (46.40) (28.60)  (4.80)  (1.20)   
83 53 19 11  8  174  Japan   (47.70) (30.50) (10.90)  (6.30)  (4.60)   
35 63 20  0  5  123  United 
Kingdom    (28.50) (51.20) (16.30)  (0.00)  (4.10)   
35 49 31  0  3  118  Thailand   (29.70) (41.50) (26.30)  (0.00)  (2.50)   
41 53 34  7  7  142  Netherlands   (28.90) (37.30) (23.90)  (4.90)  (4.90)   
19 55 26  4  2  106  India   (17.90) (51.90) (24.50)  (3.80)  (1.90)   
26 36 19  0  0  81  Philippines   (32.10) (44.40) (23.50)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
14 48 29 10  1  102  Malaysia   (13.70) (47.10) (28.40)  (9.80)  (1.00)   
0 69 55 17  0  141  Germany   (0.00) (48.90) (39.00) (12.10)  (0.00)   
24 53 32  8  1  118  Indonesia   (20.30) (44.90) (27.10)  (6.80)  (0.80)   
31 70 37 10  6  154  France   (20.10) (45.50) (24.00)  (6.50)  (3.90)   
4 40 19  7  3  73  Argentina   (5.50) (54.80) (26.00)  (9.60)  (4.10)   
2 5 5 2  0  14  Guatemala   (14.30) (35.70) (35.70) (14.30)  (0.00)   
10 50 26  0  4  90  Spain   (11.10) (55.60) (28.90)  (0.00)  (4.40)   
0  92 4 0  0  96  Viet Nam   (0.00)  (95.80) (4.20) (0.00)  (0.00)   
0 27 22  0  0  49  South Africa   (0.00) (55.10) (44.90)  (0.00)  (0.00)   
Number in parenthesis is percent of total number of products Hanho Kim, Munisamy Gopinath, and Jae-Kyung Kim 
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To further illustrate the extent of competitive threat from China, we carry out an in-depth 
examination of Korean Cereal imports, where China, the United States and Australia are 
major players. Within Cereal (HS10), we compute threat levels for 8 four-digit commodities. 
Table 10 shows that the United States has been directly threatened by China in all cereal 
categories with the exemption of 1003 (Barley) and 1008 (Buckwheat, Millet, Canary Seed 
and other Cereals).Most exporters of corn (HS1005) and wheat (HS1001) face either Direct or 
Partial Threat from China’s exports.
5 
 
Table 10. Competitive Threat of China in HS 10 (Cereal) 1990-2005 
 
Top-20  Exporters 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 
USA    5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 
Australia    4 3 4 4 3 4 3 5 
Canada    4 5 5 5 4 0 4 4 
Brazil    0 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Japan    0 0 0 4 5 4 5 4 
U.K.    4 4 4 0 4 0 0 0 
Thailand    5 0 0 0 5 5 0 5 
Netherlands    4 4 4 0 4 4 0 0 
India    4 4 0 0 4 5 4 0 
Philippines    0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 
Malaysia    0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 
Germany    4 4 4 0 0 4 0 0 
Indonesia    3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 
France    4 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 
Argentina    4 0 0 0 3 0 4 5 
Guatemala    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam  0 0 0 0 4 4 0 4 
South  Africa    0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 
CONCLUSION 
Korea, a large net-food importing country, is rapidly opening its doors to agricultural 
imports from the rest of the world. The recent free trade agreement with Chile and others in 
the making are expected to increase the openness of the economy and the competition in 
Korean food markets. Moreover, these agreements are acting as a strong signal to other major 
players in the global economy that Korea, once regarded as one of the most closed economies 
in terms of agriculture, is striving to transform itself into an open agricultural economy. With 
high per capita income, Korea is a highly-desired market for several agricultural exporters.  
                                                        
5 We explored beta convergence in export shares, i.e., is the rate of share change positively associated with base 
period shares?  In a simple regression using data on the top 20 exporters to Korea, the beta-convergence 
coefficient is not statistically significant.  The two top exporters, United States and China, have similar export 
structure, and so, we are unable to document how commodity composition may affect the rate of share change.  Competition Between China and the United States in the Korean Food Market 
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The objective of this article to investigate the nature and extent of competition among 
foreign suppliers to the Korean food market. In particular, we examine China’s impact on the 
Korean food market, which will help understand the changing relationship between Korea 
and its agricultural trade partners, especially the United States. For this purpose, we have 
employed two frameworks. The first is the un-centered correlation distance, which helped 
uncover the similarities in the export structures of countries competing to serve the Korean 
market. The second framework is the concept of competitive threat, through which we have 
determined the competitive relationship between any two exporters, by comparing their 
growth rate of exports and export shares to Korea. The combined results of these two 
frameworks allowed us to investigate the changing roles of China, the United States, and 
other countries in the Korean import market.  
The results show that the United States, traditionally a large food exporter to Korea, is 
facing serious competition from China’s exports. The similar export structures of China and 
the United States have made the latter vulnerable to competition during the last two decades. 
With increased globalization, characterized by the URAA, China’s accession to WTO and 
other global events (e.g., currency appreciation/depreciation), the geographic proximity of 
China to Korean markets confers the former several advantages in its competition with the 
United States. For instance, China possesses varieties and breeds of agricultural products 
similar to those in Korea and also benefits from lower transport costs. This is especially 
visible in cereal markets, where both countries have increased exports to the world, but show 
opposite trends in the Korean market. The market share of U.S. products has rapidly declined 
while that of China has witnessed dramatic growth.  
Using the concept of competitive threat, we show that China poses a Direct or Partial 
Threat to the United States in virtually every agricultural product exported to Korea. Among 
173 U.S. products exported to Korea, 91 are directly threatened by China’s products, and 54 
items face a Partial Threat. That is, about 80% of U.S. export product lines in the Korea 
market are challenged by China’s exports.  
With the recently signed Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement waiting for approval 
in both countries, it would be interesting to see how the elimination of trade barriers will 
affect the U.S. position in the Korean market. Additional research will be needed to assess the 
effects of trade and non-trade barriers, which immediately favor U.S. products, as well as the 
importance of factors such as low costs, similar breeds of crop, and geographical proximity, 
which favor Chinese products. Furthermore, the possibility of a Korea-China Free Trade 
Agreement increases the complexity of trade patterns and competition, which will remain an 
important topic for future research. 
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ABSTRACT 
The study examines the economic determinants of crop diversity using a survey 
of 406 farmers located in 21 villages in three agro-ecological regions of Bangladesh. 
The computed value of diversity indices of crop concentration (Herfindahl), richness 
(Margalef) and evenness (Shannon) confirm that farming system in Bangladesh is 
still relatively diverse despite four decades of thrust in the diffusion of a rice-based 
‘Green Revolution’ technology. Results reveal that a host of price and non-price 
factors significantly influence farmers’ decision to diversify. Likelihood of 
diversification increases with a fall in the prices of fertilizers, animal power services 
and modern rice and a rise in the price of cash crops. Crop diversification is 
positively influenced by farm size, livestock ownership, farming experience, 
education, membership in NGOs, regions with developed infrastructure and 
unavailability of irrigation. Also, diversification is higher among owner operators. 
Therefore, crop diversification can be promoted significantly by investing in rural 
infrastructure, farmers’ education, and supporting NGOs working at the grassroots 
level. Price policies aimed at improving cash crop prices and reducing fertilizer and 
animal power prices will also promote diversification. In addition, land reform 
policies focusing on delegating land ownership to landless/marginal farmers and 
policies to improve the livestock sector in order to promote livestock ownership by 
individual farmers are also noteworthy.   
 
Key words: Crop diversity, socio-economic factors, Tobit model, Bangladesh. 
JEL Classification: O33; Q18; C21 
INTRODUCTION 
The economy of Bangladesh is largely dependent on agriculture. Although, rice 
production dominates the farming system of Bangladesh, accounting for 70% of the gross 
cropped area (BBS 2001), several other crops are also grown in conjunction with rice in 
order to fulfil a dual role of meeting subsistence as well as cash needs. Since the 
beginning of 1960s, Bangladesh has pursued a policy of rapid technological progress in 
                                                        
1 Dr. Sanzidur Rahman is Senior Lecturer in Rural Development at the School of Geography, University of 
Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth, PL4 8AA, UK. Phone: +44-1752-585911, Fax: +44-1752-585998, E-
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referees which improved the paper substantially. All caveats remain with the author. An earlier version of 
this is in Castalonge, O.W. (ed.) Agricultural Systems: Economics, Technology and Diversity. New York: 
Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 2008. Sanzidur Rahman 
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agriculture leading to diffusion of a rice-based ‘Green-Revolution’ technology package. 
As a result, farmers concentrated on producing modern varieties of rice all year round 
covering three production seasons (Aus - pre-monsoon, Aman - monsoon and Boro - dry 
winter), particularly in areas that are endowed with supplemental irrigation facilities. This 
raised concern regarding loss of crop diversity, consequently leading to an unsustainable 
agricultural system. For example, Husain, Hossain and Janaiah (2001) noted that the 
intensive monoculture of rice led to a displacement of land under low productive non-rice 
crops such as pulses, oilseeds, spices and vegetables, leading to an erosion of crop 
diversity, thereby, endangering the sustainability of crop-based agricultural production 
system. Mahmud, Rahman and Zohir (1994) also noted that “the area under non-cereal 
crops has continuously fallen since late 1970s, mainly due to the expansion of irrigation 
facilities, which led to fierce competition for land between modern Boro season rice and 
non-cereals”. However, an analysis of the level of crop diversification between the two 
Agricultural Censuses of 1960 and 1996 reveals a different story.  
Table 1 presents the cropped area, cropping intensity and the level of crop 
diversification between the Agricultural Censuses of 1960 and 1996, respectively. The 
former census just precedes the onset of Green Revolution while the latter census is the 
latest available to date, and is comprehensive in nature, scope and content. It is clear from 
table 1 that, although there were dramatic changes in the structure of the farms and rise in 
cropping intensity, the level of crop diversification changed only moderately over a 36-
year period.  
With a boom in population growth between the two censuses, the average operational 
size per farm shrunk dramatically. The large and medium farms gave way to small farms 
largely because of increase in the number of farms competing for a fixed amount of 
cultivable land. The decline in net cropped area by 12.7 percent is largely offset by a 26 
percent rise in cropping intensity, thereby, leaving gross cropped area slightly positive (a 
2.5 percent increase). An examination of the crop shares reveal that the share of cereals 
(rice, wheat and other minor cereals) increased by only 1.7 percent in 36 years. The main 
changes were in the composition of modern varieties of rice, which replaced the 
traditional varieties. Also, there was a five-fold increase in modern wheat area. The non-
cereal crops used to account for 23.4 percent of the gross cropped area in 1960 and now 
accounts for 21.7 percent in 1996, a negligible decline of 1.4 percent in 36 years. 
However, there has been a shift in the composition of non-cereals over this period. The 
areas under pulses, cash crops and spices declined sharply, while areas under oilseeds and 
vegetables increased over this period. As a result, contrary to expectation, crop diversity 
in agriculture (as revealed by the computed Herfindahl index of crop concentration) has 
actually increased by 4.5 percent over a 36 year period, which can hardly be justified as a 
serious replacement of land area by rice monoculture. The Herfindahl index of crop 
concentration was computed at 0.59 in 1960 and 0.54 in 1996.  
There is an apparent paradox in that many non-cereal crops (e.g., potatoes, vegetables, 
onions and cotton) are more profitable (both in economic and financial terms) than 
modern rice cultivation, which was mainly attributed to high risk as well as 
incompatibility of the existing irrigation system to produce non-cereals in conjunction 
with rice (Mahmud, Rahman and Zohir 1994). However, it has been increasingly 
recognized that, under non-irrigated or semi-irrigated conditions, better farming practices 
and varietal improvements in non-cereal crops will be more profitable and could lead to 
crop diversification as a successful strategy for the future growth and sustainability of 
Bangladeshi agriculture (MoA 1989; Mahmud, Rahman and Zohir 1994; PC 1998). The 
Fifth Five Year Plan (1997–2002) set specific objectives to attain self-sufficiency in The Economic Determinants of Crop Diversity on Farms … 
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foodgrain production along with increased production of other nutritional crops, as well 
as to encourage export of vegetables and fruits, while keeping in view the domestic needs 
(PC 1998). The Plan also earmarked Tk 1,900 million (US$ 41.8 million) accounting for 
8.9 percent of the total agricultural allocation to promote crop diversification. Such an 
emphasis at the policy level points toward the importance of identifying the determinants 
of farmers’ crop choice decisions, so that an informed judgment can be made about the 
suitability of crop diversification as a desired strategy for promoting agricultural growth 
in Bangladesh.  
 
Table 1. Changes in Cropped Area, Cropping Intensity and Crop Diversification 
Between Censuses of 1960 and 1996 
 
dicators  Census 1960 Census 1996 Inter-census change (%) 
Number of farms  6,139,480 11,798,242 92.17 
% of small farms (0.02 – 1.01 ha)  51.63 79.87 197.26 
% of medium farms (1.01 – 3.03 ha)  37.68 17.61 -10.19 
% of large farms (above 3.03 ha)  10.69 2.52 -54.63 
Operated area (ha)  7,744,929 8,076,369 4.28 
Net temporary cropped area (ha)  7,627,372 6,655,771 -12.74 
Gross cropped area (ha)  11,283,169 11,580,666 2.64 
Operated area per farm (ha)  1.26 0.68 -45.74 
Net temporary cropped area per farm (ha)  1.24 0.56 -54.59 
Gross cropped area per farm (ha)  1.84 0.98 -46.59 
Proportion of cropped area under (%)       
Rice 75.76 72.80 -1.37 
Wheat and other minor cereals  0.83 5.52 585.35 
Pulses 6.31 4.63 -24.72 
Oilseeds 2.82 4.14 50.92 
Cash crops  8.74 6.32 -25.77 
Vegetables 2.22 3.55 64.49 
Spices and other miscellaneous crops  3.33 3.04 -6.34 
Cropping intensity (all farms)  148 174 26.00 
Small farms  167 187 20.00 
Medium farms  152 171 19.00 
Large farms  135 154 19.00 
Herfindahl index of crop concentration (all farms) 0.59 0.54 -4.50 
Small farms  0.57 0.52 -4.59 
Medium farms  0.59 0.55 -4.23 
Large farms  0.60 0.59 -0.79 
Source: Adapted from Rahman (2009). 
 
Given this backdrop, the present study is aimed at determining the underlying factors 
affecting crop diversity on farms in rural Bangladesh. We estimate a model of crop choice 
in a theoretical framework of the farm household model applying a micro-econometric 
approach.  
METHODOLOGY 
Theoretical Model  
We develop a general model of farm production to examine the determinants of crop 
diversity. The farmer produces a vector Q of farm outputs using a vector of inputs X. The 
decision of choice, however, is constrained by a given production technology that allows 
combination of inputs (X) and an allocation of a fixed land area (A = A
0) among j number Sanzidur Rahman 
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of crops, given the characteristics of the farm (Z). The total output of each farmer i is 
given by a stochastic quasi-concave production function: 
 
) , | , .... ( i i ijk ijk ij Z A X X f Q ε =        (1) 
 
where ε is the stochastic variable indicating impacts of weather conditions or random 
noise. It is assumed that fXk>0 and fXXk<0. Each set of area shares (αj) among j crops sums 
to 1, ∑ = =
J
j j J j , ,.... 2 , 1 , 1 α  which maps into the vector Q through physical input-
output relationships. The choice of area shares implies the level of farm outputs. The 
profit of each farm i is given by: 
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where p is the vector of output prices and w is the vector of input prices.    
The farmer is assumed to have a von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function, U(W) 
defined on wealth W with UW>0 and UWW<0. The wealth is represented by the sum of 
initial wealth (W0) and the profit generated from farming (π). Therefore, the objective of 
each farm is to maximize expected utility as (Isik 2004): 
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where E is the expectation operator defined over ε. The choice variables in (3), the farm’s 
input levels Xijk, are characterized by the first-order conditions 
) 4 ( 0 ) * ( = − =
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The second-order conditions are satisfied under risk aversion and a quasi-concave 
production function (Isik 2004). The optimal input mix is given by: 
 
) 5 ( ) , | , , (
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And the optimal output mix, depending on  ) (
*
ijk X  is defined as: 
 




i i ijk ij ij Z A X X f Q =  
Factors Affecting Choice of Crops 
To determine the factors affecting a farmer’s choice of crops, we derive the 
equivalent wealth or income from the expected utility: 
 
) 7 ( ) , | , , , ( ( 0 i i i i Z A w p X Q W E E π + =  
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This equivalent wealth or income in a single decision making period is composed of 
net farm earnings (profits) from crop production and initial wealth that is ‘exogenous’ to 
the crop choices (W0), such as farm capital assets and livestock resources carried over 
from earlier period.  
Under the assumption of perfect market, farm production decisions are made 
separately from consumption decisions and the household maximizes net farm earnings 
(profits) subject to the technology and expenditure constraints (Benin et al. 2004). 
Therefore, production decision of the farms, such as crop choices, are driven by net 
returns (profits), which are determined only by input and output prices, farm physical 
characteristics and socio-economic characteristics of the farm household (Benin et al. 
2004). Therefore, the optimal choice of the household can be re-expressed as a reduced 
form function of input and output prices, market wage, farm size, initial wealth, and 
household and farm characteristics:  
 
) 8 ( ) , , , , ( 0
* *
i i i k j i i W A Z w p h h =  
 
Eq. (8) forms the basis for econometric estimation to examine the factors affecting 
diversity of crops on household farms, an outcome of choices made in a constrained 
optimization problem. Diversity of crops (D) for each farm i is expressed in the following 
conceptual form (Benin et al., 2004): 
 
) 9 ( ) , , , , ( ( 0
*
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Data and the Study Area  
The study is based on farm-level cross section data for the crop year 1996 collected 
from three agro-ecological regions of Bangladesh. The survey was conducted from 
February to April 1997. Samples were collected from eight villages of the Jamalpur Sadar 
sub-district of Jamalpur, representing wet agro-ecology, six villages of the Manirampur 
sub-district of Jessore, representing dry agro-ecology, and seven villages of the Matlab 
sub-district of Chandpur, representing wet agro-ecology in an agriculturally advanced 
area. A multistage random sampling technique was employed to locate the districts, then 
the Thana (sub-districts), then the villages in each of the three sub-districts, and finally 
the sample households. A total of 406 households
1 from these 21 villages were selected. 
Detailed crop input-output data at the plot level for individual farm households were 
collected for ten crop groups
2. The dataset also includes information on the level of 
                                                        
1 The sample households were selected based on the information on the total number of households including 
their land ownership categories, which were obtained from BRAC (a national non-governmental 
organization). Then a stratified random sampling procedure was applied using a formula from Arkin and 
Colton (1963) that maximizes the sample size with a 5% error limit. Farm size categories (large, medium, 
and small farmers) were used as the strata (for details, see Rahman 1998).  
2 The crop groups are: traditional rice varieties (Aus – pre-monsoon, Aman – monsoon, and Boro – dry 
seasons), high yielding/modern rice varieties (Aus, Aman, and Boro seasons), modern/high yielding 
wheat varieties, jute, potato, pulses, spices, oilseeds, vegetables, and cotton. Pulses in turn include lentil, 
mungbean, and gram. Spices include onion, garlic, chilli, ginger, and turmeric. Oilseeds include sesame, 
mustard, and groundnut. Vegetables include eggplant, cauliflower, cabbage, arum, beans, gourds, radish, 




3 and soil fertility determined from soil samples collected 
from representative locations in the study villages
4. 
Dependent Variables: Diversity Indices 
The dependent variables are the diversity indices, where each diversity index (D) is a 
scalar constructed from the vector of area shares allocated to crops. The crop groups are 
mentioned in footnote#2. We employ three indices, of which two have been adapted from 
the ecological indices of spatial diversity in species (Margalef and Shannon indices) and 
one from the marketing industry index of market concentration (Herfindahl index) (Table 
2). Each index represents a unique diversity concept. Richness, or the number of crops 
observed is measured by a Margalef index. Evenness, which combines both richness and 
relative abundance concept, is measured by a Shannon index (Benin et al. 2004), and the 
concentration of crop type is measured by a Herfindahl index.  
 
Table 2. Dependent Variables Used in the Analysis of Crop Diversity on Farms 
 
Index Concept  Construction  Explanation Interpretation 
Margalef   Richness  0 , ln / ) 1 ( ≥ − = M M D A S D   A = total area 
planted to all crops 
by the household, S
is the number of 
crops. 
Higher value of 
index denotes 
higher diversity 
Shannon Evenness  or 
equitability (both 
richness and relative 
abundance) 
0 , ln * ≥ − = ∑ S j j S D D α α
αj = area share 
occupied by the jth 
crop in A. 
Higher value of 
index denotes 
higher diversity 
Herfindahl Concentration  ∑ ≤ ≤ = 1 0 ,
2
H j H D D α  
αj = area share 
occupied by the jth 
crop in A. 
A zero value 
denotes perfect 
diversification and 
a value of 1 denotes 
perfect 
specialization 
Source: After Benin et al. (2004); Bradshaw (2004) and Llewelyn and Williams (1996). 
                                                        
3 A composite ‘index of underdevelopment of infrastructure’ was constructed using the cost of access 
approach. A total of 13 elements are considered for its construction. These are primary market, secondary 
market, storage facility, rice mill, paved road, bus stop, bank, union office, agricultural extension office, 
high school, college, thana (sub-district) headquarters, and post office  (see Ahmed and Hossain 1990 for 
construction details). 
4 The ‘soil fertility index’ was constructed from test results of soil samples collected from the study villages 
during the field survey. Ten soil fertility parameters were tested. These are soil pH, available nitrogen, 
available potassium, available phosphorus, available sulfur, available zinc, soil texture, soil organic 
matter content, cation exchange capacity of soil, and electrical conductivity of soil (for details of 




Independent variables are operational measurements of the vectors shown in the right 
hand side of Eq. (6). The variables incorporated in the econometric models were: three 
output prices (modern rice, jute, cash crops
5), four input prices (fertilizers, animal power 
services, labor, and pesticides), amount of land cultivated, livestock ownership, value of 
farm capital assets, irrigation, tenurial status, farmers’ education, farming experience, 
subsistence pressure, extension contact in the past one year, membership in NGOs, index 
of underdevelopment of infrastructure, soil fertility index, and regional dummies for 
Comilla and Jessore. The definition and measurement of all these variables are presented 
in table 5. The justification for including these variables in the model is discussed below. 
Land is the scarcest resource in Bangladesh, and farm size largely determines the 
level and extent of income to be derived from farming. Land also serves as a surrogate for 
a large number of factors as it is a major source of wealth and influences decision to 
choose crops. Also, greater farm areas can be allocated among more crops (Benin et al. 
2004). However, the impact of tenancy on the extent of modern rice technology adoption 
among farmers is varied (Hossain, et al. 1990). Hence, the amount of land cultivated (to 
represent wealth) and the proportion of land rented-in (to represent tenurial status) were 
incorporated to test their independent influence on decisions regarding crop diversity.  
Farmers in Bangladesh are not only land poor, but also resource poor. The farm 
capital asset variable (which includes the value of all tools and equipments used directly 
into farm operations) was included to examine its influence on crop diversity. Livestock, 
as a measure of wealth, have an ambiguous effect. Livestock ownership is expected to 
contribute positively to crop diversity through ensuring draught power for ploughing 
when needed (Benin et al. 2004).  
Access to modern irrigation facilities is an important pre-requisite for growing 
modern rice, particularly the modern Boro rice grown in the dry winter season. Lack of 
access to modern irrigation facilities has been identified as one of the principal reasons 
for stagnation in the expansion of modern rice area, which currently accounts for a little 
over 50 percent of total rice area (Rahman and Thapa 1999; Mahmud, Rahman and Zohir 
1994). Also, irrigation may decrease diversity through uniform moisture conditions 
(Benin et al. 2004).  
Use of farmers’ education level as explanatory variable in technology adoption 
studies is common (e.g., Nkamleu and Adesina 2000; Adesina and Baidu-Forson 1995). 
The education variable was used as a surrogate for a number of factors. At the technical 
level, access to information as well as capacity to understand the technical aspects and 
profitability related to different crops may influence crop production decisions. The 
justification of including farming experience is straightforward
6. Experienced farmers are 
more likely to be open to choices regarding crops, be it modern rice or non-rice crops. 
Agricultural extension can be singled out as one of the important sources of 
information dissemination directly relevant to agricultural production practices, 
particularly in nations like Bangladesh where farmers have very limited access to 
information. This was reinforced by the fact that many studies found a significant 
influence of extension education on adoption of land-improving technologies (e.g., 
                                                        
5 This output price variable is constructed by summing up the gross value of all individual crops (excluding all 
types of rice and jute) and dividing by the total volume of output. Correlation among the three output 
prices used in these models (modern rice, jute and cash crops) is very low (r=0.19) and is not significantly 
different from zero. 
6 We did not include age because it is mainly used to act as a proxy for farming experience, which we have 
already included.  Sanzidur Rahman 
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Adesina and Zinnah 1993). Therefore, this variable was incorporated to account for its 
influence on adoption decisions. 
According to Chayanovian theory of the peasant economy, higher subsistence 
pressure increases the tendency to adopt new technology, and this has been found to be 
the case in Bangladesh (Hossain et al. 1990; Hossain 1989). The subsistence pressure 
variable, measured by family size per household was incorporated to account for its 
influence on crop choices.  
The effect of the gender composition of the household is difficult to predict, while 
household size is expected to increase diversity through preference heterogeneity and 
labor capacity (Benin et al. 2004). We have, therefore, added proportion of male working 
members in the household in order to capture the influence of male labor capacity in crop 
choice decisions
7.  
Infrastructure affects agricultural production indirectly through prices, diffusion of 
technology and use of inputs and has profound impact on the incomes of the poor 
(Ahmed and Hossain 1990). The state of infrastructure implies improved access to 
markets and institutions as well as better access to information and hence may influence 
farmers’ crop choices. Also, when improved market infrastructure reaches a village, new 
trade possibilities emerges, adding crops and production possibilities to the range of 
economic activities undertaken (Benin et al. 2004). This effect was captured by the index 
of underdevelopment of infrastructure.  
Soil fertility is a key factor that exerts a positive influence on productivity (Rahman 
and Parkinson 2007), which in turn may influence decision to choose crops. Finally, we 
include two dummy variables for regional location as a determinant of diversity to 
capture the cultural and physical environment in which farmers make their decision 
(Benin et al. 2004). 
Regression Structure 
The general structure of the regression equation is given by: 
 
) 10 ( i i i i i i e Z d w c p b a D + + + + =  
 
where D represents any one of the three indices, the Margalef index of richness or the 
Shannon index of evenness or the Herfindahl index of concentration, p is a vector of 
output prices, w is a vector of input prices, Z  is a vector of farm and household 
characteristics, e is the error term controlling for the unobserved factors and/or random 
noise, and a, b, c and d are the parameters to be estimated.   
A major estimation problem was encountered as a large proportion of households 
grew only one crop. In this case, both the Margalef and Shannon indices are censored at 
zero. In such case, Tobit model is most appropriate because it uses all observations, both 
those are at the limit, usually zero and those above the limit, to estimate a regression line, 
as opposed to other techniques that uses observations, which are only above the limit 
value (McDonald and Moffit 1980). The stochastic model underlying Tobit may be 
expressed as follows (McDonald and Moffit 1980): 
 
                                                        
7 Although female labor are also used to some extent in farming in Bangladesh (Rahman 2000), the dominant 
labor force in farming is still male. The Economic Determinants of Crop Diversity on Farms … 
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where M is the number of observations, ym is the dependent variable (diversity index), Xm 
is a vector of independent variables representing technology attributes and farm and 
farmer specific socio-economic characteristics, β is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and um is an independently distributed error term assumed to be normal with 
zero mean and constant variance σ
2. The model assumes that there is an underlying 
stochastic index equal to (Xmβ + um), which is observed when it is positive, and hence 
qualifies as an unobserved latent variable. The relationship between the expected value of 
all observations, Ey and the expected conditional value above the limit Ey* is given by: 
 
Ey = F(z) Ey* 
 
where F(z) is the cumulative density normal distribution function and z = Xβ/σ.  
On the other hand, when farm households grow only a single crop, the Herfindahl 
index is computed as 1. Also, none of the farm households in our sample could reach the 
perfect diversification score of 0. In our sample, the minimum value of the Herfindahl 
index of crop concentration was 0.18 while a substantial number scored a maximum of 1. 
Therefore, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is best suited for this model because 
it has the BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) properties.  
As a result, Tobit regression was applied to estimate the parameters of the crop 
richness (Margalef index) and crop evenness (Shannon index) models and OLS 
regression was applied to crop concentration (Herfindahl index) model. Parameters for all 
the models were estimated using NLOGIT-4 software program (ESI 2007).  
RESULTS 
Level of Crop Diversification  
Table 3 presents the existing cropping practice and the extent of crop diversity 
amongst the sampled households in each region. It is clear from table 3 that there are 
substantial variations among the regions with respect to each of the aspects considered. 
Although 51 percent of the total farmers adopted modern rice monoculture, a substantial 
37 percent of the total farmers adopted both modern rice as well as a diversified cropping 
system. In terms of area allocated to crops, the non-rice crops cover an estimated 19 
percent of gross cropped area. In fact, farmers produce a wide range of crops in a 
cropping year. The mean number of crops grown is estimated at 3.6 with a maximum of 
11 crops in a year. The lower panel of table 3 presents the actual measure of crop 
diversity using the three indices of richness, evenness and concentration. All the three 
indices clearly indicate that cropping system in Bangladesh is relatively diverse, 
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Table 3. Extent of Crop Diversity Among Sampled Farmers 
 
Variables Comilla  Jessore Jamalpur  All  region 
Proportion of farmers:         
Only modern rice adopter   0.51  0.27  0.65  0.51 
Only diverse crop adopter   0.16  0.23  0.02  0.12 
Adopter of both diversified crop and 
modern rice   0.33  0.50  0.33  0.37 
Proportion of gross cropped area under:        
Modern rice only  0.65  0.32  0.63  0.56 
Diverse crops (excluding all types of rice)  0.22  0.37  0.07  0.19 
Traditional rice only  0.13  0.31  0.30  0.25 
Average number of crops grown in one 
year 3.34  4.19  3.35  3.57 
Standard deviation  1.57  2.16  1.73  1.85 
Maximum number of crops grown in one 
year 
8.00 11.00  10.00 11.00 
Crop diversification indices of         
Species concentration (Herfindahl index)  0.69  0.46  0.63  0.60 
Species richness (Margalef index)  0.28  0.43  0.24  0.30 
Species evenness (Shannon index)  0.55  0.96  0.59  0.67 
Number of observations (farm households) 126  105  175  406 
Notes: The actual data were collected at plot level. Therefore, the total plot level observations 
of all types of crops grown by these 406 farmer stands at 1,448. Number of observations 
of modern rice = 622 (Aus = 25, Aman = 150, and Boro = 447); traditional rice = 324 
(Aus = 37, Aman = 266, and Boro = 21); and diverse crops = 502 (wheat = 103, jute = 92, 
potatoes = 59, pulses = 70, spices = 47, oilseeds = 71, vegetables = 44, and cotton = 16). 
Pulses in turn include lentil, mungbean, and gram. Spices include onion, garlic, chilly, 
ginger, and turmeric. Oilseeds include sesame, mustard, and groundnut. Vegetables 
include eggplant, cauliflower, cabbage, arum, beans, gourds, radish, and leafy vegetables. 
 
Table 4 presents the input use rates classified by the level of farm diversification. We 
designated farms censored at zero as the ‘specialized farms
8’ who happens to grow only a 
single crop of modern rice, and the others as the ‘diversified farms’. It is clear from table 
4 that the operational size of diversified farms is significantly higher and the use rates of 
inputs per hectare, except pesticides and irrigation, are significantly lower. The use rates 
of labor, animal power services and fertilizers are 25, 13 and 19 percent lower among 
diversified farms compared with those of specialized farms
9. Although the gross value of 
output is significantly higher for specialized farms, profits are similar between specialized 
and diversified farms, due to significantly lower use of inputs by the latter. 
Summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analyses are presented in 
table 5. The farm-specific variables provide a summary of the characteristics of these 
farms. The amount of land cultivated per farm is 0.98 ha. The average level of education 
is less than four years; experience in farming is 26 years; average family size is six 
persons; 22 percent of income is derived off-farm; and only 13 percent of farmers have 
had contact with extension officers during the past year. 
 
                                                        
8 The specialized farms are those which scored zero values for both Margalef and Shannon indices, which in 
turn scored 1 on Herfindahl index.  The Economic Determinants of Crop Diversity on Farms … 
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(Diversified vs. Specialized) 
t-ratio 
Land area cultivated (ha)  1.17 0.53 0.56  4.99*** 
Labor (days/ha)  92.62 123.86 -31.24  -6.85*** 
Animal power services 
(pair-days/ha)  
26.34 30.37 -4.04 -4.45*** 
Fertilizer (kg/ha)   212.37 262.74 -50.37  -6.30*** 
Pesticides  (Taka/ha)  288.96 306.50 -17.54  -0.38 
Irrigation (Taka/ha)  1,587.16 1,528.68 58.47  0.44 
Gross value of output 
(Taka/ha) 
22,164.46 24,470.43 -2,305.86 -2.99*** 
Profits (Taka/ha)  12,616.01 13,202.84 -586.83  0.82 
Number of farms  299 107    
Notes: Profits = (gross value of output – variable cost of all inputs). *** = significant at 1 
percent level (p<0.01) 
 
Table 5. Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in the Models 
 
Variables Unit  of  Measurement  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Price variables      
Fertilizer price  Taka per kg  5.85  1.38 
Animal power price  Taka per animal pair-days  83.56  17.34 
Labor wage  Taka per person-day  44.67  8.22 
Pesticide price  Taka per 100 gm/ml  1015.14  1300.95 
Modern rice price  Taka per kg  7.57  2.61 
Jute price  Taka per bale  9.59  0.88 
Cash crop price (overall)  Taka per kg  4.95  2.35 
Socio-economic characteristics of farm and household    
Amount of land cultivated  Hectare  0.98  1.02 
Farming experience  Years  25.51  14.21 
Education of farmer  Completed year of schooling  3.74  4.26 
Family size  Persons per household  6.02  2.53 
Ratio of working male member  Number  0.27  0.15 
Value of livestock owned  Thousand taka  7.79  8.38 
Other farm capital asset   Thousand taka  4.19  12.95 
Amount of loan taken  Thousand taka  4.08  13.29 
Tenurial status  Proportion of land rented in   0.20  0.29 
Irrigation 
Proportion of land under 
irrigation 0.62  0.30 
Extension contact 
Dummy (1 if had contact, 0 
otherwise) 0.13  0.33 
Membership in NGOs 
Dummy (1 if member, 0 
otherwise) 0.29  0.45 
Infrastructure index  Number  33.32  14.95 
Soil fertility index  Number  1.68  0.19 








                                                                                                                                                 
9 The Herfindahl index is an index of crop concentration. Therefore, a negative sign of the coefficient on the 
explanatory variable implies positive relationship with diversity and vice-versa. Sanzidur Rahman 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics of the Variables Used in the Models (Continued) 
 
Variables Unit  of  Measurement  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Diversity indices      
Species concentration (Herfindahl)  Number  0.60  0.46 
Species richness (Margalef)  Number  0.30  0.27 
Species evenness (Shannon)  Number  0.67  0.51 
Number of observations    406   
 
Table 6. Economic Determinants of Crop Diversity on Farms 
 
Tobit Model of Richness 
Index 
Tobit Model of Evenness 
Index
OLS Model of Concentration 
Index 
Variables 
Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 1.4006*** 4.22 3.0168*** 5.18 -0.4805**  -1.97 
Price variables    
Fertilizer price  -0.0477*** -4.18 -0.0872*** -4.35 0.0379***  4.47 
Animal power price  -0.0031*** -2.81 -0.0056*** -2.86 0.0024***  2.87 
Labor wage  0.0018 0.63 0.0044 0.91 -0.0026  -1.29 
Pesticide price  0.0001 0.12 -0.0001 -0.08 0.0001  0.21 
Modern rice price  -0.0351*** -6.32 -0.0819*** -8.40 0.0394***  9.85 
Jute price  -0.0209 -1.41 -0.0411 -1.57 0.0187  1.63 
Cash crop price (overall)  0.0139** 2.42 0.0076 0.76 -0.0006  -0.13 
Socio-economic  
characteristics    
Amount of land cultivated  0.0643*** 3.53 0.1345*** 4.20 -0.0444***  -3.23 
Farming experience  0.0017 1.59 0.0034* 1.78 -0.0014*  -1.72 
Education of farmer  0.0110*** 2.88 0.0161** 2.40 -0.0065**  -2.27 
Family size  -0.0017 -0.26 0.0039 0.34 -0.0029  -0.61 
Ratio of working male 
member -0.0343 -0.35 -0.1163 -0.67 0.0585  0.81 
Value of livestock owned  0.0036* 1.85 0.0066* 1.92 -0.0021  -1.40 
Other farm capital asset   -0.0019 -1.39 -0.0050** -2.12 0.0022**  2.18 
Amount of loan taken  0.0002 0.16 0.0020 0.95 -0.0011  -1.22 
Tenurial status  -0.1325** -2.42 -0.2781*** -2.91 0.1258***  3.22 
Irrigation -0.2399*** -4.84 -0.4451*** -5.11 0.1861***  5.13 
Extension contact  0.0476 1.11 0.0972 1.29 -0.0368  -1.14 
Membership in NGOs  0.0599* 1.92 0.0814 1.49 -0.0237  -1.02 
Soil fertility index  -0.0804 -0.71 -0.2034 -1.03 0.0815  0.98 
Infrastructure index  -0.0049*** -3.53 -0.0093*** -3.81 0.0039***  3.98 
Jessore region  0.0455 0.78 0.1029 1.00 -0.0340  -0.80 
Comilla region  -0.0381 -0.61 -0.1620 -1.49 0.0736*  1.65 
Model diagnostics    
Log likelihood  -97.31 -273.55 -97.41   
χ
2
(23, 0.99) 232.53*** 274.53*** --   
F(23, 382) -- -- 16.61***   
Pseudo-R
2/Adjusted R
2  0.54 0.33 0.47  
Uncensored observations  299 299 406   
Left censored observations  107 107 --   
Number of observations  406 406 406   
Notes: *** = significant at 1 percent level (p<0.01); ** = significant at 5 percent level 
(p<0.05); * = significant at 10 percent level (p<0.10). 
 
Table 6 presents the parameter estimates of all three regression models. Prior to 
describing the results, we discuss estimation diagnostics briefly. A total of 107 
observations were censored on the left at 0, implying that these are the specialized farms. 
The presented models were able to explain 54 and 33 percent of the variations in crop 
diversity as reflected by pseudo-R
2 in crop richness and evenness models and 47 percent The Economic Determinants of Crop Diversity on Farms … 
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in the crop concentration model reflected by adjusted-R
2 value, respectively. Coefficients 
on 11 out of a total of 23 variables were significantly different from zero at 10 percent 
level at least in each of the models, indicating that the variables included in the models to 
explain crop diversity were correctly justified. The signs of the coefficients mirror each 
other in all three models indicating robustness of the results, although their magnitudes 
differ slightly across models
9. Coefficients of the Tobit models cannot reveal the 
magnitude of the effect directly. Therefore, their marginal effects
10 were estimated and 
presented in table 7.  
 
Table 7. Marginal Effects of the Economics Determinants of Crop Diversity on 
Farms 
 
Tobit Model of Richness 
Index  
Tobit Model of Evenness 
Index 
OLS Model of Concentration 
Index 
Variables 
Coefficient t-ratio  Coefficient t-ratio  Coefficient  t-ratio 
Constant  1.1633*** 4.20  2.7194*** 5.18 -0.4805**  -1.97 
Price variables           
Fertilizer price  -0.0398***  -4.18  -0.0785***  -4.34  0.0379***  4.47 
Animal power price  -0.0026***  -2.80  -0.0051***  -2.86  0.0024***  2.87 
Labor  wage  0.0015 0.63  0.0040 0.91  -0.0026 -1.29 
Pesticide price  0.0009  0.12  -0.0001  -0.08  0.0001  0.21 
Modern rice price  -0.0292***  -6.37  -0.0741***  -8.50  0.0394***  9.85 
Jute  price  -0.0175 -1.42  -0.0371 -1.57  0.0187  1.63 
Cash crop price (overall)  0.0115**  2.40  0.0067  0.74  -0.0006  -0.13 
Socio-economic 
characteristics 
         
Amount of land cultivated  0.0536***  3.53  0.1214***  4.20  -0.0444***  -3.23 
Farming  experience  0.0015  1.61  0.0031* 1.79  -0.0014* -1.72 
Education of farmer  0.0092***  2.90  0.0145**  2.40  -0.0065**  -2.27 
Family  size  -0.0014  -0.25 0.0036  0.35 -0.0029  -0.61 
Ratio of working male 
member 
-0.0288 -0.35  -0.1054 -0.67  0.0585  0.81 
Value of livestock owned  0.0031*  1.86  0.0060*  1.93  -0.0021  -1.40 
Other farm capital asset   -0.0016  -1.40  -0.0045**  -2.13  0.0022**  2.18 
Amount of loan taken  0.0002  0.16  0.0018  0.94  -0.0011  -1.22 
Tenurial status  -0.1101**  -2.41  -0.2513***  -2.91  0.1258***  3.22 
Irrigation -0.1997***  -4.84  -0.4026***  -5.14  0.1861***  5.13 
Extension  contact 0.0399 1.11  0.0873 1.28  -0.0368 -1.14 
Membership in NGOs  0.0503*  1.94  0.0734  1.49  -0.0237  -1.02 
Soil fertility index  -0.0655  -0.69  -0.1820  -1.02  0.0815  0.98 
Infrastructure index  -0.0041***  -3.52  -0.0084***  -3.81  0.0039***  3.98 
Jessore  region  0.0381 0.78  0.0918 0.99  -0.0340 -0.80 
Comilla  region  -0.0313 -0.61  -0.1460 -1.49  0.0736* 1.65 
Notes: *** = significant at 1 percent level (p<0.01); ** = significant at 5 percent level 
(p<0.05); * = significant at 10 percent level (p<0.10). Computing marginal effects of 
dummy variables in censored regression models are highly complicated. However, 
Greene (2007) claims that the default computational method of marginal effects (i.e., 
coefficient * probability of non-censored observations) for the dummy variables in 
NLOGIT-4 software provides a remarkably close guesstimate of the true effect (ESI, 
2007). 
 
The likelihood of crop diversity increases significantly by a decline in the prices of 
fertilizers and animal power services. For example, a one percent decline in the price of 
fertilizers will increase crop richness by 4 percent, evenness by 8 percent and diversity by 
                                                        
10 Since, OLS model is used to estimate the parameters of the crop concentration model, the regression 
coefficient essentially depicts the marginal effects. Therefore, the regression result from table 6 was 
reproduced for this model in table 7. Sanzidur Rahman 
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5 percent, respectively. This is expected because some crops, particularly vegetables 
and/or potatoes, require large amount of fertilizers and, therefore, a decline in fertilizer 
prices would induce the switch from conventional rice farming. Similarly, a reduction in 
the price of moder rice will significantly promote crop diversity. Alternatively, a rise in 
rice price will promote modern rice monoculture. Also, an increase in the cash crop price 
will significantly increase crop diversity as expected, although the magnitude of influence 
is quite low, about 1 percent.  
Farm size is positively related to promoting crop diversity, as expected. The 
implication is that, as farm size increases, farmers are able to choose a diversified 
portfolio of crops which satisfies both consumption purposes as well as generate 
surpluses for the market by growing high value non-cereal and/or cash crops. Benin et al. 
(2004) also found significant relationship of farm size with crop diversity in Ethiopian 
highlands. In addition to farm size, livestock ownership also positively influences farmers 
to diversify, as expected. Benin et al. (2004) also found a similar significant relationship 
of oxen ownership with crop diversity. On the other hand, farm capital asset promotes 
specialization towards modern rice monoculture, although the magnitude of influence is 
very small. 
Availability of irrigation is the single most important determinant of specialization 
towards modern rice monoculture, as expected (see the crop concentration model). This 
result corroborate with the finding of Hossain et al. (1990), who noted that access to 
irrigation is a major determinant of modern rice technology adoption in Bangladesh. In 
other words, cropping diversity is significantly higher in areas with no irrigation, which 
corroborates with the conclusions of Mahmud, Rahman and Zohir (1994) and Morris, 
Chowdhury and Meisner (1996). In fact, wheat provides highest returns in non-irrigated 
zones and in areas that are unsuitable for Boro rice (Morris, Chowdhury and Meisner 
1996). Benin et al. (2004) reported similar effect but its influence was not significantly 
different from zero.  
Owner operators are more likely to diversify their farms as compared to the tenants, 
who tend to specialize towards modern rice monoculture, which corroborates with the 
finding of Hossain et al. (1990). This is because tenurial system in Bangladesh is largely 
based on arrangements related to rice production. In the most common tenurial arrangement 
practiced in Bangladesh, the landlord receives one-third of the crop output share (mostly 
rice). The incidence of input cost share by the landlord varies across regions. Areas where 
such cost is shared (usually on a 50-50 basis), the arrangement is based on sharing of 
relatively scarce input, e.g., fertilizer, irrigation and/or animal power hire costs (Rahman 
1998). Therefore, existing tenurial arrangement seems to work well when the tenant grows 
rice. However, when a diversified cropping system is adopted, it may exert a discouraging 
effect, because the amount to be received as output share cannot be clearly estimated a 
priori. 
The education level of farmer and farming experience, both have a significant 
positive relationship with crop diversity, as expected. As mentioned earlier, the ability to 
process information increases with education as well as experience. Therefore, educated 
and/or experienced farmers choose to adopt a diversified cropping system in order to take 
advantage of all the potential benefits arising from making such a choice, e.g., high 
returns for a particular crop, low overall resource cost, and/or spreading of scarce family 
labor evenly over a crop year.  
Farm households with membership in development NGOs are also likely to diversify. 
This is expected because most development NGOs in the rural regions of Bangladesh The Economic Determinants of Crop Diversity on Farms … 
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promote vegetable production by involving female clientele of the farming households, 
popularly known as kitchen gardens.  
The likelihood of adopting a diversified cropping system is significantly higher in 
regions with developed infrastructure
11. The influence of developed infrastructure in 
adopting a diversified cropping system is obvious. For example, vegetable production 
provides a significantly higher return (Rahman 1998), but is highly perishable and needs 
to be marketed immediately after harvest. The prospect of doing so increases only in 
regions with developed infrastructure.  
Farmers in Comilla region has the lowest crop diversity and tends to specialize 
towards modern rice monoculture, which is also evident in table 3. This is because, 
Comilla region is a densely populated region with relatively small farm size and all 
technological innovations relating to ‘Green Revolution’ have been initiated in this region 
through BARD (the Bangladesh Academy of Rural Development) located in the central 
district of Comilla.  
Discussions 
Results of this study clearly reveal that a host of price and non-price factors influence 
farmers’ decision to diversify. When a farm diversifies into a variety of crops, the farmer 
uses the opportunity to select enterprises that complement each other, given the nature of 
seasonality in demand for various inputs. The cropping system in Bangladesh is largely 
influenced by access to water. The cropping pattern can be broadly classified into 
cropping under rainfed and irrigated conditions, which again vary according to the degree 
of seasonal flooding. As mentioned earlier, although many non-cereals are more 
profitable than producing modern rice, their expansion has stagnated due to the 
incompatibility of the existing modern irrigation systems (Mahmud, Rahman and Zohir 
1994). In general, the proportion of non-cereal crops is lower under irrigated conditions 
as compared to rainfed conditions (Mahmud, Rahman and Zohir 1994), which is also 
demonstrated in this study. For example, crop diversity is significantly lower in the 
Comilla region when compared with Jamalpur and Jessore regions. This is because some 
of our sampled households in Comilla region were located within the catchment area of 
the Meghna-Dhonagoda Flood Control, Drainage and Irrigation (FCD/I) project, where 
modern rice monoculture is the norm because of the assured availability of surface water 
for irrigation at a cheap rate (Rahman 1998). Also, as mentioned above, ‘Green 
Revolution’ towards modern rice monoculture is also initiated in Comilla region, which 
later expanded to every corner of Bangladesh. 
An important issue that limits the scope to expand non-cereals is the existence of the 
price risk associated with uncertainties in marketing, particularly for perishable crops, 
such as vegetables. In fact, annual variability in harvest prices is as high as 15–25 percent 
for most fruits and vegetables (including potatoes) and 20–40 percent for spices as 
compared to only 5–6 percent for cereals (Mahmud, Rahman and Zohir 1994). This 
perhaps explains the decline in the area under spices between the census years (Table 1). 
Mahmud, Rahman and Zohir (1994) further noted that the price shock is most severe at 
the level of primary markets during harvest seasons. Delgado (1995) stressed the need for 
addressing marketing issues and constraints as a priority option to promote agricultural 
diversification in sub-Saharan African regions. This is because in the absence of Sanzidur Rahman 
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improved markets, the agricultural sector is likely to suffer from demand constraints as 
well as a weak supply response, thereby, affecting growth. One way to lower the price 
risk is through improvements in marketing, which in turn depends on the development of 
the rural infrastructure.  
Our results clearly show that prices of modern rice and cash crops have significant 
bearing on farmers’ decision to diversify. Also, developed rural infrastructure 
significantly promotes adoption of a diversified cropping system. Infrastructure 
development in turn may also open up opportunities for marketing, storage and resource 
supplies, which complements crop diversification. For example, Ahmed and Hossain 
(1990) concluded that farms in villages with relatively developed infrastructure use 
relatively greater amounts of fertilizer and market a higher percentage of their agricultural 
products in Bangladesh. Evenson (1986) noted a strong relationship between roads and 
increased agricultural production in the Philippines. He claimed that a 10 percent increase 
in roads would lead to a 3 percent increase in production in the Philippines. Ahmed and 
Donovan (1992) concluded that “the degree of infrastructural development is in reality 
the critical factor determining the success of market-oriented sectoral and macroeconomic 
policies in the developing world” (p39).   
Also, it should be noted that the non-cereals produced by most farmers comprised 
largely traditional varieties, which are low yielding. Strategy to improve varieties of non-
cereals, therefore, provides further potential to improve productivity gains from 
diversification. Conventionally, the R&D activities in Bangladesh are largely 
concentrated on developing modern rice varieties to the neglect of most other crops. 
Among the non-cereals, modern technology is only well established in potato cultivation 
(Mahmud, Rahman and Zohir 1994). The Bangladesh Agricultural Research Institute 
(BARI) is entrusted with the responsibility of developing modern varieties of all cereal 
and non-cereal crops except rice and jute. To date, a total of 131 improved varieties of 
various cereal and non-cereal crops have been developed and released by BARI (Hossain 
et al. 2006). The thrust in developing and releasing improved varieties by BARI actually 
gained momentum from mid-1990s, a complementary effort to government’s emphasis on 
promoting crop diversification in its Fifth Five Year Plan document (1997–2002). 
However, there is a need to examine the impact of these new releases on farmers’ 
portfolios of crop choices at the farm level, because the technical and socio-economic 
constraints on the diffusion of these technologies remain unexplored and less understood 
(Mahmud, Rahman and Zohir 1994). 
Farmers’ wealth status in the form of farm size and livestock ownership also has 
significant influence on crop diversity. Therefore, shrinking of farm size that we observed 
over the years is likely to adversely affect crop diversity. However, improvement in the 
livestock sector in order to promote livestock ownership by individual farmers could 
partially offset such a detrimental effect of shrinking farm sizes on crop diversity.   
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study was to identify the economic determinants of crop diversity on 
farms in rural Bangladesh. The computed value of diversity indices of species 
concentration (Herfindahl), richness (Margalef) and evenness (Shannon) confirm that 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 The index reflects the underdevelopment of infrastructure, and therefore, a negative sign indicates positive 
effect on the dependent variable. In other words, the positive sign on the coefficient implies positive 
relationship towards crop diversification. The Economic Determinants of Crop Diversity on Farms … 
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farming system in Bangladesh is still relatively diverse despite four decades of thrust in 
the diffusion of a ‘Green Revolution’ technology package aimed at promoting modern 
rice monoculture. Results reveal that a host of price and non-price factors significantly 
influence farmers’ decision to diversify. Likelihood of diversification increases with a fall 
in the prices of fertilizers, animal power services and modern rice and a rise in the price 
of cash crops. Crop diversification is positively influenced by farm size, livestock 
ownership, farming experience, education, membership in NGOs, regions with developed 
infrastructure and unavailability of irrigation. Also, diversification is significantly higher 
among owner operators.  
Policy Implications 
The key policy implications that emerge from this study are that crop diversification 
can be promoted significantly by investing in rural infrastructural development, education 
targeted at the farming population, livestock sector, and supporting NGOs working in the 
rural areas. Also, price policies aimed at reducing fertilizer and animal power prices and 
increasing cash crop prices would significantly promote crop diversity. A diversified 
cropping system is likely to have a positive impact on agricultural sustainability, as it is 
clear from the literature that the Green Revolution technology based on modern rice 
monoculture is unsustainable in the long-run. Therefore, the present thrust at the planning 
level to promote crop diversification is a step in the right direction. Furthermore, 
appropriate land reform policies that focus on delegating land ownership to landless, 
marginal and small farmers as well as improvements in existing tenurial system, which is 
now biased towards favoring modern rice monoculture, would boost the number of owner 
operators, who are the most likely adopters of a diversified cropping system. Another area 
of intervention is in the livestock sector, which is a crucial input in the farming industry. 
The aim would be to promote livestock ownership by individual farmers which have a 
significant positive influence on crop diversity.  
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ABSTRACT 
This study addressed the pricing-to-market behavior and the completeness of 
exchange rate pass-through in the EU market for Lake Victoria (Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda) fish. Results suggest that European importers priced-to-market when purchasing 
fresh fillets from Kenya and frozen fillets from Uganda. The estimated exchange rate 
effect for fresh fillet imports indicated that 50% of currency devaluations are passed 
through to import prices denominated in the exporting country’s currency (shillings). 
Only 30% of currency devaluations are passed through to the import prices of frozen 
fillets denominated in shillings. Overall, results suggest that EU importers were able to 
adjust import prices downward when currency values declined in Kenya, Tanzania or 
Uganda. This suggests that Lake Victoria fish exporters do not fully benefit from 
exchange rate policies to encourage exports.    
 
Key words: Lake Victoria, EU, fish, pricing-to-market, exchange rate pass-through  
JEL Classification: Q17, F13  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The noncompetitive pricing behavior of large exporters has been extensively studied. Past 
research that addressed exporter market power have utilized the pricing-to-market (PTM) 
hypothesis (Krugman 1987) which states that a large exporter can price discriminate across 
destination markets given changes in bilateral exchange rates (Miljkovic 1999). Since Knetter 
(1989) developed an empirical methodology for testing PTM behavior, a number of studies 
have followed which include Pick and Park (1991), and Yumkella, Unnevehr and Garcia 
(1994). The PTM literature is primarily comprised of exporter oriented studies, and as noted 
                                                        
1 Department of Agricultural Economics Mississippi State University PO Box 5187 Mississippi State, MS 39762 
Phone: (662) 325-0200 Fax: (662) 325-8777 E-mail: muhammad@agecon.msstate.edu Andrew Muhammad 
and Ardian Harri are Assistant Professors in the Department of Agricultural Economics at Mississippi State 
University. Andrew Muhammad and Ardian Harri 
 
72
by Devadoss and Song (2006), market imperfections due to oligopsony (importer) power 
have received far less attention in the new trade theory literature. 
Karim (2005) notes that there have been a large number of empirical studies considering 
the extent to which changes in exchange rates are passed through to import prices. Exchange 
rate pass-through (EPT) is the percentage change in local currency import prices following a 
1% change in the bilateral exchange rate between an importing and exporting country. A one-
to-one response of import prices to exchange rate changes is referred to as complete EPT 
while a less than one-to-one response is referred to as partial or incomplete EPT 
(Rakotoarisoa and Shapouri 2001). Empirical studies of exchange rate pass-through (EPT) 
have largely focused on the extent to which exchange rate movements are transmitted to the 
pricing of traded goods versus absorbed in the profit margins of firms. Most studies have 
focused on the industrialized countries. EPT research for developing countries has been 
lacking (Karim 2005). 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the analysis of importer PTM behavior and 
EPT in developing countries. Developing countries have common characteristics in that they 
tend to be price takers in international markets and are dependent upon industrialized 
countries for export disappearance where exports are typically concentrated in a single 
destination country or market. This geographic concentration of exports can have negative 
economic consequences. Exports are more vulnerable to fluctuations in a single country or 
region’s import demand and economic conditions, and exports are particularly vulnerable to 
protectionist policies (McGowan 1976; Moss and Ravenhill 1989). Moreover, the 
concentration of exports could give rise to importer price discrimination resulting in relatively 
lower prices for exports (Rakotoarisoa and Shapouri 2001). 
The primary objective of this study is to test the PTM hypothesis and the completeness of 
EPT in the EU market for Lake Victoria fish. The fish sector is of particular importance 
because it is considered a “nontraditional” agricultural sector different from traditional sectors 
such as coffee, cotton and tea. Unlike traditional agricultural exports which are mostly raw 
commodities, a significant amount of domestic value added occurs in the nontraditional 
sectors creating employment for poor rural households. Nontraditional exports are also 
considered to be instrumental in restoring balance of payments, increasing export earnings 
and reducing export revenue variability in the Lake Victoria region, and are important to 
overall economic growth (Dijkstra 2001). Increased investments in nontraditional exports 
have resulted in Lake Victoria fish being a major source of foreign exchange for riparian 
countries, particularly for Uganda where fish is the second largest export by value (Abila 
2000; Uganda Export Promotion Board 2005). 
Following Knetter (1989), Rakotoarisoa and Shapouri (2001) developed a method for 
testing the PTM hypothesis for large importing countries. Aside from being the fist study to 
analyze PTM behavior in the context of a large importer, there study also highlighted a 
common phenomenon with certain agricultural exports from developing countries which is 
the tendency for a single industrialized country to account for a significant percent of export 
disappearance. This is particularly true in the EU market for Lake Victoria fish where, in 
2005, the EU accounted for 98%, 90% and 65% of all fresh fillet exports from Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania, respectively, and imported 60%, 35% and 10% of all frozen fillet 
exports from Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania, respectively (UNCOMTRADE 2006). Given that 
the EU is the principal market for Lake Victoria fish, it is not unlikely that the concentration 
of fish exports has resulted in importer price discrimination. Pricing-To-Market and Exchange Rate Pass-Through in European Import Markets… 
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PTM behavior on the part of EU importers and the completeness of EPT is of particular 
importance to the fish exporting sectors in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda with even broader 
implications for the macroeconomy. Theoretically, a shilling devaluation should results in 
higher exports prices (in shillings), increased fish exports and increased export revenue (Koo 
and Kennedy 2005, pp. 218-220). However, with incomplete or partial EPT, exporters do not 
fully benefit from currency devaluations. This has important implications for the effect of 
monetary policy on domestic industries. For instance, in an effort to increase export revenue, 
the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) of the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund mandated currency devaluations for developing countries as a precondition for 
receiving financial support (Wobst 2001; Welch and Oringer 1998). PTM behavior and 
partial EPT could diminish the effects of such policies or render them ineffective (Mumtaz, 
Oomen and Wang 2005). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a brief 
overview of the fish exporting industries around Lake Victoria and their relationship to the 
EU. Exchange rate movements from 2000-2006 and their impact on import prices are also 
discussed in this section. The third section presents a brief overview of the conceptual model. 
The fourth section gives an overview of the data and estimation methods. The fifth section 
presents the empirical results. In the final section we summarize the results and give closing 
remarks. 
2. BACKGROUND 
Lake Victoria is the second biggest freshwater lake in the world. At 69,000 km
2, the lake 
is the same size as Ireland and is shared between three countries: Tanzania (which possesses 
49%), Uganda (45%) and Kenya (6%) (Bokea and Ikiara 2000). Fish exports from Lake 
Victoria and neighboring waters have been an important source of revenue for riparian 
countries. In 2004, total fish exports for the region were 94 million kilograms (kg), valued at 
$256 million dollars. Exports for each country were 46, 31 and 17 million kg for Tanzania, 
Uganda and Kenya respectively. From 2000 to 2005, the fish exporting sectors in the three 
countries grew by 24% (Kenya), 11% (Tanzania) and 89% (Uganda) annually 
(UNCOMTRADE, 2006).  
The development of the fish exporting sectors around Lake Victoria is relatively recent. 
Of the three countries, Kenya was the first to establish processing plants dedicated to exports. 
Uganda and Tanzania soon followed (Dijkstra 2001). Prior to the late 1980s, Lake Victoria 
fisheries provided for local populations for the most part. In the decades that followed, over 
exploitation of fish stocks in industrialized countries increased dependence on fish stocks in 
the Lake Victoria region. Consequently, the number of fish processing plants along Lake 
Victoria increased significantly. The first processing plant for the export market was built in 
late 1980. By 2000, 35 factories had been constructed, of which 25 were established after 
1990 (Reynolds and Greboval 1988; Abila 2000). 
The primary fish export from Lake Victoria is the Nile perch in fillet form. Introduced in 
the early 1960s, the Nile perch has been the subject of controversy due to the 200 indigenous 
fish species becoming extinct as a result of the Nile perch’s predatory nature. Ecological 
impacts aside, the introduction of the Nile perch resulted in unprecedented catches, stimulated 
commercial fisheries and increased socio-economic benefits for the people in the riparian Andrew Muhammad and Ardian Harri 
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states (Export Processing Zone Authority 2005; Pringle 2005; Ntiba, Kudoja and Mukasa 
2001; Dijkstra 2001). As noted by Abila (2000), the development of the fish processing 
sectors around Lake Victoria was a direct result of the extensive growth in Nile perch demand 
in developed countries.  
The EU’s dominance in Lake Victoria’s fish trade was made apparent by three successive 
import bans imposed on fish from the region. The bans were imposed from February 1997 
through June 1998 and March 1999 through August 2000. The first and second bans were due 
to the Spanish Veterinary Authority detecting salmonella microbes in Lake Victoria fish. The 
third ban was the result of fisherman using pesticides and chemicals to intoxicate fish to 
increase catches (Dijkstra 2001). Much of the capital in the fisheries sector went unused 
during this period causing prices and industry output to decline significantly (Marriott, Dillon 
and Hannah 2004). During this period, fresh fillet exports reached an annual low of 5,613 
tons. After the ban was lifted, fresh exports averaged 33,500 tons annually (2001-2003). 
Frozen fillets reached a low of 2,800 tons during this period and have averaged 8,000 tons 
since (Josupeit 2005).  
European import prices denominated in euros (by exporting country) are presented in 
Figures 1 and 2. Overall, import prices for fresh and frozen fillets are highly correlated 
between the three exporting countries. This should be the case given the geographic proximity 
of the three countries and the cross-country homogeneity of their fish exports. Given this 
homogeneity, we would also expect cross-country price differences to be minimal or 
nonexistent. However, with PTM behavior it is possible for import prices (in euros) to differ 
across countries given changes in bilateral exchange rates even when products are relatively 
homogeneous across countries (Miljkovic 1999).  
Cross-country price differences were found in the fresh fillet market. From 2001 through 
2003, the difference in fresh fillet import prices ranged from €0 to about €50. Significant 
price differences occurred in 2004. In April 2004, the price of Tanzania’s fillets (€318) was 
over €100 lower than Uganda’s price (€426) and €73 lower than Kenya’s price (€391). In 
2005 and 2006, Kenya’s price was significantly lower than Uganda and Tanzania. 
Throughout 2006, the price of fresh fillets from Uganda averaged €500. Tanzania’s price was 
€40 lower on average, and Kenya’s price was about €100 lower. Frozen fillet import prices 
were relatively the same across the three exporting countries, particularly in 2005 and 2006 
where the difference in import prices averaged less than €20. 
Indexes of the euro per shilling exchange rate for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (January 
2000-May 2006) are presented in Figure 3. To account for the strength of the euro relative to 
other vehicle currencies, an index of the U.S. dollar per euro exchange rate is also included in 
the figure. The year 2000 is the base year for all indexes (2000 average = 100). Lake Victoria 
currency values relative to the euro were significantly related to the strength of the euro 
relative to the U.S. dollar. Simple regressions showed that 96% of the variation in the Kenyan 
shilling was explained by the value of the euro relative to the dollar. The dollar price of the 
euro also explained 91% and 90% percent of the variation in the Tanzanian shilling and 
Ugandan shilling, respectively. 
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Figure 2. EU import prices for Lake Victoria frozen fillets: July 2001-May 2006 
From January 2000 to early 2002, each country’s currency maintained its value relative to 
euro. Starting in 2002, the euro appreciated against the dollar and consequently, the Kenyan, 
Tanzanian and Ugandan shillings all decreased in value relative to the euro. This continued 
until 2005. Although each country was impacted by the relatively strong euro, the Tanzanian 
shilling lost more value when compare to the other currencies. In 2005, the dollars per euro 
exchange rate began to decrease and the Kenyan shilling became relatively stronger. The 
Ugandan and Tanzanian shillings remained relatively unchanged on average during this 
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Figure 3. Euro per Shilling Exchange Rate Index by Country and the $US per Euro 
exchange rate index: January 2000-May 2006 (2000 average =100) 
A comparison of the imports prices in Figures 1 and 2 and the exchanges rate indexes in 
Figure 3 show the possible relationship between the exchange rate and import prices 
denominated in euros. The dollar per euro exchanged rate increased by 40% during the period 
2002-2004. This resulted in a significant depreciation in the shilling(s) relative to the euro. 
Fillet import prices (in euros) decreased in value during this period more so than any other 
period. When the euro increased in value by 40%, the price of fresh and frozen fillets fell by 
41% and 38% respectively during this period.  
With complete EPT it can be easily shown that import prices denominated in euros 
should be invariant to changes in the exchange rate. The law of one price states that prices in 
euros p€ should equal to prices in shillings psh times the euro per shilling exchange rate e€/sh. 
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With complete EPT the second term on the right hand side of equation (1) is equal to -1 
and equation (1) is equal to 0. Therefore complete EPT implies that exchange rate changes are 
fully pass through to prices denominated in shillings and import prices denominated in euros 
should remain unchanged. The observed relationship between exchange rates and import 
prices in the previous figures may be an indication of partial or incomplete EPT in these 
markets.  Pricing-To-Market and Exchange Rate Pass-Through in European Import Markets… 
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3. CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The PTM hypothesis offers evidence on the role of market structure in international trade. 
Following Knetter (1989), Rakotoarisoa and Shapouri (2001) developed a method for testing 
the PTM hypothesis for large importing countries. Their study investigated whether U.S. 
importers of vanilla beans offered different prices to exporters in developing countries. 
Similar to the U.S. market for vanilla bean imports, the EU dominates fish trade with the 
Lake Victoria region which is comprise of developing countries. Thus, we use the empirical 
model in Rakotoarisoa and Shapouri (2001) for our analysis which is presented in this 
section.  
Let EU fillet imports from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania be represented by x1, x2, and x3 
respectively, and let the inputs required for processing and importing be represented by the 
vector Z. Z includes labor, capital, and other value-added inputs. The production function for 
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m are the domestic and import prices respectively, and w is a vector of input prices. If 
the importer is sufficiently large, import prices are not exogenous and the first order 
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εit is the export supply elasticity for exporting country i. For a small importer εit = ∞, and the 
import price pi
m is equal to the marginal value product, p
dfxi. Therefore, the term in brackets is 
the import price markdown due to monopsony power. Solving equation (2) for pi
m, the import 
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(MPx)it = fxit, which is the marginal product of x.  
Taking the natural log of equation (4) and including an exchange rate term, Rakotoarisoa 
and Shapouri (2001) proposed the following fixed-effects econometric specification for 
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e is the exchange rate and u is the error term. θt and λi are the time and country effects, 
respectively. The parameter θt captures the time effects which can measure changes in the Andrew Muhammad and Ardian Harri 
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quality of imports or increases in the marginal product overtime. λi captures the country effect 
which measures the component of the markdown factor that differs across exporting sources. 
The coefficient α indicates the change in the benefit margin and is also the inverse of the 
pooled elasticity of output price with respect to import price. βi  measures the impact of 
exchange rates on optimal monopsony markdowns.  
Abbott, Patterson, and Reca (1993) indicate that the parameters in equation (4) provide 
the basis for testing PTM behavior when an imported product is not differentiated across 
source countries. This issue was further investigated by Lavoie and Lui (2007) where they 
note that past findings of PTM that are often attributed to price discrimination might 
alternatively be due to product differentiation, particularly when aggregate units values are 
used as proxies for prices. Given that the primary fish export from this region is Nile perch 
which is relatively homogeneous across riparian countries, and given the geographic 
proximity of the three exporting countries, country-specific product differentiation should be 
minimal or nonexistent in this instance. Therefore, the PTM behavior observed in the EU 
market for fresh and frozen fillets should be the result of price discrimination and not product 
differentiation.  
For a small importer, prices are the same across all destinations (no PTM) and changes in 
the bilateral exchange rate do not affect bilateral import prices (complete EPT). This is the 
case when λi = 0 and βi = 0. The lack of market power does not allow the importer to affect 
import prices when the exchange rate varies, or to price discriminate among sources. When λi 
= 0 and βi = 0, equation (5) states the first order condition for a perfectly competitive industry 
which is that import prices equal the marginal value product. 
It is possible for EPT to be complete in the presence of an imperfectly competitive import 
market. This is the case when λi ≠ 0 and βi = 0. Although exchange rate movements have no 
direct impact on the export supply elasticity and do not affect import prices, the supply 
elasticity perceived by importers may be constant but may differ across exporting countries 
allowing for price discrimination. λi  ≠ 0 and βi  ≠ 0 for the ith country indicate price 
discrimination and incomplete EPT (Rakotoarisoa and Shapouri, 2001). 
If the export supply elasticities vary with the exchange rate, then the optimal markdowns 
below marginal import cost will also vary with the exchange rate. This implies that βi ≠ 0. 
The sign of βi reveals the way markdowns respond to exchange rate changes. A negative sign 
indicates that importers adjust prices downward when the exporter’s currency is devalued and 
that exchange rate changes are not fully reflected in import prices denominated in the 
exporter’s currency. Therefore, the percentage of devaluations pass through to import prices 
denominated in the exporter’s currency can be calculated as 1-⏐βi⏐. 
4. DATA AND ESTIMATION METHODS 
In this study we considered the three exporting countries in the Lake Victoria region 
(Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) and one importing country (region) the EU. The 
products/markets were frozen and fresh fillets. The data used in the analysis were monthly 
and covered the period July 2001 through May 2006 for frozen fillets and September 2000 
through May 2006 for fresh fillets. Imported quantities were the CN8 commodity 
classifications “fresh or chilled fillets of freshwater” and “frozen fillets of freshwater” (not Pricing-To-Market and Exchange Rate Pass-Through in European Import Markets… 
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elsewhere specified). Per-unit import values (total value ÷ total quantity) were used as proxies 
for import prices. Country-specific import quantities and values were obtained from Eurostat 
(Statistical Office of the European Communities). Monthly exchange rate data were provided 
by the OANDA Corporation. 
Josupeit (2005) notes that the majority of Nile perch consumed in the EU is imported via 
Belgium or the Netherlands. This suggests that re-export values in Belgium and the 
Netherlands could reflect the wholesale value of Nile perch in the EU. Given that Belgium 
and the Netherlands account for a significant percent of intra-EU exports in the two CN8 
commodity classifications encompassing Nile perch, we use the intra-EU per-unit export 
value (also provided by Eurostat) as a proxy for the domestic price. While this is somewhat 
different from Rakotoarisoa and Shapouri (2001), their study did not involve a re-exported 
product. 
In equation (5) i∈(Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda); ln pi
m is the natural log of EU import 
prices of frozen or fresh fillets in euros per 100 kg; ln p
d is the natural log of EU export prices 
of fresh or frozen fillets in euros per 100kg; and ln eit is the natural log of the bilateral 
exchange rate between the EU and the ith country where e is defined as shillings per euro.   
 A procedure for estimating equation (5) is the Park’s method which is available in SAS 
9.1 (TSCSREG procedure). The Park’s method assumes that the random errors are AR(1) 
with contemporaneous correlation between cross sections and a different AR parameter for 
each cross section. However, Park’s method has been criticized for this assumption (Beck and 
Katz, 1995). Instead, Beck and Katz suggest a single pooled AR parameter for all cross 
sections. Yet, given the nature of the problem with different countries exporting the same 
product to a single country, there may be common shocks affecting the import price for each 
of the exporting countries, e.g. macroeconomic and microeconomic factors that would impact 
Nile perch demand in the EU thus impacting all three countries. This is to a degree reflected 
in the import price movements in Figures 1 and 2. In addition, these common shocks may 
cause the error term in equation (5) to be non-stationary. The existence of common shocks of 
non-stationarity leads to cointegrated series. Bai, Kao, and Ng (2007, p.1-2) notes that in a 
panel data model specified by yit = x’itβ + eit where yit and xit are I(1) processes, and that eit 
are iid across i, cointegration is said to hold if eit are ‘jointly’ I(0), or in other words, (1, −β) is 
the common cointegrating vector between yit and xit for all n units. They further state that 
failure to account for commons shocks can potentially invalidate estimation and inference of 
β.  
Pedroni (2004) provides a series of test for the null hypothesis of no cointegration for 
pooled time series panels. Bai, Kao, and Ng (2007) provide consistent estimators of βi in 
equation (5) in the presence of unobserved common stochastic shocks. In brief, Bai, Kao, and 
Ng (2007) adopt the framework that uit in equation (5) has a common component and a 
stationary idiosyncratic component, thus uit =γ’iFt + νit with Ft representing the unobserved 
common shock. This means that panel cointegration holds when uit = yit - βxit -γ’iFt is jointly 
stationary. Bai, Kao, and Ng (2007) treat the common shocks Ft as parameters and estimate 
them jointly with β using an iterated procedure. Two consistent estimators are derived from 
this procedure, the CupBC estimator which estimates and corrects for the asymptotic bias at 
the final stage of the iteration and CupFM which estimates and corrects for the asymptotic 
bias at every iteration. Readers are referred to Bai, Kao, and Ng (2007) for further discussion. Andrew Muhammad and Ardian Harri 
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An additional point of clarification is that equation (5) contains both I(1) and I(0) 
regressors. The estimated coefficients for the I(0) regressors need no correction for the 
presence of the common shocks. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients for the I(1) 
regressors have distributions as if there are no I(0) regressors except the intercept. To obtain 
estimates for the parameter of the I(0) regressors we use the least squares dummy variables 
(LSDV) model (Kmenta, 1997, pp. 631-635). The residuals from the LSDV model with all 
regressors included are then used in the joint estimation of the common unobserved shocks 
and the coefficients of the I(1) regressors (see Bai, Kao, and Ng 2007, pp. 18-19 for further 
discussion). 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Panel cointegration tests are reported in Table 1. We report Pedroni’s (2004) panel t-stat 
and group t-stat, two of Pedroni’s most powerful statistics. Both statistics reject the null of no 
cointegration. These results provide support for use of the panel cointegration models 
discussed above. Results using the Park’s method are reported in Table 2, and the LSDV, 
CupFM and CupBC estimates are reported in Table 3. Overall there is little difference in the 
estimates of the I(0) regressors using the Park’s method and LSDV method; however, the 
goodness of fit (R
2) is higher for the LSDV method. 
 
Table 1. Pedroni’s Tests of the Null Hypothesis of No Cointegration 
 
Test Fresh  Frozen 
Panel t-stat  -7.558 (0.0001)  -3.459 (0.0003) 
Group t-stat  -42.663 (0.0001)  -10.301 (0.0001) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the probabilities values. 
 
The following discussion is limited to the LSDV estimates and the CupFM and CupBC 
estimates in Table 3. The estimates in Table 2 are presented for comparison only. Although 
relatively small, the time effects are significant for both the fresh and frozen models. Past 
studies suggest that the time effects account for changes in the marginal product overtime. It 
is unlikely that the marginal product would change within a six-year time period and the 
negative time effects may reflect the trend in import prices more so than technological decline 
in fish importing. As expected, the output (re-export) price effects are positive for both fresh 
and frozen fillets. The estimate for α (0.355) in the fresh fillet model indicates that for every 
percentage increase in the re-export value, import prices increased by 0.36%. A percentage 
increase in frozen fillet re-export values results in a 0.19% increase in import prices. The 
country effects (λ) indicate discriminatory pricing in Kenya (fresh fillets) and Uganda (frozen 
fillets). This is likely due to the EU accounting for 98% of all fresh exports from Kenya and 
60% of all frozen exports from Uganda. Although the EU accounted for 90% and 65% of 
fresh exports from Uganda and Tanzania, results indicate no evidence of price discrimination 
between the two countries. In the frozen fillet market, the EU accounted for 60% of Uganda’s 
exports, but only 35% and 10% of exports from Tanzania and Kenya. 
The exchange rate term (e) is defined such that a shilling devaluation (or euro 
appreciation) is indicated by an increase in e.  In both import markets (fresh and frozen fillets) Pricing-To-Market and Exchange Rate Pass-Through in European Import Markets… 
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EPT was incomplete for all exporting countries. As noted by Rakotoarisoa and Shapouri 
(2001), incomplete EPT is the results of noncompetitive pricing only when the country effect 
is also significant, but in the absence of a significant country effect, incomplete EPT may be 
the result of changes in the supply and demand elasticities.  
 
Table 2. Parameter Estimates of the Fixed-Effects models (Park’s method) for EU 
Import Prices of Fresh and Frozen Fillets from Lake Victoria 
 
 Fresh      Frozen   
Parameter Estimate      Estimate   
Intercept 7.489  (0.765) 
a***   7.223  (0.894)  *** 
 Time  effects   
01 θ   -0.111 (0.030)  ***         
03 θ   -0.092 (0.030)  ***    -0.076  (0.030)  ** 
04 θ   -0.076 (0.032)  **    -0.222  (0.036)  *** 
05 θ          -0.083  (0.033)  ** 
 Country  effects   
Kenya λ   2.003 (0.685)  ***    -0.048 (0.605)   
Uganda λ   -0.375 (0.531)     1.282  (0.726)  * 
 Output  price  effect   
α  0.137 (0.061)  **    0.107  (0.092)   
  Exchange rate effects   
1 β
b  -0.959 (0.144)  ***    -0.436  (0.140)  *** 
2 β   -0.244 (0.095)  ***    -0.434  (0.110)  *** 
3 β   -0.326 (0.085)  ***    -0.283  (0.086)  *** 
 R
2=0.37     R
2=0.45  
a Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
b 1, 2, and 3 are Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania respectively. 
*** Significance level = 0.01. 
**  Significance level = 0.05. 
*   Significance level = 0.10. 
 
Exchange rate estimates suggest that EU importers were able to adjust fresh and frozen 
import prices downward when currency values declined in the exporting countries. The 
results show that a devaluation in the Kenyan shilling (1% increase in e) results in a 0.95% 
decrease in fresh fillet import prices denominated in euros. This indicates that 0.05% is 
passed through to prices denominated in Kenyan shillings. A devaluation in the Ugandan 
shilling results in a 0.30% decrease in fresh import prices (in euros) which indicates that 
0.70% is passed through to fresh prices denominated in Ugandan shillings. If the Tanzanian 
shilling is devalued, fresh import prices (in euros) decrease by 0.35%, indicating that 0.65% is 
passed through to fresh prices denominated in Tanzanian shillings. The EPT incompleteness Andrew Muhammad and Ardian Harri 
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is relatively large for fresh fillets from Kenya. Given that the country effect (λ) for Kenya 
was also significantly different from zero, the relatively large incomplete EPT is likely due to 
the combined effects of changes in supply and demand, and discriminatory pricing. Pooled 
estimates of the exchange rate effect (β), which are statistically superior to the LSDV 
estimates indicate an average pass through of 0.50% (Pooled LSDV), 0.48% (CupFM) and 
0.60% (CupBC).  
 
Table 3. Parameter Estimates of the Fixed-Effects models (LSDV, CupFM and CupBC 
methods) for EU Import Prices of Fresh and Frozen Fillets from Lake Victoria 
 
LSDV Estimates 
 Fresh    Frozen 
Parameter Estimate    Estimate 
Intercept 6.187  (0.965)
a***   6.895  (0.845)  *** 
 Time  effects 
01 θ   -0.167 (0.035)***         
02 θ   -0.160 (0.025)***    -0.074 (0.022)  *** 
03 θ   -0.126 (0.020)***    -0.104 (0.017)  *** 
04 θ   -0.114 (0.022)***    -0.285 (0.022)  *** 
05 θ        -0.096  (0.021)  *** 
 Country  effects 
Kenya λ   1.910 (0.673)***    0.010 (0.453)   
Uganda λ   0.122 (0.656)    1.516 (0.572)  *** 
 Output  price  effect 
α  0.355 (0.068)***    0.189 (0.095)  ** 
  Exchange rate effects 
1 β
b  -0.950 (0.114)***    -0.480 (0.104)  *** 
2 β    -0.300 (0.094)***    -0.484 (0.084)  *** 
3 β   -0.351 (0.061)***    -0.303 (0.061)  *** 
   R
2=0.67     R
2=0.85  
Pooled LSDV, CupFM and CupBC estimates for β 
  Exchange rate effects 
Pooled LSDV  -0.501  (0.353)***    -0.798  (0.032) *** 
Pooled CupFM  -0.518  (0.115)***    -0.765  (0.112) *** 
Pooled CupBC  -0.403  (0.065)***    -0.719  (0.271) *** 
a Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
b 1, 2, and 3 are Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania respectively. 
*** Significance level = 0.01. 
**  Significance level = 0.05. 
*   Significance level = 0.10. Pricing-To-Market and Exchange Rate Pass-Through in European Import Markets… 
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For frozen fillets, the LSDV exchange rate effects for each country are relatively close, 
-0.48 for Kenya and Uganda, and -0.30 for Tanzania. Results show that the pooled exchange 
rate estimates were significantly greater than the individual country exchange rate estimates. 
Depending on the pooled estimate considered, a devaluation of the exporter’s currency will 
decrease frozen imports prices (in euros) by 0.80% (LSDV), 0.76% (CupFM) or 0.72% 
(CupBC), indicating that only 20% to 28% of currency devaluations are passed through to 
frozen fillet prices denominated in shillings for either of the three exporting countries.  
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study addressed the pricing-to-market behavior and completeness of exchange rate 
pass-through in the EU market for fish from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Given the high 
concentration of Lake Victoria fish in the EU, EU importers were able to adjust fresh and 
frozen import prices downward when currency values declined in the exporting countries, and 
discriminatory pricing was found for Kenya (fresh imports) and Uganda (frozen imports).  
Pooled estimates of the exchange rate effect for fresh fillets indicated that 50% of 
currency devaluations are passed through to import prices denominated in the exporter’s 
currency. Pooled estimates indicated a greater degree of EPT incompleteness for frozen fillets 
where only 30% of currency devaluations are passed through to exporter-denominated import 
prices.  
The results of this study imply that macroeconomic policy such as exchange rate 
adjustments can lose its effectiveness for generating export revenue in the face of imperfect 
markets. This finding is very important given that the SAP policies of the IMF and World 
Bank include currency devaluations as important to economic development strategies. This 
suggests is that the expected benefit of currency devaluations are not fully realized in the 
importing country and that EU importers simply adjust prices downward when shilling values 
decline. This is particularly true for Kenya (in the fresh fillet market) where not only was 
there evidence of price discrimination, but the incompleteness of EPT was relatively high 
(.95). We would expect that exchange rate policy would have little effect on fresh fillet 
exports in Kenya. In the frozen fillet market, EPT incompleteness was relatively high across 
all countries (combined effects: -0.72 to -0.80). Lastly, given that evidence of price 
discrimination was found for Uganda in this market, it is likely that the behavior of EU 
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ABSTRACT 
The latest round of WTO negotiations has generated proposals that would constrain 
food aid shipments under the export competition pillar of a new agriculture agreement. 
Competing exporters are concerned that new export competition disciplines will push 
commodities that would have otherwise been shipped under export subsidies or credit 
guarantees into food aid, thereby reducing the effectiveness of a new export competition 
pillar. This concern is premised on the assumption that food aid is an alternative outlet to 
export subsidies and credit guarantees for agricultural commodities. This article tests that 
assumption in a time-series model using historical data from the US and finds that 
changes in shipments of commodities under export subsidy and credit guarantees have 
not significantly affected food aid shipments. The model’s results are discussed in the 
context of current WTO proposals on food aid, and suggest that negotiating parties may 
be overzealous in their attempts to collar food aid shipments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The negotiations over export competition disciplines in the World Trade Organization’s 
(WTO) Doha Development Agenda (DDA) have included spirited debates over the inclusion 
of food aid rules. The food aid guidelines that emerged from the Uruguay Round Agreement 
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on Agriculture (URAA) have not been followed by some donor member countries
1 and DDA 
negotiators appear determined to include new rules that will be binding and enforced to the 
standard of other elements of a new Agreement. The presence of food aid rules in 
international trade negotiations is the result of an intersection of the interests of two, often 
divergent, groups; humanitarian advocates and competing agricultural exporters. 
Humanitarian advocates hoped that the coercive measures of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Understanding could be brought to bear on donors to modify their food aid policies 
(minimum donation requirements, untying aid, etc.) because the Food Aid Convention and 
the Food and Agricultural Organization’s Consultative Subcommittee on Surplus Disposal 
have not been effective in governing international food aid shipments (Barrett and Maxwell, 
2006). 
Agricultural exporting member countries of the WTO viewed the prospect of new 
disciplines on export subsidies and credit guarantees as ill-fated without rules on food aid, 
which is widely perceived to have been used as a tool of surplus disposal for some food aid 
donors. This aspect of the DDA negotiations has been framed by the dispute over export 
competition between the EU and the US. US food aid policies are the primary targets of new 
DDA food aid proposal for two reasons. First, the US is the only large donor that still donates 
most of its aid in-kind; in-kind, as opposed to cash-based, food aid is most commonly 
associated with surplus disposal motives and can be highly distortionary in recipient 
countries. The second reason is the reciprocal nature of WTO negotiations; EU negotiators 
are seeking concessions on food aid from the US in return for reductions in EU export 
subsidies. New rules that emerge from a DDA deal will apply to all (developed) member 
countries, but are primarily targeted at the US.  
The WTO agreements are fundamentally commercial trade agreements, not humanitarian 
or economic development treatises. As a result, the most recent draft documents to emerge 
from the DDA negotiations appear to tip towards the interests of competing agricultural 
exporters by outlining rules that limit the circumstances under which food aid shipments will 
be allowed instead of imposing positive food aid obligations (ex: minimum donation 
requirements) on member countries. The underlying concern of some competing exporters is 
that as new rules decrease the volume of commodities that is shipped under export subsidies 
and credit guarantees, some of these commodities will be channelled into food aid and 
potentially displace commercial trade in recipient-country markets (WTO 2008). The 
effectiveness of the proposed new rules on export competition, including food aid, is 
questionable (Cardwell 2008), but a premise on which new food aid rules is based is that food 
aid is an alternative outlet to export subsidies and credit guarantees.  
Given the importance of new food aid rules in a DDA trade deal, it is worth testing the 
validity of this premise. This article examines the historical relationship between alternative 
forms of export competition and provides econometric estimates of the impact of changes in 
one outlet on changes in other outlets. A time-series model is developed that generates 
impulse response functions for shocks to hypothesised alternative forms of export 
competition.  
                                                        
1 Article 10 of the URAA includes guidelines on food aid shipments in an effort to avoid circumvention of export 
subsidy commitments.  These guidelines have not been followed by all member countries and are not 
enforced.  See Cardwell (2008) for a discussion of these guidelines. Food Aid, Surplus Disposal and Multilateral Trade Agreements… 
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The model’s results indicate that food aid has not served as a large or significant 
alternative vent to export subsidies or credit guarantees. A new WTO deal would generate a 
structural rule change in export competition disciplines that is outside the sample of the 
estimation; specifically binding limits on export credit guarantees and the possible 
elimination of export subsidies. As such, the model’s results must be interpreted in an 
historical context. However, the results of this research suggest that negotiating parties may 
be overestimating the historical relationship between food aid and export competition in their 
attempts to collar food aid shipments.   
Section 2 provides an overview of food aid rules in the WTO as well as an outline of 
proposed disciplines on export competition that have emerged from DDA negotiations. 
Section 3 introduces the conceptual and empirical models and describes the data. Section 4 
explains the empirical results and discusses the model’s findings, and section 5 concludes 
with observations.  
FOOD AID AND THE WTO 
The government provision of export subsidies and export credit guarantees have proven 
to be challenging obstacles at the DDA negotiations. Despite the difficulty in reaching 
agreement on the scale and scope of new export competition disciplines, new rules on export 
subsidies and credit guarantees are certain to appear in a final DDA agreement. Because of 
these new rules on export competition, a DDA agreement will also include binding rules on 
food aid shipments, which many negotiating parties view as having been used as an 
alternative to export subsidies and credit guarantees for disposal of domestic agricultural 
surpluses. An important concern among negotiating parties is that as the quantity of 
commodities that is shipped under export subsidies and export credit arrangements declines, 
there will be added pressure on donor countries to dispose of commodities as food aid. Such 
food aid (particularly if it is untargeted
2 in-kind aid) may displace commercial trade in 
recipient countries, thereby undermining the benefits of tighter constraints on export subsidies 
and export credits. This section provides a brief outline of proposed disciplines on export 
subsidies, credits and food aid.
3 
Food aid disciplines in the DDA have evolved over the past few years as negotiating 
parties have struggled to find middle ground that is acceptable to all member countries. Early 
proposals, such as the guidelines in the URAA (ex: untying food aid from donor sourcing) 
and earlier DDA draft modalities (ex: phasing out in-kind aid) no longer appear in WTO 
documents. Positive obligations for member countries, such as those appearing in the Food 
Aid Convention (minimum donation requirements, specification of acceptable commodities), 
are also absent from the proposals. Rather, food aid proposals are negative in nature, and 
outline the circumstances in which food aid shipments would not be subject to export 
competition disciplines.  
                                                        
2 Untargeted food aid is sold on the open market in a recipient country.  Targeted food aid is delivered to intended 
recipients. 
3 See Thompson (2007) for a more thorough examination of DDA proposals for export competition disciplines and 
Cardwell (2008) for a more thorough treatment of DDA proposals on food aid. 
 Ryan Cardwell 
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It appears as though a final agreement will contain a “safe box” for emergency food aid. 
Safe box aid will be exempt from export competition disciplines and allowed only in 
circumstances that meet the WTO’s definition of allowable emergency food aid. There is 
great hesitancy on the part of WTO negotiators to venture into the assessment of a food 
emergency, and negotiators acknowledge that the WTO’s expertise is in commercial trade, 
not in humanitarian and development assistance (WTO 2007a). As such, it appears as though 
the WTO would defer to humanitarian and development organizations for the declaration and 
assessment of food emergencies. The current proposal is that a declaration of an emergency 
by either the affected region’s government or the United Nations would trigger safe box food 
aid. 
Working papers that appeared early in the DDA negotiations (WTO 2006c) broached the 
possibilities of eliminating donor-sourced in-kind aid and phasing out monetized aid.
4  
Competing exporters argue that monetized food aid is not additional consumption and 
necessarily displaces either commercial imports or domestic production, or both. 
Development advocates argue that monetized food aid can depress local food prices and 
generate disincentives for local producers because it is untargeted. Elimination of donor-
country sourced in-kind and monetized aid has met with resistance, however, and these 
proposals have been watered down in subsequent negotiations. The proposals from the 
February 2008 modalities are less instructive, and simply encourage members to make “their 
best efforts to move increasingly towards more cash-based [instead of in-kind] food aid.” 
(WTO, 2008). There is no requirement for the elimination of in-kind food aid. Agricultural 
exporters (chiefly the US
5) appear determined to hang on to donor-country sourced in-kind 
commodity donations as an option. US negotiators have indicated that if food aid programs 
are disciplined in a manner that would reduce the volume of in-kind aid shipments, they do 
not anticipate that US cash-based aid will increase sufficiently to fill the void (Abbott, 2008).  
The elimination of monetized aid has also raised the ire of some non-governmental aid 
agencies, many of whom rely on the proceeds from monetized aid to fund development and 
humanitarian projects.
6 The February 2008 (WTO, 2008) draft modalities call for monetized 
aid in the safe box to be limited to situations that generate funds to finance the delivery of 
food within the recipient country. Monetization of non-emergency food aid is to be allowed 
only for the financing of food delivery or the procurement of agricultural inputs (though most 
of this section falls within square brackets, indicating the lack of consensus on this issue).  
Proposed DDA food aid disciplines have been well received by many developing 
countries who are frequent recipients of food aid. Submissions by African and least-
developed countries (WTO, 2006a) and by the G-20 group of developing countries (WTO, 
2006b) indicate that these member countries are satisfied that new disciplines will not impede 
legitimately needed food aid. 
The presence of food aid disciplines in the export competition pillar of the DDA speaks 
to the concern that member countries have about food aid being used as a method to dispose 
of agricultural commodity stocks, and the potential for food aid displacing commercial trade 
                                                        
4 Monetized aid is in-kind aid that is delivered to the recipient country and sold on the local market.  Proceeds are 
often used for development-related projects. 
5 The US negotiating position has been in favour of continuing current food aid disciplines as outlined in Article 
10.4 of the URAA (Young 2002). 
6 There are also several food aid organizations who oppose the monetization of food aid.  Oxfam and CARE, two 
large international food aid donors, have both expressed opposition to monetization. Food Aid, Surplus Disposal and Multilateral Trade Agreements… 
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in recipient countries. In fact, the tightening of export subsidy and export credit disciplines 
was a primary motivation for member countries to negotiate the inclusion of enforceable food 
aid disciplines in the DDA round. This motivation can be viewed as having two bases. The 
first is that EU negotiators sought reciprocal concessions from the US in response to 
requested reductions in export subsidies. The second is that tighter constraints on export 
subsidies and credit guarantees could push commodities into food aid and displace 
commercial imports. This article analyses the latter. The notion that food aid can lead to 
commercial displacement is widely accepted among WTO member countries, and the July 
2007 draft modalities (WTO, 2007b) contain specific reference to rules that will ensure the 
elimination of commercial displacement that is caused by food aid. It is therefore worth 
discussing the directions that export subsidy and credit disciplines might take in a DDA deal.  
The DDA negotiations have included ambitious proposals on disciplining agricultural 
export subsidies and export credits. The agenda for export subsidies is clear; member 
countries intend to eliminate agricultural export subsidies over an implementation period by 
2013. If this discipline is enforced, then the quantity of commodities that are shipped under 
export subsidies will fall to zero.  
The debate over export credits is less clear. The intention of many negotiating parties is 
to eliminate the subsidy element from officially supported export credits; the means by which 
to achieve this goal is as yet uncertain. The July 2007 modalities outline several key 
objectives including: 1) requiring repayment terms of fewer than 180 days, 2) requiring 
payment of a minimum interest rate, 3) requiring premiums to cover the risk of non 
repayment, and 4) requiring a credit program to be self financing. An export credit program 
that is outside of these disciplines would be considered an export subsidy and have to be 
eliminated by 2013.
7 
DDA negotiations have also included proposals for disciplining exporting state-trading 
enterprises (STEs) (WTO, 2008). The primary thrust of DDA proposals for STEs is the 
elimination of the subsidy element to their operations, including food aid and export credits. 
STEs in developing member countries shall receive special and differential treatment, 
including allowance for programs that stabilize domestic prices and food supply. Young 
(2005) provides a detailed treatment of STEs in DDA negotiations.  
The fallout from a DDA deal will be fewer commodities shipped under export subsidy 
and credit arrangements. Whether this pushes more commodities into food aid will be an 
empirical question that will have to be evaluated after a DDA implantation period. However, 
an assessment of whether this relationship has existed in the past can be conducted using 
historical data. The forthcoming model investigates that historical relationship.  
MODEL AND DATA 
The inclusion of food aid disciplines in the export competition pillar of the DDA 
negotiations is premised on three assumptions. First, that new disciplines on export subsidies 
and credits will be binding and effective. The effectiveness of new rules on export 
competition is far from certain (Thompson 2007), and will have to be evaluated after an 
                                                        
7 There are several important obstacles to a resolution of the negotiations over export credits.  These include 
determining the subsidy element and special and differential treatment for developing countries.  See 
Thompson (2007) for a discussion of these issues. Ryan Cardwell 
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implementation period has passed. A second assumption is that food aid may displace 
commercial trade in recipient-country markets. The degree of displacement depends heavily 
on the level of targeting and the type of aid delivered (i.e. emergency vs. program), but there 
is empirical evidence of such effects (Barrett et al. 1999; Lowder 2004).  The February 2008 
Draft Modalities (WTO, 2008) expressly cite preventing commercial displacement as a goal 
of new food aid disciplines. The third assumption is that tighter constraints on export 
subsidies and credit guarantees could push WTO member countries to channel commodities 
that were previously sold under export subsidies or credit guarantees into food aid. 
This third assumption will ultimately have to be evaluated after an implementation 
period. However, the historical relationship between forms of export competition and food aid 
can be investigated to determine if there is historical justification for the belief that food aid 
has been used as an alternative to export subsidies and credit guarantees. If negative 
covariate, contemporaneous and lagged, relationships between food aid and export 
competition can be established empirically then WTO member countries may be justified in 
their concern about food aid having been used as a tool of surplus disposal. If such 
relationships cannot be observed, then there may be overzealousness on the part of 
negotiating parties to confine food aid shipments. The results of an empirical analysis can 
inform trade policy negotiations. 
Modelling this relationship empirically requires an assessment of how changes in one 
proposed form of export competition affects others; specifically, how changes in the volume 
of commodities shipped under export subsidy or export credit arrangements have affected 
food aid shipments. The URAA implementation phase of 1995-2000 provides a unique 
sample in which allowable export subsidies were decreased according to The Agreement’s 
disciplines. It seems reasonable to investigate a causal relationship between reductions in 
allowable export subsidies and changes in food aid shipments over that period. The nature of 
the URAA scheduled reductions make the investigation of such a relationship impossible, 
however. Export subsidies were bound at levels high enough so that not all member countries 
were utilising all of their allowable allotments. This is particularly the case in the US where 
export subsidies for wheat fell out of favour with the demise of the Export Enhancement 
Program in 1997. Export subsidy disciplines were not binding and reductions in allowable 
subsidies did not translate into reductions in actual subsidies. This “water” in allowable 
export subsidies prevents the empirical establishment of a causal relationship between 
alternative forms of export competition. The URAA did not contain explicit export credit 
disciplines
8, so a link cannot be established between mandated decreases in export credit 
guarantees and food aid shipments.  
An alternative approach is to investigate the historical time-series relationships between 
alternative forms of export competition. This can be done by treating hypothesized 
alternatives as endogenous to each other and estimating the interactive effects of each by 
means of a vector autoregression (VAR). The model’s estimated parameters and constructed 
impulse responses provide insight into the degree to which changes in the volume of 
commodities shipped under one tool affect changes in the others.  
                                                        
8 The WTO decision on cotton illustrates that some export credit arrangements can be interpreted as export 
subsidies.  Export credit guarantees provided for cotton exports from the US were deemed to be export 
subsidies by both an initial and appellate WTO panel (Young, 2005). Food Aid, Surplus Disposal and Multilateral Trade Agreements… 
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The US is chosen as the subject of the theoretical and empirical investigations. The US is 
investigated for several reasons. First, the US is by far the largest donor of food aid, 
accounting for approximately 56% of global food aid shipments by volume over the past ten 
years (WFP Interfais). Second, the US is the primary donor of in-kind aid and the donor 
country most frequently accused of using food aid as a tool of surplus disposal (Young 2002; 
Barrett and Maxwell 2005); if an empirical relationship exists between forms of export 
competition then it is likely to be found in these data. Finally, the data required for time-series 
analysis are most readily available from for the US. 
Other major food aid donors are less likely than the US to exhibit significant relationships 
between alternative forms of export competition and food aid deliveries, especially in recent 
years. The EU’s food aid policy was reformed in 1996 to better address global development 
issues by emphasizing factors such as local and triangular purchases (European Commission, 
2000) and Canada announced in April of 2008 that future food aid procurement is to be 
completely untied, after partially untying procurement in 2005. 
New agricultural disciplines from a DDA deal would apply to all (developed) member 
countries, however food aid rules are primarily aimed towards the US. Negotiators from the 
EU are pushing for food aid constraints in response to US pressure for reductions in EU 
export subsidies. This reciprocal trade-off between EU and US negotiators has framed much 
of the food aid debate in the DDA. However the nature of WTO negotiations is that all rules 
must apply to all members (special and differential treatment for developing-country 
members aside); disciplines on EU export subsidies must apply to all member countries, and 
likewise for disciplines on US food aid shipments. Young (2005) points out that new 
disciplines must be specific enough to address the current concerns of negotiating parties, 
while remaining broad enough to discipline future, unforeseen policy developments. Given 
that US food aid programs have historically (Schultz 1960) been motivated by the need to 
dispose of surplus commodities that were acquired through the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s (USDA) loan rate program, there is concern on the part of negotiators that new 
export subsidy and credit guarantee rules could result in the circumvention of export 
competition rules by encouraging member countries (specifically the US) to ship more 
commodities as food aid.  
The evolving nature of USDA programs has sharply reduced the public acquisition of 
grain stocks in the US, however. The deficiency payment program sharply reduced the 
Commodity Credit Corporation’s (CCC) acquisition of stocks; stocks that were once an 
important source for US food aid shipments. The USDA estimates that an average of just 
under 30% of food aid shipments between 1992 and 2004 were procured from USDA 
inventories. The remainder were procured through open market operations from private 
dealers (USDA, 2006b). Though the role of food aid in disposing of CCC stocks has 
declined
9, the US continues to use in-kind food aid donations for non-humanitarian policy 
objectives. Barrett and Maxwell (2005) describe the “iron triangle” of interest groups who 
benefit from continued in-kind donations; these groups include food processors, maritime 
interests and non-governmental organisations that rely on the proceeds from monetised food 
aid. 
                                                        
9 The USDA reports (USDA, undated) that Section 416(b) food aid is currently inactive because of a lack of CCC 
commodity stocks Ryan Cardwell 
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It is interesting to note that benefactor-countries of export credit guarantees are often 
different than traditional recipients of food aid.
10 The OECD (2000) reports that the majority 
of export credit programs are provided to OECD countries, and are generally not used to 
address liquidity constraints in developing countries. For example, the US - by far the largest 
user of export credit guarantees - provides approximately 60% of its export credit guarantees 
to other OECD countries (OECD, 2000). OECD countries are not significant recipients of 
international food aid. Less than 10% of all export credits have been granted to net-food 
importing developing countries (OECD, 2000). Despite these observations export credit 
guarantees and food aid could have been used as policy substitutes in the past; commodities 
may have been transferred between uses, though likely to different recipient countries. 
However these observations generate some a priori scepticism to the establishment of a 
significant empirical relationship between export credit guarantees and food aid shipments. 
Furthermore, the institutions that have been used to finance and administer export credit 
programs differ from food aid administration programs. Nearly 98% of export subsidies in the 
US have been applied to dairy exports through the Dairy Export Incentive Program (Young, 
2001). Dairy is a minor food aid commodity, and the ability for policy makers to easily 
transfer resources from an export credit program to a food aid program could be limited by 
institutional factors.   
Using the institutional structure of the US for the basis of the model, commodities sold 
under export subsidy or credit arrangements, food aid shipments and carry-over stocks are 
treated as theoretical alternatives. Figure 1 illustrates how the VAR captures the relationship 
between proposed outlets.  
Domestic production is divided into two portions - commercial trade and domestic 
surplus. The surplus that is analyzed in the VAR is divided into three outlets; commodities 
can be shipped under export subsidies or credit arrangements (traditional export competition 
tools), shipped as food aid, or held as carry-over stocks into the next period. The model 
hypothesizes that these three alternative outlets share an endogenous relationship, and that 
changes in one affect changes in others. A VAR that is estimated using historical data can 
reveal the significance of such a relationship. The model also controls for circumstances in 
which food aid shipments have been particularly large in response to foreign assistance 
programs. US Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending is included as an exogenous 
control variable to account for periods in which food aid flows may have been affected by 
factors other than the endogenous relationships outlined in figure 1. A large food aid response 
to a humanitarian crisis or foreign policy objective are examples of such a situation, where 
ODA spending on the crisis would be large and an associated increase in food aid is not 
related to domestic stocks or export subsidies and credits.  
It is worth making a few important points about using VAR analysis for the current 
research. First, there is no attempt to estimate or explain the size of the domestic surplus or 
the relationship between the size of the surplus and the outlets. Export competition policies 
could impact the size of a country’s surplus, however modelling this relationship is outside 
the scope of this research. This limitation is acknowledged. The objective is to test for and 
estimate dynamic endogenous relationships between a group of proposed outlets given a fixed 
surplus. Once these relationships are determined, one can infer how changes in the use of one 
vent have affected the use of others. Second, a new WTO agreement would presumably 
                                                        
10 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this observation Food Aid, Surplus Disposal and Multilateral Trade Agreements… 
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establish new trade rules, thereby introducing the Lucas critique (Lucas 1976) to the analysis. 
The importance of the Lucas critique in VAR analysis is a subject of debate (Stock and 
Watson 2001; Rudebusch 2002), but no attempt is made to forecast how commodity 
shipments under subsidy and credit arrangements would change after a DDA agreement. The 
goal is to understand if export subsidies, credits and food aid have been used as alternatives in 
the past, and to provide empirical estimates of these effects. Such knowledge is valuable in 
evaluating the motivations for including food aid disciplines in the export competition pillar 
of the DDA negotiations. Also, a new policy environment that develops as a result of a new 
WTO agreement does not render the historical relationship between variables meaningless. 
Donors have long felt the need to dispose of surplus commodities
11, and if food aid was an 
alternative to export subsidies or credit arrangements, then that relationship should be present 
in the data. If such a relationship cannot be established, or is not significant, then new WTO 
rules would not necessarily create such a relationship. This is especially true given evolving 
policies and institutions in important donor countries (most importantly, vastly smaller public 
















Figure 1. Conceptual Model 
                                                        
11 US Congressman Harold Cooley’s comments before the House Committee on Agriculture exemplify this 
historical concern: “We are primarily interested in getting rid of these surpluses and we don’t care how you do 
it...” (US House of Representatives, 1959). Ryan Cardwell 
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The structural-form VAR for a specific commodity is 
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t x  is a three by one vector of endogenous variables that includes the volume of exports 
shipped under subsidy or credit arrangements, food aid shipments and year-end carry-over 
stocks.  i t x −  is a matrix of lagged endogenous variables and  t z  is contemporaneous 
development assistance spending.  i B Γ Γ , , 0  and Π  are parameter matrices to be estimated. 
This structural-form model represents the relationships between the endogenous variables and 
between the exogenous variable and the endogenous system.  
The structural form of equation (1) cannot be estimated in its current form because 
endogenous variables appear on both sides of the equation. The structural form can be 
reduced to standard form by inverting the B  parameter matrix and reorganising terms to 
generate 
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1 − = . Equation (2) is estimated as a 
VAR using ordinary least squares.  
The standard form of equation (2) is under identified; the contemporaneous effects of 
parameter matrix B cannot be recovered without parameter restrictions. Theory provides a 
structural decomposition on the system to ensure identification, however. Within the system 
of endogenous variables, there is a hierarchy by which each outlet is utilized. Commodities 
are first sold under export subsidy or credit arrangements. This is the first portion of surplus 
that is disposed, and has direct contemporaneous effects (the solid lines in figure 1) on food 
aid shipments and carry-over stocks. The remainder is either shipped as food aid or held as 
carry-over stocks, with food aid being determined first. Carry-over stocks do not have 
contemporaneous effects on the other vents. This structural decomposition is operationalised 
by imposing the following constraints when recovering the structural-form parameters from 
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Food aid deliveries are persistent (Barrett et al. 1999; Diven 2001), so that aid in one 
period begets aid in the subsequent period. The parameter matrix  i Γ  is left unrestricted to 
account for potential lagged effects in the endogenous system. These are the dotted lines 
within the circle of endogenous variables in figure 1. Food Aid, Surplus Disposal and Multilateral Trade Agreements… 
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The variables that make up the commodity surplus do not comprise a singular system. 
The use of the VAR methodology allows an examination of the relationships between 
endogenous variables without having to explain the disposition of all variables. This means 
that if a decrease of 100mt in commodities shipped under export subsidy arrangements is 
imposed on the VAR, then the other proposed outlets (food aid and carry-over stocks) need 
not increase by 100mt in the same period. The VAR conveys historical estimates of how the 
group of endogenous variables has moved together over the sample period. 
The interpretation of effects from the estimated parameters in equation (2) is as follows: a 
change in the volume of wheat sold under export subsidies or credit guarantees from period 
() 2 − t  to period () 1 − t  of k  metric tonnes changes food aid shipments from period () 1 − t  
to period t  by k  metric tonnes times the estimated parameter on the export competition 
variable,  ceteris paribus. These effects are updated to simultaneous effects using the 
restrictions from equation (3). 
The data are taken from several sources and are comprised of US wheat
12 shipments. 
Food aid data are compiled from three USDA sources (Hoffman et al. 1995; Suarez 1994; 
USDA, 2006a) and comprise US wheat shipments from 1954 to 2004. Shipments from major 
US food aid programs
13 (PL480, Section 416 and Food for Progress) are aggregated into one 
variable. Some US food aid programs are likely to be more closely related to surplus disposal 
motives than others, especially Section 416 shipments. However the evolving nature of US 
food aid programs precludes modelling the relationship between surplus disposal outlets and 
each aid program individually. The structures of PL480 food aid programs were redesigned in 
1975 to change the allocation policies between PL480’s various “titles”, and wheat volumes 
delivered under Section 416 have waxed and waned over the past 20 years. Because of these 
changing policies, a decision was made to aggregate all food aid programs into one variable 
that would capture policymakers’ broad use of food aid as an export competition tool. 
Aggregating food aid data into one variable also provides a larger sample, which is important 
in the estimation of time-series models.  
Export credit data comprise CCC export credit programs, which are taken from Hoffman, 
et al. (1995) and from the annual USDA Wheat Yearbook. Export subsidy data are taken from 
the Wheat Yearbook and include Export Enhancement Program shipments from 1986 to 
1996. Wheat shipped under export subsidies and credits are aggregated into one variable for 
the empirical application. While it is possible that not all of the shipments sold under credit 
arrangements contained a subsidy element, the series are aggregated to discern the effects of 
an overall decline in subsidy and credit shipments (the goal of export competition disciplines 
in a potential DDA deal) on food aid shipments. Also, aggregating these data provides an 
adequate time series for VAR estimation. 
Year-end stock data comprise both public and private stocks. Some US food aid 
programs, especially Section 416, draw exclusively from public stocks, however Section 416 
shipments have fallen sharply over the past several years and are currently zero (USDA, 
undated). A large share of US food aid shipments are now taken from private stocks in 
                                                        
12 Wheat has accounted for approximately 50% of aid shipments by volume over the past ten years (WFP Interfais) 
and is the most important food aid commodity. 
13 Food aid that is sold concessionally is not categorized as credit or subsidy shipments because the US currently 
reports such shipments as food aid, not as credit or subsidy shipments.  It is possible that a new WTO 
agreement would require that all concessional sales be reported as such, and not as food aid. Ryan Cardwell 
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response to invitations for bids that are issued to private firms. Private stocks, though volatile, 
now dwarf public stocks (figure 2). Stocks data are from USDA’s Wheat Situation and 
Outlook Yearbook, 2006. The data are converted from crop year to fiscal year to allow stocks 
to act as a repository for wheat that is not sold under export subsidies/credits or shipped as 
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Public Private  
Figure 2. US wheat stocks (thousands mt) 
The exogenous control variable is ODA spending. This accounts for periods of unusual 
food aid shipments that are not the result of an endogenous relationship between the 
postulated export competition alternatives. ODA data are from the OECD. All data are annual 
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Figure 3. Raw Data (thousands mt) Food Aid, Surplus Disposal and Multilateral Trade Agreements… 
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ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
The data are first tested for unit roots. This is done using the stepwise augmented Dickey-
Fuller procedure outlined in Enders (2004) to ensure inclusion of the appropriate 
deterministic variables in the test equations. The null hypotheses of unit roots in levels cannot 
be rejected for any of the series, including the ODA control variable. The same test rejects 
unit roots for all variables in first differences, indicating that the data is difference stationary. 
The existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship between the hypothesized 
endogenous variables (food aid, export subsidies and credits, and carry-over stocks) is 
investigated by testing for cointegration. The stepwise Johansen procedure from Enders 
(2004) is used to ensure that the appropriate forms of the test equations are used. The optimal 
lag length for the test VAR is one, as determined by Schwarz Information Criteria. The 
presence of an intercept in the cointegrating test equation is tested using a chi-square statistic, 
and the null hypothesis of an intercept cannot be rejected. This relationship is tested for 
cointegration using the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests, and no cointegrating vectors are 
found using either test. Time-series tests conclude that the data are difference stationary, but 
are not cointegrated.
14 
The lack of cointegrating relationships between the variables means that a VAR must be 
estimated in first differences to account for the data’s nonstationarity. The downside of 
estimating in first differences is that long-run relationships between the model’s variables are 
not observed. While unfortunate, the loss of this information is not critical to this analysis as 
it might be in a study of food aid from a recipient country’s perspective. We are primarily 
interested in the short-run impact of a change in one hypothesized alternative on the change in 
other hypothesized outlets from the donor’s perspective. This is not to suggest that food aid 
cannot have long-run effects in recipient countries. For example, US PL480 Title I food aid is 
primarily intended for the promotion of US agricultural exports and advancing foreign policy 
objectives (Barrett and Maxwell, 2005), and PL480 Title III food aid was intended to provide 
funding for long-term development projects through monetization. These tools could certainly 
have long-run effects in recipient markets. The lack of cointegration between the endogenous 
variable limits the empirical results in this area.  
The current WTO proposals on food aid are targeted at preventing commercial 
displacement, however. One would hope that WTO member countries view this as a short-run 
concern (in that competing exporters are concerned that a food aid shipment may displace a 
specific commercial transaction in a current year) and not a long-term concern (in that WTO 
member countries want to prevent food aid that would foster underlying economic 
development in the recipient country - something that might actually increase future demand 
for imported food). The long-run effects of food aid are fundamentally important from a 
development economics perspective, however negotiators involved in WTO consultations are 
focused primarily on the short-term effects on competing exporters from a trade policy 
perspective. 
Standard-form parameter estimates for the VAR are reported in table 1. These 
parameters, in combination with the parameter restrictions of equation (3) and the estimated 
residual covariances, are used to recover the structural-form parameters of matrices  i B Γ Γ , , 0  
                                                        
14 Econometric test results are available from the author by request. Ryan Cardwell 
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and Π  (table 2) by solving a set of simultaneous equations in MatLab. Our primary interests 
are the dynamic effects of changes in one hypothesized outlet on changes in other outlets. 
This information is obtained by generating impulse responses from the structural-form 
parameters in table 2. Impulse responses are based on the imposition of exogenous 
innovations on the endogenous variables and the tracing of effects on other variables in the 
system.  
 
Table 1. Standard-Form Coefficients 
 
Dependent Variables
Regressors Credit/Subsidy Food Aid Carry-Over Stocks
Constant 251.5460 -139.7117 -97.7576
(-718.20) (-259.74) (-784.27)
Lagged Subsidy/Credit 0.1759 0.0320 -0.2285
(-0.16) (-0.06) (-0.17)
Lagged Food Aid -0.0351 -0.3608 -0.2234
(-0.39) (-0.14) (-0.42)
Lagged Carry-Over Stocks 0.2885 0.0966 0.3521
(-0.14) (-0.05) (-0.15)
Overseas Development Assistance -0.2513 0.0294 -0.1002
(-0.51) (-0.19) (-0.56122)
Standard errors in parentheses
All variables in first differences  
 
The February 2008 Draft Modalities (WTO, 2008) are used as guidelines for the 
innovations. One proposal calls for quantity reductions in export subsidies by twenty percent 
upon implementation of an agreement. Imposed innovations are therefore set to twenty 
percent of each shocked series’ ten-year average. Impulse responses are presented in figure 4 
with corresponding ± two standard error confidence bands. 
 
Table 2. Contemporaneous Coefficients 
 
Dependent Variables
Regressors Subsidy/Credit Food Aid Carry-Over Stocks
Subsidy/Credit 1 -0.0113 0.5237
Food Aid 0 1 0.5255
Carry-Over Stocks 0 0 1
Overseas Development Assistance 0.1759 0.0300 -0.1195
All variables in first differences  
 
We are primarily interested in the effects of a shock to subsidy and credit sales (figures 
4a, 4d and 4g), which is approximately -1.2 million mt; note that a negative shock is imposed 
to be intuitively consistent with a WTO deal that reduces the volume of commodities shipped 
under subsidy or credit arrangements.
15 
                                                        
15 Innovations on all other variables are also negative for consistency.  Food aid and stock shocks are equal to 




Figure 4.  Impulse responses (with ± two standard errors)




















































































i. Response of Stocks to Stocks
 
 
The immediate effect of the shock to subsidy/credit sales on food aid shipments (figure 
4d) is a very small decrease. However, the confidence interval around the impulse response in 
figure 4d includes zero, implying that the response of food aid to a decline in subsidy and 
credit sales is not significant. The lagged effect on food aid is also very small, though 
consistent with the expectation that a decline in subsidy and credit shipments will increase 
food aid shipments - aid shipments increase by approximately 29,000 mt one period after the 
one-time shock. It is not surprising that a positive effect on food aid is not observed until one 
period after the initial shock. Institutional constraints delay the procurement and delivery of 
food aid, from five months for emergency aid to as long as two years for non-emergency aid 
(Barrett and Maxwell 2005). The effects on food aid shipments remain small thereafter, and 
decay towards zero by the end of ten periods. The confidence band encompasses zero 
throughout the horizon, implying little statistical significance of food aid’s response. 
Food aid responses are small relative to historical food aid shipments. The accumulated 
response of food aid to a twenty percent export subsidy/credit shock is approximately 61,000 
mt after ten years. This amounts to less than one percent of total food aid shipments over the 
same ten-year period.  
The effect on carry-over stocks is much more pronounced; a one-time decrease in 
commodities that are shipped under subsidy and credit arrangements generates a 
contemporaneous increase in carry-over stocks of approximately 656,000 mt (figure 4g). The 
constructed confidence band around the carry-over stock response indicates a statistically Ryan Cardwell 
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significant reaction to subsidy/credit shipments. The lagged effects decay thereafter, but 
remain larger than the effects on food aid. The accumulated response of carry-over stocks to 
the subsidy/credit shock is small relative to historical stock levels; a ten-year total response of 
approximately 1.4 million mt compared to a ten-year total of approximately 180 million mt. 
There appears to be very little inertia in subsidy and credit shipments (figure 4a), as the 
dynamic path decays quickly after following an inverse J-curve pattern. 
The VAR’s variance decompositions are displayed in table 3. This table conveys the 
percentage of the forecast error of selected responding variables that is attributable to changes 
in the system’s other variables. These results are derived from estimated parameters and 
provide a complementary evaluation tool to the impulse responses in figure 4. The variance 
decompositions indicate that a change in subsidy and credit sales has little explanatory power 
in the dynamic behaviour of food aid shipments. The share of variation in the food aid 
response that is due to the subsidy/credit shock is less than one percent after one period and 
remains near one percent after ten periods. The contribution of carry-over stocks to the 
dynamic response of food aid is also small, reaching just five percent after five periods. The 
variation in carry-over stocks that is due to the initial shock to subsidy and credit shipments is 
much larger, reaching thirty-two percent after five periods.  
 
Table 3. Variance Decompositions (%) 
 
Aid Carry-Over Stocks
Lead (years) Credit/Subsidy Carry-Over Stocks Lead (years) Credit/Subsidy Aid
1 0.10 0 1 23.52 3.03
5 1.09 5.33 5 31.79 2.43
10 1.09 5.33 10 31.79 2.43  
 
The empirical model was estimated over alternative sample periods during the modelling 
process. For example, one trial period was 1954 to 1989 to correspond with the introduction 
of the US Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade (FACT) Act of 1990. The FACT Act 
increased the emphasis on humanitarian objectives in US food aid policy (Shapouri, Rosen 
and Meade, 2004); it is conceivable that the degree of substitutability between food aid and 
other forms of export competition could have been more significant prior to 1990. Estimation 
results do not corroborate this conception. The dynamic paths of responding variable are 
similar in nature to the paths estimated over the entire sample (though scales vary slightly). 
Given that the estimation results did not markedly change for different sample periods, a 
decision was made to include all observations to maximize the degrees of freedom in this 
time-series model. 
The empirical model provides interesting insight into the historical relationships between 
export subsidy and credit sales, food aid shipments and carry-over stocks. A reduction in sales 
of wheat under export subsidy and credit arrangements has not had significant effects on food 
aid shipments. The model predicts that food aid shipments increase by a very small amount 
(less than five percent of the decrease in subsidy/credit sales) after several years, however 
confidence intervals indicate the responses are not statistically significant. The empirical 
model does not identify food aid as an important alternative outlet to subsidy and credit sales 
for the disposal of surplus wheat. The relationship between the two may deteriorate even Food Aid, Surplus Disposal and Multilateral Trade Agreements… 
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further in the future (new WTO rules notwithstanding) because food aid deliveries are 
becoming more responsive to recipient-country need over time (Young and Abbott, 2008). 
The use of export promotion programs has varied over the years in response to factors 
other than the motivation to dispose of surplus commodities; this variation may contribute to 
the lack of a significant relationship between subsidy/credit sales and food aid shipments. For 
example, export credit guarantees were more prevalent when importing countries were 
dealing with STEs, whose numbers have declined in recent years.
16 
There remains the possibility of an indirect dynamic link between subsidy/credit sales 
and food aid through carry-over stocks. The empirical model identifies a significant 
relationship between a change in subsidy/credit sales and carry-over stocks (figure 4g); these 
carry-over stocks can become food aid in the subsequent period. However this indirect 
relationship is small and not significant. Figure 4f illustrates the dynamic path of food aid in 
response to an innovation in carry-over stocks. Food aid responds in an amount that is less 
than ten percent of a shock to carry-over stocks, and the estimates are not statistically 
significant.  
The empirical model is only applied to US wheat. However wheat is the most important 
food aid commodity from the largest donor, and the donor most often accused of using food 
aid as a tool of surplus disposal (Young 2002; Barrett and Maxwell 2005). If a relationship 
between export competition and food aid exists, then it should be detected here. 
The lack of significant relationships may indicate overzealousness on the part of 
competing exporters in negotiating new food aid disciplines in the DDA. The hypothesized 
relationship between export subsidy/credit shipments and food aid is not identifiable in this 
econometric investigation. A new WTO deal will presumably establish new policy rules that 
will change the institutional structure in which the model was estimated. However the need to 
dispose of surplus agricultural commodities is not a new pressure for exporting countries; in 
fact it is of declining importance as domestic stocks contract. Even though food aid shipments 
may have grown in response to large domestic stocks, the model’s results indicate that they 
have not expanded in response to decreased export subsidy and credit shipments. There may 
be exceptions
17 in which policy makers use food aid as an alternative, but it is far from clear 
that the great efforts that have gone into food aid negotiations and the ill-will that WTO 
negotiators have fostered among humanitarian NGOs have been based on historical 
experience. This is especially true if new disciplines on export competition prove difficult to 
implement and enforce (Thompson 2007; Cardwell 2008).   
CONCLUSIONS 
Negotiating parties in the DDA appear determined to constrain the use of food aid as an 
alternative to export subsidies and credit guarantees in hopes of averting commercial 
displacement. One of the key premises on which the incentives for new rules rests is that food 
aid is, or has been, an alternative outlet to export subsidy or credit arrangements. This 
proposition is tested empirically using historical data from the US. The model’s results 
suggest that a change in export subsidy and credit sales of wheat has not significantly affected 
                                                        
16 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this observation. 
17 Margulis (2007) has noted anecdotally that aid shipments of skim milk powder increased as donors encountered 
binding URAA export subsidy constraints. Ryan Cardwell 
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the dynamic path of food aid shipments. Impulse responses of food aid are small and 
insignificant following a shock to the quantity of commodities shipped under export subsidy 
and credit guarantees. Variance decompositions confirm that changes in export subsidy and 
credit shipments are not driving forces behind changes in food aid shipments.  
The empirical results suggest that negotiating parties’ enthusiasm to collar food aid 
shipments is not based on observable relationships between aid shipments and export 
subsidies or credit guarantees. A new WTO agreement would presumably establish new 
binding rules on export subsidies and credit guarantees, thus changing the institutional 
structure that underlies this investigation. However the lack of an historical relationship 
implies that the concern that food aid will be used as an alternative outlet may be 
exaggerated.  
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ABSTRACT: 
The European Union (EU) is the first target market for developing countries’ and 
Least Developed Countries’ agricultural exports. Preferential trade agreements, either 
reciprocal or not, play a central role in forming trade opportunities for numerous 
developing countries. Our objective is to measure the impact of eleven regional trade 
agreements (RTA) on European agricultural imports with an expanded gravity model. 
Also, in order to compare these RTAs and their effects we calculate the implied tariff 
equivalent. Results indicate that a large number of EU’s RTAs support the agricultural 
exports of developing countries to the EU market. Thus, RTAs are generally an attractive 
alternative for countries wishing to speed up the move towards multilateral free trade in 
agriculture. Nevertheless, two most important and unilateral RTAs (Generalized System 
of Preference expanded by Everything But Arms) and the agreement with Mexico have 
the negative effect over agricultural exports to EU. We attempt to explain the reasons of 
their failure. 
 
JEL classification: C10, F10, F15 
Keywords: preferential trade agreements, gravity model, implied tariff equivalent, 
agricultural sector, LDCs, EU. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries mostly claim that their market shares in developed market remain 
limited, in spite of complex and sometimes extensive preferential access granted by rich 
countries to them. In particular, there are special regional trade agreements (RTAs) which 
permit to access easily to the rich countries markets. Those claims have been an important 
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component of the arguments of developing countries in the recent trade liberalization talks 
and these argumentations over agricultural goods are more significant. The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) reports that the share of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in total 
agricultural imports of Northern America was 2.6% in 1980 and 0.6% in 2000 in value. The 
corresponding figures for the Western Europe were 2.3% and 1.1%, Japan’s figures were 
1.4% and 0.9% (WTO (2001)).  
The European Union (EU) is the biggest agricultural market in the world and has 
approximately 20% of total exports and imports of agricultural products during 1980-2004 
(FAOSTAT online database). For the same period, the other big agricultural products 
importers like US, Japan, China, Canada and India had respectively 7.6%, 9.3%, 4.6%, 2.1% 
and 0.43% of the total value of agricultural goods imported in the world (author’s calculation 
based on FAOSTAT online database). The EU is definitely an important target market for 
developing countries’ and LDCs’ agricultural exports in general and it is especially important 
for most former colonies of EU member states. The EU’s trade preferences are thus 
potentially an important opportunity to increase the EU’s market access. Actually, 
preferential trade agreements, either reciprocal or not, play a central role in forming trade 
opportunities for numerous developing countries, remarkably for the poorest ones. But EU's 
trade policy is fairly complex, and many trade partners benefit from various preferential 
agreements. For example, sub-Saharan Africa poor countries benefit from the Everything But 
Arms (EBA) program and the Cotonou agreement simultaneously. Moreover, EU has 
agreements with developed countries like the US. The analysis of the preferences must 
therefore be adapted to this specific context, where in addition the administrative 
requirements and the rules of origin vary from one agreement to the other, included for a 
given partner. The consideration of a given preferential arrangement cannot be properly 
studied without taking into account whether an alternative preferential arrangement is offered 
or not to the exporters. It justifies the interest to take a broad view of preferential agreements 
offered by the EU, whether reciprocal or not.  
So this study tries to explain whether EU’s preferential trade agreements improve the 
EU’s agricultural market access for developing countries especially for LDCs or not. Our 
objective in this research is to measure the impact of eleven RTAs on European agricultural 
imports with special attention to LDC countries.  
In that prospect, the gravity model is a good candidate. It has performed remarkably well 
as an empirical framework for measuring the impact of RTAs (for example see Frankel and 
Wei (1993), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995), Finger, Ng and Soloaga (1998)). We follow the 
method of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and develop it to provide new results focusing 
on the EU’s agricultural market access. Commonly, the gravity models are applied to 
aggregate data and they are used for the whole of an economy (e.g. see Aitken (1973), 
Thursby and Thursby (1987), Bergstrand (1989), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1993), Krueger, 
(1999), Soloaga and Winters (2001) Greenaway and Milner (2002), Ghosh and  Yamarik 
(2004a, 2004b),  Elliott and Ikemoto (2004), Mayer and Zignago (2005), Lee and Park 
(2005), Carrère (2006)). Jayasinghe and Sarker (2008) with gravity modelling using 
disaggregate data find the positive effects for NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement) in trade of selected agricultural products.  
We apply the gravity model to a group of less aggregated goods (i.e. the agricultural 
sector). This is made possible by the construction and use of a new database extending the 
Trade and Production database recently issued by the COMTRADE (Commodity Trade European Union’s Preferential Trade Agreements in Agricultural Sector… 
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Statistics of United Nation) and WB (World Bank) data to cover more countries and years. A 
specific characteristic of our study is to identify in the border effect measurement of trade 
volume, the part associated with observed direct protection (RTAs, common border, common 
language etc.). We incorporate dummy variables capturing the lower (or higher) impact of 
borders on trade inside each RTA, and thus characterizing the extent of integration of the 
zone, compared to trade taking place in the rest of the sample. We identify eleven actual EU’s 
RTAs defined in Table a1 in Appendix. Since the evaluation of EU’s RTAs is complex and 
ambitious, we calculate the implied tariff equivalent of EU’s RTAs to simplify the 
comparison of RTAs and their effects. In other words, we try to show the effect of RTAs like 
a reduction (or increase) in import tariff.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the European 
preferential trade agreements in agricultural field. Section 3 motivates the methodology. It 
describes the modified gravity approach for agricultural sector of EU. Data and results are 
reported in section 4 and the final section concludes. 
2. EU’S PREFERENTIAL TRADE SCHEMES 
Undoubtedly, the EU is the first supplier of trade agreements worldwide, with more than 
50 RTAs (WTO discussion papers (2007)). According to WTO (2007), the EU with 14 north-
south RTAs
1 in goods is the first supplier among developed countries in 2006. It is followed 
by the US with 8 RTAs, Canada and Australia with 4 RTAs each one, Japan and New 
Zealand with 3 RTAs. As illustrated by Figure 1 in Appendix, even a simplified overview of 
the EU's trade policy remains quite complex. The political economy roots of this profusion of 
agreements belong to the heterogeneity of the EU, to the specific role-played by its trade 
policy and by the strong demand from trading partners (Sapir (1998), Lamy (2002) and 
Panagariya (2002)). 
From the beginning two kinds of RTAs must be distinguished, reciprocal and unilateral. 
First, RTAs are bilaterally agreed with reciprocal commitments between the members. 
Second, non-reciprocal agreements are unilaterally granted by the EU to developing countries 
or LDCs. While the first kind is planned to be a tool of regional economic integration, the 
second allowances more favourable market access to developing countries. Since the non-
reciprocal agreements can be unilaterally changed, the nature of them involves uncertainty on 
the future. These numerous agreements can be also classified in a few categories. A first set 
includes close neighbourhood, reciprocal agreements within Europe, with in particular the 
EEA (European Economic Area) agreement, bilateral free-trade agreements with Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs) untitled EU-Enlargement, and a few additional bilateral 
agreements like Euromed (Figure 1 in Appendix). For more details about the EU’s RTAs, the 
date of sign and their member states, see Table a1 in Appendix. 
Most of EU’s preferential trade agreements with developing countries and LDCs are non-
reciprocal. EU programs include the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, 
which contains a special scheme for developing countries and LDCs known as the 
“Everything But Arms” Agreement (EBA); the Cotonou agreement with Africa, Caribbean 
and Pacific countries (ACP); and the Euro-Mediterranean agreements (EMA). The EU wants 
                                                        
1 The RTAs between developed countries and developing countries or LDCs. Esmaeil Pishbahar and Marilyne Huchet-Bourdon 
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to help the poorest countries to increase their agricultural market access. Therefore, the EU 
has adopted an "Everything but Arms" (EBA) proposal that gives the LDCs duty-free and 
quota-free access for over 900 agricultural products with a limited preferential margin for so-
called sensitive products. 
The GSP is characterized by its temporary nature, with periodical revisions. Graduation 
measures are taken when beneficiary countries may have reached, in some sectors, a level of 
competitiveness that makes sure further growth without preferential access to the EU market 
(Candau and Jean (2005)). The GSP is associated with relatively stringent rules of origin. A 
special and more beneficial regime has in the past been granted to countries fighting drugs 
2 
(Coulibaly and Fontagné (2004)). Nevertheless, the duration of the EBA is unlimited, but the 
Cotonou Agreement will end in 2020.  
The EU actually began offering nonreciprocal tariff preferences in the 1950s, providing 
preferential market access to former EU colonies for a larger set of products than the GSP 
program. 
3 These preferences were included in the first Lomé Convention, signed in 1975 with 
46 countries. Lomé arrangements were continued and expanded every 5 years, as in 2000 it 
was named Cotonou agreement and the number of countries grew to 73. Recently, the EU has 
new negotiations with ACP countries in order to sign a new agreement entitled Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The aim is to make a free trade area between the EU and the 
ACP countries. The problem of EPAs is that the non-reciprocal and discriminating 
preferential trade agreements offered by the EU are incompatible with WTO rules. Besides, 
the other difficulty of EPA scheme is the adaptation of EPAs with EBA agreement. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. International Trade Volume and Border Effects 
Mayer and Zignago (2005) claimed, “International trade flows are not enough to measure 
international markets integration”. This statement is based on the simple idea that two 
countries could be considered perfectly integrated if the national borders have no effect over 
the choice of consumers for their purchases and of producers for selling their products. In 
fact, it is summarized as the whole idea of the EU’s Single Market that aims to eliminate the 
economic effects of national borders. 
The degree of international fragmentation of market is measured by the evaluation of the 
impact of national borders. To measure it, we have to consider both international trade flows 
and domestic good flows to compare them. The gravity equation is the ideal candidate to 
reach this aim. Indeed, even in the absence of flows between sub-national regions, you can 
still measure the total volume of trade occurring within a country. For a specified sector, you 
can measure the value of goods shipped from a country to its own consumers if you remove 
the total exports to the overall production of the country. This observation can then be 
inserted in a bilateral trade equation, together with all the international flows. Our framework 
                                                        
2 In 2001, only Central American and Andean Pact countries were concerned. 
3These preferences have their roots in the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community 
(which later became the EU) in 1957 and provided for trading and other arrangements with former colonial 
territories. The European Development Fund was established to help the economic development of those 
former colonies. European Union’s Preferential Trade Agreements in Agricultural Sector… 
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also incorporates recent advances in the modelling of gravity equations (recent examples and 
surveys of those approaches include Feenstra (2003), Mayer and Zignago (2005) and 
Minondo (2007)).  
The border effect methodology has an important advantage in the study of trade volume. 
It was indeed measured for many issues. Take as an example the attempts to measure the 
impact of EU membership on trade flows. Aitken (1973) is one of the first to have made such 
a study. Frankel and Wei (1993), Frankel (1997), Soloaga and Winters (2001) and Mayer and 
Zignago (2005) are recent examples of such works. The border effect measure is also a useful 
methodology because it captures all barriers to trade related to the existence of the national 
borders (like common langue, common frontier, technical barrier, non-tariff barriers, RTAs 
and so on) through their impacts on trade flows. Most of those impediments and barriers are 
hard to measure individually, so it is useful to consider them in a global picture. In the next 
section, we describe the theoretical gravity model and show the border effect. 
3.2. A Gravity Model for EU Agricultural Sector 
In order to estimate the effect of EU’ RTAs on trade flows among EU and its trading 
partners we use the gravity model developed by Deardorff (1998) and Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) with Armington’s (1969) hypotheses. 
Like Armington (1969) we assume that all goods are differentiated by place of origin, the 
supply of each being fixed and the consumer demand being defined by a CES utility function. 
In 1979, Anderson presented a theoretical foundation for the gravity model based on CES 
preferences and on goods that are differentiated by region of origin. We also assume, in this 
paper, that the consumer follows a two-step budgetary procedure. In the first step, the 
importing country’s consumers define the import demand, choosing between domestic and 
imported products, in order to satisfy the total demand. In the second step, the import demand 
is differentiated by country of origin. Because we analyze the access to the European market, 
we only focus on this second step on the budgetary constraint, under the assumption that the 
first one is already done and that the total demand of imports is already defined. Thus, at the 
second step, like Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) the representative consumer from 
country j (importing country) maximizes a utility function of CES type for the product k with 
the geographical repartition of its imports from country i (exporting country):  
 















ijk ik jk q b U
 (1) 
 
where j denotes the importing country, i is its trading partners, and k the exchanged product.
4 
qijk is the quantity of product k originating from country i consumed in country j, and σ is the 
                                                        
4 In this study, we suppose that k represents the sum of agricultural goods i.e. the total value of agricultural goods of 
country i exported to country j.  Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) have applied their model for the whole 
economy, so their model is based on total GDP. Here, we use their model for the agricultural sector. Thus, we 
have introduced the k index for this sector and we use agricultural GDP. Esmaeil Pishbahar and Marilyne Huchet-Bourdon 
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elasticity of substitution between exporting countries (σ ≠ 1). The consumer in country j 




ijk ijk jk q p Y
 (2) 
 
where Yjk is the total expenditure of j for the imported product k and is defined in the first step 
of budgetary procedure. pijk is the price of product k from country i, paid by consumer in 
country j. pijk differs from exporter’s supply price pik due to trade costs, which are not directly 
observable. Trade costs are broadly defined to include all costs incurred in getting a good to a 
final user other than the production cost of the good itself.  
Assuming that trade costs are born by sellers and taking the “iceberg” form, the consumer 
price received by sellers in i (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) is: 
 
ijk ik ijk t p p =
 (3) 
 
where tijk is the bilateral trade resistance (or in other words trade costs factor) for which the 
assumption was made that it encompasses tariffs, transport costs (proxied by distance), non-
tariff barriers and other factors (they will be listed after).  
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where  jk P  refers to country j’s CES price index for product k, related to j’s overall import 
price of product k. So the consumer price index for product k is computed as: 
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ijk ik ik jk t p b P
 (5) 
 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) use market clearance condition (country i’s income 
should equal the value of its exports plus the value of the production sold in the domestic 
market), and assume that trade barriers are symmetric, i.e. tij = tji. These assumptions allow, 
firstly, to define each country’s consumers price index as a function of partners countries 




















1  (6) 
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where θik is country i’s share in the world income (Yk






≡ θ ). Anderson and 
van Wincoop (2003) refer to consumer price indexes as multilateral resistance, as they depend 
on all bilateral resistances.  






















X  (7) 
 
where Yik is the total income of country i for the product k,  jk P  the consumer price index for 
product k in country j and  ik P  is the consumer price index for product k in country i.  
Then equation (7) is called gravity equation. As in traditional gravity equations, trade is 
supposed to depend positively on the size of each country and negatively on a trade barrier 
factor. But here, trade is also affected by the price indexes of both countries.  
The next step is to model trade costs. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) assumed in their 
model that the trade cost factor consists on two terms corresponding to two different types of 
costs: non-border costs (d), national border effects (bor) i.e.: 




They showed the border effect only with one dummy variable, i.e. if two countries are the 
same border borij is equal to 1, and 0 otherwise. But the common border effect is also affected 
by other factors like colony (Col), regional trade agreements (RTA) between two countries’ i 
and j. Consequently we define the border effects by: 
 
ij ij ij ij ij RTA Land L Col B
ij e bor
5 4 3 2 1 θ θ θ θ θ + + + + =  (9) 
 
where Bij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if countries i and j have common border and 0 
otherwise,  Colij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if countries i are the ancient colony of 
countries j and 0 otherwise, Lij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if countries i and j speak a 
common language and 0 otherwise, Landij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if countries i are in 
landlocked group countries, RTAij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if both countries i and j are 
members of the RTA and 0 otherwise. As a result we redefine the trade cost by: 
 
] exp[ 5 4 3 2 1 ij ij ij ij ij ij ijk RTA Land L Col B d t θ θ θ θ θ
ρ + + + + =
 (10) 
 
Transforming equation (7) in log terms and replacing the trade cost factor with equation 
(10) yields: Esmaeil Pishbahar and Marilyne Huchet-Bourdon 
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where  ijk X  is the nominal value of agricultural exports from exporting countries i (here EU’s 
trading partners) to the importing country j (here EU), 
W
k Y is the world GDP of agricultural 
sector,  Yik is the agricultural GDP in exporting country i.  Yjk is the agricultural GDP in 
importing country j,  ik P  refers to export price index of exporting country i,  jk P  refers to 
import price index of importing country j, dij is the distance between capitals of country i and 
country j.  
Therefore, for total agricultural products, the equations (12) and (13) are estimated by 
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Although in traditional gravity equation (equation (7)) the coefficients of income 
variables (Yik, Yij and Yk
w) equal one, most of empirically studies relax this restriction and 
estimated general form (equation (12)) (For example see McCallum (1995), Ghosh and 
Yamarik (2004a, 2004b) and Carrère (2006)). Also, the restricted form, with the income 
coefficient equal to one (equation (13)), was used in some studies (e.g. Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003)). In this study, both forms (equations (12) and (13)) are estimated. 
The aggregate prices  ) ( jk ik P and P mostly are not accessible so many researchers 
suggested to proxy them. Traditionally, remoteness variables are used, which are presumed to 
reflect the distance of a country from its alternative trading partners (for example, Wei 
(1996), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)).We substitute the price indexes terms by two 
types of proxy. First, price indexes terms are proxied by FAO indices for total agricultural 
products. These value indices represent the change in the current values of export (f.o.b.) and 
of import (c.i.f.), all expressed in US dollars.  jk P  is substituted by “import value index” (IMj) 
and  ik P  is substituted by “export value index” (EXi). Therefore, this new variable (PI) is 
defined by: 
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Second, like many researchers (e.g. Wei (1996), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)) we 
substitute the price index terms with remoteness variable, which is supposed to reflect the 
distance between a country and its trading partners. This variable represents bilateral 












where country m is an alternative trading partner (or the other target markets for country’s i), 
Dim is the distance between country’s i and m, Ym is the income of country m in the sector of 
k. US and Japan constitute approximately 20% of world agricultural imports. Hence, we 
consider these countries like alternative trading partners. Consequently, m refers to these two 
countries.  
We expect to find a positive sign for RIMi. If the country’s i is far from the alternative 
target markets, there are more chance to export to the EU. Also, if the countries’ m are rich 
the opportunity of exporting towards EU decreases because these alternative trading partners 
buy more products from countries i. 
4. DATA AND ESTIMATIONS 
4.1. Data Description 
The values of imports (total agricultural sector) are collected from Commodity Trade 
Statistics of United Nation (COMTRADE) for 5 years from 2000 to 2004. The Agricultural 
GDP and population are collected by World Bank (WB) data. During this period, the total 
agricultural imports are considered for the EU with 15 member states. The system of 
classification SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) has 1-digit code for the 
agricultural sector. Trade and agricultural GDP are expressed in US dollar ($). Distances 
between the capitals (by kilometres, Brussels is supposed to be the capital of the EU) and 
dummy variables (common border, common language, landlocked countries, and ancient 
colony) are collected with the CEPII data file. 167 countries (all EU’s trading partners) are 
considered (Table a2 in Appendix). The “export value index of agricultural goods” for 
exporting countries (country i) and the “import value index of agricultural goods” for 
importing countries (country j, here the EU) are collected with the FAOSTAT database. 
The examined trade agreements are the following: African-Caribbean and Pacific States 
(COTONOU), Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), Everything But Arms (EBA), 
European Economic Area (EEA), European Union-Chile Association Agreement (EUCAA), 
Central and Eastern European Countries or EU-Enlargement (EUEN), Euro-Mediterranean 
Agreement (Euromed), European Union Caribbean Economic partnership agreement 
(EU/Caraibbean-EPA) is a new agreement with Central American Common Market countries 
(CACM) and Andean Group (ANDEAN), Mexico-European Union Free Trade Agreement 
(MEUFTA) and Trade Development Cooperation Agreement with South Africa (TDCA) (for 
more details about EU’s RTAs see Table a1 in Appendix). Esmaeil Pishbahar and Marilyne Huchet-Bourdon 
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4.2. Econometric Results 
Table 1 reports the econometric results from equations (12) and (13), based on the 
specifications discussed above (columns 1 and 3 correspond to the estimation with RIM as a 
price proxy and columns 2 and 4 correspond to the estimation with PI as a price proxy). 
According to this table, the implied income elasticity (agricultural GDP for exporting 
countries LnYAGi) is positive and significant in all cases. The positive effect for exporter 
countries (LnYAGi) shows that the high- agricultural income countries export more.  
 
Table 1. Results of gravity models (with panel data) for EU (2000-2004) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Eq. 12  Eq. 12  Eq. 13  Eq. 13  Variables 
Coefficients   t-values  Coefficients   t-values Coefficients    t-values Coefficients    t-values 
LNYAGi  0.88
* 92.35 0.88
*  92.08  --- --- --- --- 
LNYAGEU  1.04
* 2.89 -0.34 -0.68  ---  ---  ---  --- 
LNPI  --- ---  0.44
* 4.08  ---  ---  0.63
* 5.93 
LNRIM  0.83
* 7.81  ---  ---  0.60


















































































2  0.60 0.60 0.36 0.38 
* denotes significance at the 5% level 
Note: the results are shown after correction of heteroscedasticity. 
YAGi = the agricultural GDP of exporting country, YAGeu = the agricultural GDP of importing 
country (EU), PI= the price indexes, RIM= the remoteness variable, DIS = the distance between 
the capitals, BOR = common border, LAND = landlocked group countries, LANG = the same 
language, COL = the ancient colony of countries j, RTA = Regional Trade Agreement. 
 
Besides, the magnitudes of these estimates are similar to those found in the literature for 
all tradable goods (for example in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)’s and Carrère (2006)’s 
papers, it is around 1.10 and in Ghosh and Yamarik (2004a) it is 0.90). As this coefficient for 
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estimated gravity equations in three cases (export of differentiated goods, export of reference 
priced goods and export of homogenous goods): their results show that the income elasticities 
(coefficients of GDP) for homogenous goods are less than other types. 
The EU’s agricultural GDP (LnYAGEU) is significantly positive when the equation is 
estimated with the remoteness variable (column 1). It shows that the exports of agricultural 
products increase with increase in the EU’s agricultural GDP. Results concerning the distance 
show the negative effect over import of agricultural products but this coefficient is less than 
the estimates found in the literature for all tradable goods. For example, McCallum (1995), 
Feenstra et al. (2001) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) find this coefficient is around 
one. Although these studies consider entire tradable goods, Feenstra et al. (2001)’s found 
when they use the homogenous goods that distance coefficients decrease (it is around 0.7). 
Here we find the same signal: using data of agricultural sector increases the degree of 
homogeneity. In addition, this may reflect the fact that many agricultural products are shipped 
by huge transportation.  
The common border, landlocked countries, common language and EU’s old colonies 
coefficients have the expected sign and are significant at 5% level. The agreements of 
COTONOU, EEA, EUEN, CACM, ANDEAN, TDCA and EUCAA show positive and 
significant effect over exports of agricultural commodities to EU market and GSP, EBA and 
MEUFTA show negative and significant effect at 5% level. The sign associated with 
Euromed agreement is not statistically significant. The estimates for each RTA are briefly 
discussed below. 
In order to better compare the EU’ RTAs, we calculate the implied tariff equivalent with 
different substitution elasticities (σ). Table 2 shows the implied tariff equivalent for the EU’s 
RTAs subject to three rates for substitution elasticity (σ = 2, 5, 10). 
The coefficient for COTONOU agreement (between ACP countries and EU) shows 
positive effects in all cases in Table 1. Using a substitution elasticity, it is possible to calculate 
the implied tariff equivalent of the per-RTA border cost for all agricultural commodities. As 
an example, suppose an elasticity of substitution (σ=10) and the estimated border effect 
coefficient of COTONOU agreement from the first estimation (0.64), so the tariff equivalent 
of this agreement is 7 percent [=100 × (exp[0.64/(1-10)]-1)] (for more details see Appendix 
2). With a substitution elasticity of 5 (σ=5) the per-RTA border is 15 percents. A similar 
pattern emerges for the imports of agricultural commodities from EEA, EUEN, CACM, 
ANDEAN, TDCA and EUCAA. Most of EU’s RTAs are similar to a decrease in the tariff, 
except the three important RTAs (GSP, EBA and MEUFTA) for poor countries and 
developing countries that are equal to an increase in tariff (Table 2). Namely, the GSP, EBA 
and MEUFTA increase respectively by 20%, 41% and 42% the tariff (if σ =5, based on first 
estimation) for trade in all agricultural commodities. In other words, the GSP, EBA and 
MEUFTA show the negative effect over trade (Table 1). Because most of countries in these 
agreements are LDCs it may show that LDCs do not necessarily have a strong comparative 
advantage in agriculture products. In addition, it maybe shows that these kinds of RTAs (they 
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Table 2. The implied tariff equivalent (%) of the EU’s Per-RTA with trade blocs 
 
   (1) (2) (3)  (4) 







































EUROMED  5 1 1  0  0 0  3 1 0  1  0  0 
EEA  -94
* -51
























































































* Significant at the 5% level 
 
Finally, to take into account overlapped agreements, we completed the analysis. First we 
estimated the models with each RTA separately and we find the same results considering the 
sign and the magnitude of coefficients. Second, we keep the eleven RTAs but we divided 
EBA and Cotonou dummies. We so distinguished countries which participate only to the 
EBA agreement from those which participate only to the Cotonou agreement, and finally a 
dummy represents the case where countries participate to both. Results are reported in Table 
a4 in Appendix. We can notice that conclusions already expressed remain. The only 
exception concerns the case of Euromed. Indeed, this agreement shows positive and 
statistically significant effects. Nevertheless, this effect is not so surprising; it is also the result 
of some other studies (see for instance Peridy (2005)). We also run the estimations with and 
without the dummy for GSP but this last one does not change our results.  
Let us know come back to the case of EBA. If the purpose of the EBA agreement is to 
provide increased market access through eliminating tariffs and quotas, it failed. Our 
calculation based on UN Comtrade database show that the market access of LDCs in the EU 
agricultural market from 3.0% decreased to 2.7% during the period of estimation (2000-
2004). Also, Bureau et al. (2006) show that EBA had the smallest rate of utilization between 
EU’s non-reciprocal preferences (in 2002 the rate of utilization of EBA was 17% whereas it 
was 92.8% for Cotonou) (also refer to Bureau et al. (2007)). Besides, the estimated results 
present a negative effect of this agreement over exports of EBA countries (Tables 1, 2). So, 
few questions emerge: why does this agreement failure? Alternatively, why is EBA 
agreement similar to an increase in import tariff? Since EBA is an important agreement, for 
LDCs let us briefly explain this agreement and mention some failure reasons.  
 
EBA agreement and LDCs: The EBA agreement is an extension of the EU’s 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) that was entered into force in 2001. This unilateral 
agreement gives to 49 LDCs 
5 into the world zero tariffs with no quantitative restrictions on 
                                                        
5 The 49 least developed countries are those categorized within the United Nations classification format as “least 
developed.” The UN uses three criteria: low national income (under $900 GDP per capita); weak human European Union’s Preferential Trade Agreements in Agricultural Sector… 
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all products, except arms, without reciprocity. This agreement keeps out sensitive products 
including rice, sugar, and bananas. The EU preferential market access aspect of EBA aims to 
facilitate trade with the LDCs. The purpose of increased market access is to enhance trade 
with the aim to help the LDCs to expand their economies. Our data show that EU agricultural 
imports from the LDCs have been decreasing over the past years (2000-2004). In addition, the 
results of gravity model show the negative effect for this agreement. Few explanations can be 
found. First, the preferences under EBA are given in unlimited period and there is no 
guarantee for LDCs that their preferences will be retained. Second, the changes in standards 
and rules are not clear enough for LDCs. Third, the “rules of origin” 
6 dictated by the 
developed countries in some cases are too complex, inflexible and they have massive 
administrative demands; in addition, it is often very costly to prove the origin.  
The rules of origin restrictions in the EBA agreement are too restrictive and more than in 
the Cotonou Agreement. The rules of origin in the Cotonou agreement allow to the products 
to move within the ACP countries for supplementary processing before exporting to the EU. 
Although the original goods do not come from the ACP countries, they could still beneficiate 
the duty free access (Official Journal of the European Communities, L317/3 December 15, 
2000). In addition, the rules of origin for fishing exports to the EU in the Cotonou agreement 
are much more flexible. To compare some of these rules between EBA and Cotonou see 
Table a3 in Appendix. The main explanation is that Cotonou agreement imposes less 
administrative constraints, or is more flexible regarding to the origin of the material used as 
inputs to exports than competing agreements. When exporters have the choice between two 
preferential agreements and one of them is more generous than others, they tend to favour 
particular agreements. Therefore, the members prefer exports under Cotonou agreement for 
using the preferences. In the other hand, the EBA members that are not included in the 
Cotonou agreement loose the competition to entrance in the EU market. These preferences are 
much criticized by many other studies (e.g. Brenton (2003), Panagaryia (2003), Ozden and 
Reinhardt (2003) and Topp (2003)). 
Finally, although EU’s sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) regulations and import standards 
are not actually part of any specific agreement and that they are applied equally to all 
countries, obtaining these standards still keeping a comparative advantage is not easy for the 
LDCs farmers. Producers in developed countries have the luxury of technology and other aids 
but the producers in LDCs do not have the ability to pay for achieving to these standards. 
Furthermore, preferential trading arrangements can create an artificial comparative 
advantage due to the duty-free access into the market. Economic theory advises that the 
producers should allocate resources to their most efficient uses. Another negative aspect of 
the GSP and EBA preferences is that it no longer gives preferences to the same country in 
every sector. It could lead to a move from these sectors towards a beneficial one. 
Mexico is a member of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement). So, this 
country benefits a quota-free and duty-free to export to the USA and Canada for some 
agricultural products. The reduction of exports to the EU can probably be explained by more 
                                                                                                                                                       
assets; and high economic vulnerability (an index measuring instability of agricultural production and exports, 
inadequate diversification, and economic smallness). 
6 The theory behind rules of origin is to avoid trade deflection (or re-export) from countries non-benefited from 
special preferences through another country benefited from preferences and into the final market in order to 
use the trade preferences given to the LDCs. Esmaeil Pishbahar and Marilyne Huchet-Bourdon 
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Mexico’s exports under the NAFTA agreements. The consideration of the supply side needs 
more information and data. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The evaluation and the analyze of EU’s RTAs are complex and ambitious. This paper 
investigates the potential impact of EU’s RTAs on extra-trade flows. For this purpose, an 
expanded gravity model is used to estimate the impact of eleven RTAs (ten of them are with 
developing countries and poor countries) on trade patterns between EU and their trading 
partners. In order to compare these RTAs and their effects we calculate the implied tariff 
equivalent of EU’s RTAs. In other words, the effect of RTAs is shown like a reduction (or 
increase) in import tariff. 
The empirical analysis undertaken in this paper indicates that a large number of EU’s 
RTAs support the agricultural exports of developing countries to the EU market. Thus, the 
EU’s RTAs are often an attractive alternative for countries wishing to speed up the move 
towards multilateral free trade in agriculture. Nevertheless, we find the negative effect for two 
most important and unilateral RTAs (EBA and GSP) and the agreement with Mexico 
(MEUFTA).  
The EU was the first to extend unilateral trade preferences to the LDCs, to engage in 
more trade with EBA countries than does any other country in the world. The aim of EBA 
agreement is an aid for economic growth and stability for the LDCs with increasing market 
access to the EU. Therefore, it would be expected that the EBA agreement would increase the 
agricultural market access for EBA countries because of duty-free market access. 
Nevertheless results of our estimations over the period 2000-2004 show that the EBA had the 
negative effect over the exports of EBA countries to EU market. Rigorous rules of origin, in 
terms of rigid cumulation rules, substantial processing and transport regulations are maybe 
some significant causes of the failure of this agreement. Furthermore, SPS regulations and 
heavy import standards can also largely decrease the exports to the EU. Also in EBA, the 
stability of preferences is not guaranteed. Additionally, another disadvantage of these 
unilateral preferences is that countries easily become dependent on the preferences and focus 
their economy around one product rather than allocating resources throughout the economy. 
Nevertheless, the main explanation is that Cotonou agreement and EBA are overlapped and 
Cotonou imposes less administrative constraints. So when exporters have the choice between 
two preferential agreements and if one of them is more generous than others, they tend to 
favour particular agreements.  
Recently, the EU has new negotiations with ACP countries for signing a new agreement 
entitled the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). EPAs are a scheme in order to make a 
free trade area between the EU and the ACP countries. The problem of EPAs is that the non-
reciprocal and discriminating preferential trade agreements offered by the EU are 
incompatible with WTO rules. “How trade must be liberalized under the new EPAs” is still an 
extensively debated issue. Currently, the United Nations define 39 of the ACP countries as 
LDCs. As opposed to the other ACP countries, the group of LDCs will be asked to reject the 
EPAs and continue trade relations under the EBA regulation. While this provision facilitates 
the situation of the LDCs under the new trade scheme, it has also been criticised that the EBA 
initiative. European Union’s Preferential Trade Agreements in Agricultural Sector… 
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Already we mentioned that Cotonou (last agreement with ACP countries) overlap the 
EBA agreement and countries prefer to export to EU under Cotonou agreement. But, all LDC 
countries are not in the Cotonou agreement. Most of these countries are very poor countries 
and have not barging power in negotiations with EU. According to our results and mentioned 
arguments above, the authors suggest that EU has to take into account the problem of 
overlapped agreements and if EU wants that agreements do not neutralize together, it has to 
separate them. Especially, LDCs could be taken into account in separated groups and some 
agreements could be made with these countries. Accordingly, the authors suggest that EU has 
to modify these agreements if the EU aims to help poor countries.  
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APPENDIX 1: 
Table a1. The agreements between EU and the other trade blocs 
 
Regional Trade Agreement  Members  The date of sign  Reciprocal (+) or 
Nonreciprocal (-) 
Cotonou (with ACP African-
Caribbean and Pacific Group 
of States) 
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cameron, Cape Verde, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
(Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Cook 
Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, , Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Marshall Islands, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Niger, Nigeria, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Rwanda, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Sao Tome & Principe, St.-Kitts & 
2000 + Esmaeil Pishbahar and Marilyne Huchet-Bourdon 
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Nevis, St.-Lucia, St.-Vincent, Suriname, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Togo, Trinidad & Tobago, Timor-Lets, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. 
ANDEAN = (CAN) Andean 
Group  Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela  1996  + 
CACM = Central American 
Common Market countries 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica  1961 + 
EBA = Everything But Arms 
Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, 
Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Ctrl.-Africa-
Rep., Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Guinea, Guinea-Eq., Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, 
Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, 
Sao, Sierra Leone, Solomon-Isl., Somalia, 
Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tome, Tuvalu, 
Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia. 
2001 - 
EEA = European Economic 
Area  Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway  1994  + 
EUCAA = European Union-
Chile Association Agreement  Chili. 2002  + 
EUEN = Central and Eastern 
European Countries or EU-
Enlargement 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 




Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, 
Tunisia, Turkey. 
1995 + 
GSP = Generalized System 
of Preferences  All developing countries  1971, 2006 (new 
GSP)  - 
MEUFTA = Mexico-
European Union FTA   Mexico 2000  + 
TDCA = Trade Development 
Cooperation Agreement with 
South Africa 
South Africa  1999  + 
 
Table a2. The list of trade partners (167 countries): 
 
Albania Congo-Dem.  Rep  Indonesia  Mozambique  Slovenia 
Algeria Congo  Iran Myanmar  Solomon  Islands 
Angola Costa  Rica  Iraq Namibia Somalia 
Antigua & Barbuda  Cote d'Ivoire  Israel  Nepal  South Africa 
Argentina  Croatia  Jamaica  New Caledonia  Sri Lanka 
Armenia Cuba Japan New  Zealand  Sudan 
Aruba Cyprus  Jordan  Nicaragua  Suriname 
Australia Czech  Rep.  Kazakhstan  Niger  Swaziland 
Azerbaijan Djibouti  Kenya  Nigeria  Switzerland 
Bahamas Dominica  Kiribati  Norway  Syria 
Bahrain  Dominican Rep.  Rep. of Korea  Oman  Tajikistan 
Bangladesh Ecuador Kuwait  Pakistan  Tanzania 
Barbados Egypt Kyrgyzstan  Panama  Thailand 
Belarus  El Salvador  Lao   Papua New Guinea  Togo 
Belize Equatorial  Guinea  Latvia  Paraguay  Tonga 
Benin Eritrea  Lebanon  Peru  Trinidad  &  Tobago 
Bhutan Estonia  Lesotho  Philippines  Tunisia 
Bolivia Ethiopia  Liberia  Poland  Turkey 
Bosnia Herzegovina  Fiji  Libya  Qatar  Turkmenistan European Union’s Preferential Trade Agreements in Agricultural Sector… 
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Table a2. (Continued) 
 
Botswana French  Polynesia  Lithuania  Romania  Uganda 
Brazil Gabon  Macedonia  Russian  Federation  Ukraine 
Bulgaria Gambia  Madagascar  Rwanda  United  Arab  Emirates 
Burkina Faso  Georgia  Malawi  Saint Kitts & Nevis  USA 
Burundi Ghana  Malaysia  Saint  Lucia  Uruguay 
Cambodia Grenada  Maldives  Saint Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
Uzbekistan 
Cameroon Guatemala  Mali  Samoa  Vanuatu 
Canada  Guinea  Malta  Sao Tome & Principe  Venezuela 
Cape Verde  Guinea-Bissau  Marshall Islands  Saudi Arabia  Viet Nam 
Central African   Guyana  Mauritania  Senegal  Yemen 
Chad  Haiti  Mauritius  Serbia & Montenegro  Zambia 
Chile Honduras  Mexico  Seychelles  Zimbabwe 
China  Hungary  Moldova, Rep.  Sierra Leone    
Colombia Iceland  Mongolia  Singapore     
Comoros India  Morocco  Slovakia     
 
Table a3. The regulations in COTONOU and EBA agreements in fishing sector 
 
Cotonou Agreement  EBA agreement 
The vessel can be registered in the EU or in 
any ACP country, independent of which 
country the products are exported from. 
The ship must be registered to the EU or the 
direct beneficiary country. 
The vessel can sail under the flag of any ACP 
country or the EU. 
The vessel must sail under the flag of the EU 
or the direct beneficiary country. 
The master and officers along with 50 percent 
of the crew must be nationals of ACP 
countries or the EU. 
The master and officers along with 75 percent 
of the crew must be from the beneficiary or 
the EU. 
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities website 
 
Table a4. Results of gravity models considering overlapped agreements (panel data, 
2000-2004)  
 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Eq. 12  Eq. 12  Eq. 13  Eq. 13 
 Coefficients    t-value  Coefficients  t-value  Coefficients t-value Coefficients   t-value 
LNYAGi  0.91*  95.12  0.90*  92.67  --- --- ---  --- 
LNYAGEU  1.10*  2.57  -0.39  -0.72  --- --- ---  --- 
LNPI ---  ---  0.48*  4.67  ---  ---  0.66*  6.06 
LNRIM  0.85*  7.81  ---  --- 0.62*  2.70 ---  --- 
LNDIS -0.17*  -11.45  -0.15*  -15.34 -0.19* -12.37  -0.18* -15.62 
BOR 1.96*  19.64  1.99*  16.56 1.95* 18.73  1.94* 15.06 
LAND -1.01*  -15.75  -0.97*  -14.00 -1.03* -14.19  -0.96* -13.89 
LANG 1.24*  15.83  1.20*  17.77 1.19* 15.07  1.16* 18.47 
COL 1.12*  23.05  1.21*  24.58 1.15* 20.71  1.23* 24.45 
EBAonly -0.26*  -3.64  -0.21*  -2.81 -0.10 -0.80  -0.09 -1.12 
EBA&Cotonou -1.02* -3.27  -0.88*  -2.79 -0.72* -2.20 -0.64  -1.95 
COTONOUonly 0.85*  4.70  0.95* 5.01 1.06* 5.50  1.20* 6.30 
EUROMED 0.17*  5.33  0.21*  7.11 0.18* 5.31  0.20* 6.38 
EEA 3.50*  39.32  3.45*  47.12 3.52* 40.21  3.49* 50.34 
EUEN 0.98*  10.74  0.96*  10.38 1.03* 10.99  1.01* 10.87 
CACM 1.07*  15.53  1.19*  28.67 1.18* 18.76  1.31* 42.68 
ANDEAN 0.46*  6.72  0.65*  9.48 0.53* 6.68  0.69* 9.42 
TDCA 0.93*  5.83  0.81*  4.85 0.70* 4.10  0.52* 3.29 Esmaeil Pishbahar and Marilyne Huchet-Bourdon 
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Table a4. (Continued) 
 
MEUFTA -1.55*  -39.94  -1.45*  -53.05 -1.75* -40.15 -1.69* -50.74 
EUCAA 1.32*  3.01  1.66*  2.89 1.60* 3.76 1.68* 2.97 
CONSTANT -17.52  -1.54  3.78 0.27  59.87*  16.87  43.98*  42.35 
R
2 0.61  0.61  0.38  0.39 
* significant at the 5% level 
Note: the results are shown after correction of heteroscedasticity. 
EBAonly = dummy variable equal to 1 if country i participates only to the EBA agreement, 
COTONOUonly = dummy variable equal to 1 if country i participates only to the Cotonou 
agreement and EBA&Cotonou= a dummy which represents the case where country i 
participates to both agreements (EBA and Cotonou). 
APPENDIX 2: 
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Thus, the coefficient of a continuous variable is the elasticity of X for a small change in 
the explanatory variable Xs. However, a dummy variable is a discontinuous variable and the 
derivative of X with respect to a small change in Dr does not exist. Instead, we can calculate 
the percentage change in X going from X0 to X1 for a discrete change in Dr from 0 to 1 as: 
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Figure 1. EU’s trade agreements in 2004 
Source: based on Bouët et al (2002), Candau and Jean (2005) and Bouët et al. (2005). 
Note: The underlined countries have a bilateral agreement with EU.In: Journal of International Agricultural Trade and Development  ISSN# 1556-8520 
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ABSTRACT 
Hansen and Seo’s multivariate threshold cointegration model is used to characterize 
integration between selected maize markets in Benin immediately following the period of 
market liberalization and reform. Observed transaction costs for market pairs are 
compared with the estimated thresholds obtained from the multivariate model. We find 
strong evidence of threshold cointegration for some market pairings. In addition, we 
observe significant short-run price dynamics for these market pairings when price 
differentials exceed threshold levels. In contrast, our results reveal that short run price 
dynamics are insignificant or negligible when threshold levels exceed price differentials. 
This leads us to conclude that there is evidence of long run integration between at least 
some Benin maize markets and that prices in these markets quickly respond to large 
disequilibria (i.e. price differences between market pairings that exceed threshold 
transaction costs). However, transaction costs are large and hence price adjustments are 
relatively infrequent. Thus our results indicate that short run inefficiencies prevail even 
after liberalization. Although market liberalization reforms appear to have not been 
completely effective in terms of promoting quick price adjustments between markets 
during the period studied, our threshold results suggest that further policies designed to 
lower transaction costs could be effective at promoting market integration. 
 
Key words: market integration, threshold cointegration, liberalization 
JEL codes: R15, C32 
INTRODUCTION 
During the period from the 1970s to the 1990s, a number of African countries have tried 
to regulate their internal commodity market systems. These regulatory controls often involved 
regulation of quantities marketed, price control, the restriction on private traders’ activities, 
and control of arbitrage and interregional trade. During the 1990s, deregulation and price 
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liberalization policies were adopted in many countries. It was assumed that a free-market 
system would perform better than the government-controlled systems. In 1990, the Benin 
government also began a liberalization policy in grain markets and implemented several 
reforms. The government parastatal “Office Nationale des Céréales” (ONC) was abolished 
and new institutions were created to ensure a free market environment. Among them was the 
“Office Nationale de Securité Alimentaire” (ONASA) responsible for establishing a free 
market and competitive environment for traders. One of the most important policy actions 
implemented by this institution was the Market Information System (MIS). The MIS was 
designed to provide information on maize prices, market conditions and trading opportunities 
to all traders. The maize industry is an extremely important sector of Benin’s agricultural 
economy, and maize is the primary source of food for Benin’s population. Hence, the impact 
of market reforms on the marketing performance of the maize industry has always been of 
particular concern to the Benin government. To be able to efficiently manage reforms in the 
Benin maize industry, policy makers need a better understanding of the functioning of 
markets, and in particular price integration between markets. The present article investigates 
maize market integration in Benin over the post reform period 1998-2001 using a recently 
developed cointegration model that captures threshold transaction costs. As such, this type of 
modeling approach is well suited to investigating market integration in a developing country 
where transaction costs have traditionally been very large. The approach provides important 
insights with respect to the ability of regional Benin maize markets to respond to pricing 
signals in the presence of transaction costs that prevailed in the immediate post reform 1998-
2001 period.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a background of 
the functioning of the maize market in Benin and motivates the study. The Hansen and Seo 
(2002) two-regime threshold cointegration model and data are described in section 3 and 4, 
respectively. Results are presented and discussed in section 5, and section 6 concludes the 
article. 
THE BENIN MAIZE MARKET  
Benin’s economy is essentially dependent on agriculture, and maize is the most important 
food crop. Maize is used in a variety of meals consumed by households.
1 In the south of 
Benin, maize represents the main food crop and it is mainly produced by farmers for their 
own consumption and for commercialization. In the north however, maize is mainly produced 
for commercialization and represents for farmers an alternative source of income besides 
cotton which is the main cash crop. Maize is produced in rural areas, often times in 
association or rotation with other crops such as: beans, peanut, cassava, cotton, yam, etc. It 
can be sold on local markets or regional markets. During harvest periods, maize may also be 
sold directly at the farm gate. Local markets are located in the vicinity of production zones 
(rural areas). The main agents of local markets are farmers, selling maize and/or other 
commodities to retailers and wholesalers. Regional markets are much bigger than the local 
                                                                                                                                                       
2 Andrew M. McKenzie is associate professor, in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness, 
University of Arkansas.  
1 Maize flour is used to make dough, porridge, or cakes. The dough is widely consumed in Beninese households, 
often twice a day. It is accompanied with various types of sauces. Integration in Benin Maize Market 
 
131
markets and they are located within city centers where a large number of consumers are 
concentrated. Wholesalers buy maize from the farm gate and local markets with the aid of 
collectors who help them to gather the commodity. The collectors live in production areas and 
hence have better knowledge of the availability of the commodity. They are remunerated by 
wholesalers and their commission depends on the quantity collected and whether or not the 
search conditions were good or bad.
2 Most of the maize collected from the farm gate and 
local markets is conveyed to regional markets and sold to retailers or directly to consumers.
3 
In this article we focus on retail prices in these regional markets. The price of maize depends 
on the unit of measurement, which may vary from one market to another. Wholesalers and 
regional markets play an important role in the marketing system by assuring the supply and 
demand of the commodity: wholesalers assure the supply of maize by moving the commodity 
from the farm gate and local markets to regional markets, while regional markets serve as 
demand poles for the commodity because of the large presence of consumers. 
The north, the center and the south of Benin have different seasonal patterns and this 
allows arbitrage between regions and grain movement between surplus and deficit areas over 
time. Indeed, the south and the center enjoy two rainy seasons alternated with two dry 
seasons, while the north only has one rainy season followed by a dry season. Maize is only 
produced during the rainy season since there is no adequate irrigation system to allow 
production during the dry season. However, large quantities of the maize produced during the 
rainy season may be dried during the dry season, and stored over several months or years. 
Wholesalers tend to store more than retailers because they have higher business capital which 
allows them to finance storage costs.
4 
Seven regional markets are considered in this article: Cotonou, Bohicon, Parakou, Azove, 
Glazoue, Ketou, and Nikki. These markets represent important poles through which large 
quantities of maize flow throughout the year. Cotonou, Azove and Ketou are located in the 
South, Bohicon and Glazoue in the center, while Parakou and Nikki are northern markets. All 
these markets receive significant quantities from the production area located around them. 
But large flows of maize also transit to or from these markets throughout the year. Depending 
on the time of the year, the trade flow between markets may be different (see Figure 1). In 
most cases, the trade flow between any two markets is bi-directional. The double arrows in 
figure 1 indicates the potential for bi-directional trade, which may take place at different 
times of the year, depending upon levels of relative abundance or shortage of the commodity 
across locations. The direction of trade differs between two main periods: July - February 
which is usually referred to as an abundance period, and March - June which is known as the 
dead season.
5 Cotonou, known as the principal urban market in the country, receives maize 
from all the other markets. Trade along the Parakou-Glazoue-Bohicon-Cotonou axis is 
favored because of the relatively good quality of the road. Traders from Ketou prefer to sell 
their commodity to Cotonou traders with whom they have tight cultural relationships. Despite 
the proximity to Bohicon’s market, the traders from Ketou do not often trade with Bohicon 
                                                        
2 During rainy seasons, roads are in poor conditions, making it difficult to transport maize from production areas to 
local or regional markets. 
3 Retailers may buy from wholesalers and sell back to consumers on regional markets. 
4 Storage requires some specific equipment such as bags, tanks and some chemical products to prevent the 
proliferation of insects in the maize.  
5 The dead season corresponds to the period where there are no farming activities. It is also referred to as dry 
season. Valerien O. Pede and Andrew M. McKenzie 
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traders, mainly because of high transportation costs associated with the poor quality roads 
linking the two markets. During the abundance period, Azove market traders prefer to trade 
with Bohicon traders, but also with Cotonou and Parakou traders. Despite the long distance, 
Nikki and Bohicon are historical trading partners. Trade between these two markets is favored 
by the fact that several wholesalers have established some networks on both markets to 










Figure 1. Maize Flows in Benin 
All seven markets, except Cotonou, are governed by informal traders’ associations and 
four of them (Ketou, Nikki, Glazoue, Parakou) impose important trade barriers on non-
resident traders. These associations, composed of the traders themselves, control the maize 
supply from the surrounding production areas. Wholesalers belonging to these associations 
are the only ones allowed to collect maize from the production areas of their market. Non-
resident traders are always obliged to comply with the rules and instructions of those 
associations. Also, the local farmers are not organized in association, and consequently must 
comply with the rules set by the wholesalers’ association. This gives the wholesalers the 
power to influence prices at the farm gate and on local markets. These non-competitive Integration in Benin Maize Market 
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practices represent trade barriers for non-resident traders since they cannot buy directly from 
production areas which are not in their own residential area. The trade barriers lengthen the 
marketing chain between consumers and farmers and add additional costs and inefficiencies 
to the marketing system.  
MOTIVATION 
Before 1990, the Benin government has tried to control and regulate the maize market 
system. Some of its interventionist policies have hampered the local and temporal 
development of a free market system (Lutz, 1995). The goal of the government intervention 
was to fight unfair and anti-competitive marketing practices of wholesalers’ associations.  
However, the wholesaler’s associations were not removed by the liberalization process, 
initiated in 1990, and their own market regulations, which promote price distortions, persist in 
the current marketing system. Lutz (1994) observed that over the period of government 
regulation, Benin maize markets were integrated in the long run; however, price adjustment 
was sluggish in the short run. He argued that the sluggishness of price adjustments between 
markets could be attributed to strong trade barriers created and imposed by wholesaler 
associations’ regulations.  
Given the key role played by wholesalers’ associations and their powerful entrenched 
influence on the marketing system, the government’s liberalization policy focused on 
improvement and collaboration with – rather than removal of – the associations. To facilitate 
the access to information on trade opportunities was one of the priorities of the government. 
The MIS was thus initiated to fulfill that goal. The MIS functions consist of publishing a 
monthly bulletin on prices and markets conditions, posting information on each market place, 
and broadcasting price information on radio stations. Traders are also informed about market 
opportunities inside or outside the country and are provided organizational training and 
assistance. It was hypothesized that the availability of reliable market information for all the 
market agents would allow the market to perform more efficiently. Moreover, it was assumed 
that a free market system would perform more efficiently and enhance market integration 
compared with the government-regulated systems.  
To reiterate, this article investigates the effectiveness of initiatives undertaken under the 
liberalization reforms to promote an efficient marketing system. More explicitly, the article 
examines whether markets have become better integrated following the implementation of the 
liberalization strategies.  
METHOD 
Cointegration analysis has frequently been used in the literature to test for market 
integration. This body of literature has typically assumed that if spatially separated 
commodity markets are found to be cointegrated, and hence linearly linked by a long-run 
equilibrium relationship, this is an indication that the markets are integrated through trade. 
Recent literature has focused on the influence of transaction costs, seasonality, and threshold 
effects on tests for integration: Balke and Fomby (1997), Balke and Wohar (1998), Lo and 
Zivo (2001), Baum et al. (2001), Baum and Karasulu (1998), Enders and Falk (1998), Hansen Valerien O. Pede and Andrew M. McKenzie 
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and Seo (2002), Ching-Chung et al. (2003), Goodwin and Piggot (2001). For example, the 
physical costs associated with transporting a commodity from one market to another may 
preclude trade taking place if the price differential between markets is too small to 
compensate potential arbitrage traders for these costs. In such a case, prices between markets 
could deviate and show no tendency to revert back to a long-run equilibrium unless price 
differences exceeded some transaction cost level. Threshold cointegration models capture this 
behavior by estimating the transaction cost or threshold level needed to adjust prices back to a 
long-run equilibrium. Thus threshold models assume market prices evolve independently 
when deviations from equilibrium are small, but assume market prices are cointegrated when 
the disequilibrium is substantial. 
Although several studies have analyzed maize market integration in Benin, most of them 
have ignored the influence of transaction costs and threshold effects. As pointed out by 
Goodwin and Piggot (2001), ignoring transaction costs may affect test results and inferences 
about market integration. Even in the post reform period, transaction costs represent 
important features of the marketing system in Benin and, hence, have potentially a large 
influence on the degree of markets’ integration. Following several years of the free market 
system, it is of great importance to assess the extent to which this has led to a higher degree of 
market integration. The present article is placed in this context and it analyzes the mechanism 
of price integration in Benin maize markets with an emphasis on transaction costs and 
threshold effects. Hansen and Seo’s (2002) two-regime threshold cointegration approach is 
used to characterize the price integration between seven regional markets in Benin. Among 
the few studies which have addressed the concepts of transaction costs and threshold effects 
in Benin maize market is Lutz et al. (2006). This study used the traditional Johansen 
procedure incorporating impulse response analysis and a threshold cointegration type 
approach to compare the market integration under the pre and post liberalization periods. In 
this article we build upon Lutz et al. (2006) by employing Hansen and Seo’s threshold-
cointegration approach, which simultaneously estimates the threshold and cointegrating 
vector. Although in theory a two-step estimation approach is appropriate if the residuals from 
the cointegrating relationship follow a univariate self-exciting threshold autoregressive 
(SETAR) process, in practice such a procedure is subject to misspecification as the likelihood 
function on which the cointegration estimates are based depends on the threshold parameters 
(Rapsomanikis and Karfakis, 2007). In this sense our modeling approach is superior to 
previous research which has used a two-step estimation approach.  
The price series are first tested for unit roots using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test. Both the Engle-Granger test and Johansen multivariate cointegration procedures are 
applied to formally test the long-run relationship between market pairs. For those markets 
which were found to be linearly cointegrated, we proceeded to test for threshold effects. The 
Hansen and Seo (2002) approach tests for two-regime threshold cointegration and it considers 
a vector error-correction model (VECM) with one cointegrating vector and threshold effect 
based on the error-correction term. The Hansen and Seo (2002) approach provides Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) of the threshold for the complete bivariate model. The testing 
method focuses on the complete multivariate threshold model. To this end, first a joint grid 
search procedure is used to determine the threshold and the cointegrating vector. The second 
step consists in testing for the significance of a threshold effect. In other words, it is 
determined whether the dynamics of the long-run relationships among prices are linear or 
whether they exhibit threshold type nonlinearities. The null hypothesis to be tested is that Integration in Benin Maize Market 
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there is no threshold, which means that the model reduces to a conventional linear VECM. 
For the complete bivariate specification between any two market prices, the SupLM
6 test is 
used to test for the presence of threshold effect in the case where the cointegrating coefficient 
is estimated and when it is set to unity.  
Intuitively the two-regime TVECM allows for characterization of a trading environment 
in which trade between spatially separated markets only occurs when relative price 
differences exceed some threshold level. In the regime where relative price differences 
exceed the threshold level, which we will refer to as the a-typical regime, trade will promote 
market integration and induce price movements and responses between markets. In this sense, 
markets may be cointegrated within this a-typical regime. The typical regime occurs when 
relative price differences between markets are less than the threshold level. In this case there 
is no incentive to trade and price movements between markets and within the transaction cost 
band will be unrelated. In other words, the markets will not be cointegrated. It should be 
noted that, as in Balke and Fomby, the Hansen and Seo model bases the estimated threshold 
upon the error-correction term, which captures the long run equilibrium relationship. In this 
sense, market responses are conditioned upon deviations from long run equilibrium, which 
should implicitly capture the level of transaction costs associated with trade and arbitrage. In 
the results section of the article, we explore the validity of this assumption by comparing 
threshold estimates with actual observed physical transaction costs. 
Following the two-regime threshold model outlined in Hansen and Seo (2002), let  t x  be 
a two-dimensional vector of price series. If the price series are both integrated of order 1 and 
we assume that there is a long term relationship between the two price series with 
cointegrating vector β , the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) of order  1 + l  can be 
written as follows:  
 


























































                                                        
6 Since the threshold parameter is not identified under the null hypothesis, following Hansen and Seo, inference is 
based upon a SupLM test. (See Andrews and Ploberger (1994) for motivation and justification of using a 
SupLM test.) . 
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In the above equation,  ) ( 1 β − t X  is  1 × k  and the matrix  A is  2 × k  where  2 2 + = l k . 
The model also assumes that the error term  t u  is a vector Martingale Difference Sequence 
(MDS) with finite covariance matrix  ) ( t tu u E ′ = Σ . The term  1 − t w  represents the error 
correction term obtained from the estimated long term relationship between the two market 
price series.
7 
The parameters  ) , , ( Σ A β  are estimated following a maximum likelihood approach with 
the assumption that the errors  t u  are independently and identically Gaussian. The 
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where γ  represents the threshold parameter. The model in equation (3) may also be written 
as 
 




(5)  ) ( 1 ) , ( 1 1 γ γ β ≤ = − t t w if d  
 
(6)  ) ( 1 ) , ( 1 2 γ γ β > = − t t w if d  
The matrices  1 A and  2 A  will determine the dynamics in the first and second regime, 
repectively. Values of the error-correction term,  in relation to the level of the threshold 
parameter  γ , (in other words, whether  1 − t w  is above or below γ ) allow all coefficients – 
except the cointegrating vector β – to switch between these two regimes. 
In the Hansen and Seo (2002) model, threshold effects exist if  1 ) ( 0 1 < ≤ < − γ t w P , 
otherwise the model reduces to a linear cointegration form. This constraint is imposed in 
model estimation by assuming  0 1 0 1 ) ( π γ π − ≤ ≤ ≤ − t w P , where  0 0 > π  is a trimming 
parameter;  0 π  is set equal to 0.05 in the empirical estimation. Setting  0 π  equal to 0.05 
ensures that indicator function represented by equations (5) and (6) contain enough sample 
variation for each choice of γ . The likelihood function of the model in equation (4) is given 
as: 
 
                                                        
7 If  t x
 
is a two-dimensional vector of price series such that   ) , ( 2 1 t t t x x x = , the error correction term is given 
by  1 2 1 1 1 − − − − = t t t x x w β  , where β   is the cointegration vector. Integration in Benin Maize Market 
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Hansen and Seo (2002) obtained the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of  1 A ,  2 A , 
β , and γ  by maximizing  () γ β, , , , ln 2 1 Σ A A . This is achieved by first holding  ) , ( γ β  
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After  1 A ,  2 A , and Σ  have been estimated, the MLE of β  and γ  are obtained by 
minimizing  ) , ( ˆ ln γ β Σ  subject to the constraint:  0 1 0 1 ) ( π γ π − ≤ ≤ ≤ − t w P . Hansen and 
Seo (2002) used a grid search algorithm to obtain the MLE estimates of β  and γ . The grid 
search procedure requires a region over which to search. To this end, two confidence intervals 
[ L γ , U γ ] and [ L β , U β ] are constructed for β  and γ  respectively.
8 The grid search over 
) , ( γ β  examines all pairs  ) , ( γ β  on the grids on [ L γ , U γ ] and [ L β , U β ] subject to the 
constraint  0 1 0 1 ) ( π γ π − ≤ ≤ ≤ − t w P . In the empirical application the grid search 
procedure is carried out with 200 gridpoints. Onceβ  and γ  have been estimated, the 
presence of threshold cointegration is tested using the SupLM, where the null hypothesis of 
                                                        
8 The notations L and U represent respectively lower and upper values. Valerien O. Pede and Andrew M. McKenzie 
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linear cointegration is tested against the alternative of threshold cointegration. Empirical 
results presented in this article were estimated using a GAUSS software algorithm.
9 
DATA  
The data used in the study are weekly maize price series over the period September 1998 
to September 2001. These data were collected by ONASA (Office Nationale de Sécurité 
Alimentaire). The prices series are for seven spatially dispersed maize markets: Azove, 
Bohicon, Cotonou, Glazoue, Ketou, Nikki and Parakou. These price series are referred to as 
retail prices, and they represent prices paid by consumers, and they are expressed in CFA per 
kilogram.
10 All of the markets in the study are physical market places where sellers display 
their commodities.  The sellers are wholesalers or retailers, rarely farmers. The buyers may be 
consumers, retailers or even wholesalers. Wholesalers are mainly involved in arbitrage: they 
move the commodities from one market to another depending on price opportunities. Buyers 
come to the market to buy directly from sellers. During the buying process, bargaining is 
allowed, but we would not consider these markets to be traditional auction type markets. 
Cotonou may be considered as the central market and receives maize from all of the other 
markets. Likewise, large quantities of maize may be transported from Cotonou to other 
markets. There is no terminal market per see and all markets may receive or deliver maize 
during different periods of the year.  
Five of the markets (Azove, Bohicon, Cotonou, Ketou and Nikki) are 4 days-cycle 
markets while two of them (Glazoue, Parakou) are weekly markets.
11 In order to have a 
common cycle for all markets, we transform the price series of the 4-days cycles markets into 
weekly series. If one cycle falls in a week, then the price of that market day is taken as the 
price of the week. If two cycles fall in the same week then the average of the two cycles is 
taken as the price of that week
.12 The total number of observations per market is 162.  
Physical transaction costs associated with trade were computed based on previous studies 
by Adegbidi et al., (2003), Pede (2001) and Lutz (1994), and are used as a metric to 
determine the extent to which our estimated threshold levels reflect costs observed in the 
market place. These transaction costs are composed of the transfer costs between markets, the 
gross margin of wholesalers and the gross margin of retailers.
13 The transfer costs represent 
all the costs involved in moving the commodity from one market to another. These costs are: 
taxes per bag of maize, transportation fees per bag of maize, transportation fees of the trader, 
cost of measurement per unit, cost of bag sewing, collection fees, costs of truck loading at the 
departure market, unloading costs at the destination market, costs of storage, and the costs of 
broker services.  
                                                        
9 The GAUSS program used to implement the threshold model is provided by Bruce Hansen on his website at: 
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~bhansen/progs/progs_threshold.html 
10 CFA is the currency used in Benin. 1US dollar is approximately 440 CFA. 
11 A market day is an official day where a crowd of wholesalers, retailers, and consumers gather at the market place 
to exchange commodities. The market day is common knowledge to all market agents. 
12 In the dataset when the situation of two cycles in the same week happens, the prices usually remain constant or 
they are very close. This shows the sluggish change of prices in the short term. 
13 The computed transaction costs simply represent proxies of the real transaction costs. The real transaction costs 
between markets would include more than the costs mentioned. The other costs such as information costs, cost 
related to personal knowledge of markets, personal network, transaction skills, time, location, organization, 




 Table 1: Test of Stationarity for Price Series in Levels and First Difference. 
Price series  Level First difference
Azove  -2.73 -7.97**
Bohicon  -1.98 -8.72**
Cotonou  -1.11 -9.76**
Glazoue  -2.30 -10.90**
Ketou  -0.47 -7.28**
Nikki  -3.06 -9.41**
Parakou  -0.50 -8.05**




ADF tests indicated that each of the price series – in levels – contain a unit root, while 
each of the series – in first differences –  were found to be stationary (Table 1) . We 
concluded that the price series follow an I(1) process and proceeded to test for linear 
cointegration among each of the market pairings.
14 
Results presented in table 2 provide evidence for linear cointegration between several 
market pairings. Using the Engle-Granger test we found five market pairings to be 
cointegrated. The Johansen test results showed ten markets pairings to be cointegrated. All 
the linear cointegration relationships found by the Johansen test  make intuitive sense 
according to empirical knowledge of market trade flows between these markets but with two 
exceptions: Ketou-Nikki and Ketou-Parakou. The Ketou market does not trade directly with 
either Nikki or Parakou due to the bad condition of the road from Ketou to these two markets. 
The routes from Ketou to these two markets require more transportation costs and as such, 
traders from the Ketou market prefer to trade with traders from the Cotonou market. Cotonou 
and Ketou markets trade intensively throughout the year. Therefore it was expected that 
Ketou and Cotonou markets should be cointegrated. However, neither Johansen nor Engle-
Granger tests detected linear cointegration between these two markets. Lutz et al. (2006) also 
found that Ketou was not integrated with Cotonou. They argued that Ketou prices may be 
disconnected from other Benin maize markets because Ketou wholesalers actively trade with 
Nigerian markets as well.
15  
Moreover, based on the trade flows in the maize market, it was also expected that linear 
cointegration relationships would exist for three other market pairs: Azove-Cotonou, 
Bohicon-Parakou, Glazoue-Parakou. However, neither Johansen nor Engle-Granger tests 
detected linear cointegration for these markets pairs. The lack of linear cointegration for some 
of the above-mentioned market pairs may be explained by the presence of trade barriers on 
some of these markets or by the existence of imperfect market information between these 
markets. In such cases, although trade between markets may be observed, it may not occur in 
enough volume or frequency to affect prices. Thus in spite of trade, the market system 
                                                        
14 Likelihood ratio test results, based upon an initial eight week lag structure, indicated a single lag was optimal for 
all of the bivariate VECM’s.   
15 Due to its proximity with Nigerian borders, the Ketou market sometimes trades significant quantities of maize 
with Nigeria. Valerien O. Pede and Andrew M. McKenzie 
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between these locations is not well integrated and performs poorly in terms of its role to 
provide price signals. 
 
Table 2: Engle-Granger and Johansen Tests of Linear Cointegration
Markets pairings Engle-Granger Johansen
Azove Bohicon cointegrated cointegrated
Azove Cotonou not cointegrated not cointegrated
Azove Glazoue cointegrated cointegrated
Azove Ketou not cointegrated not cointegrated
Azove Nikki not cointegrated not cointegrated
Azove Parakou not cointegrated  cointegrated
Bohicon Cotonou not cointegrated  cointegrated
Bohicon Glazoue cointegrated cointegrated
Bohicon Ketou not cointegrated not cointegrated
Bohicon Nikki not cointegrated  cointegrated
Bohicon Parakou not cointegrated not cointegrated
Cotonou Glazoue not cointegrated  cointegrated
Cotonou Ketou not cointegrated not cointegrated
Cotonou Nikki not cointegrated not cointegrated
Cotonou Parakou cointegrated  cointegrated
Glazoue Ketou not cointegrated not cointegrated
Glazoue Nikki not cointegrated not cointegrated
Glazoue Parakou not cointegrated not cointegrated
Ketou Nikki not cointegrated  cointegrated
Ketou Parakou cointegrated cointegrated
Nikki Parakou not cointegrated not cointegrated
Linear Cointegration Test
 
Market pairings β = 1 β estimated β = 1 β estimated
Azove Bohicon 0.2000 0.014** 0.8330 0.7370
Azove Glazoue 0.1900 0.1620 0.3450 0.6190
Azove Parakou 0.1860 0.5380 0.4750 0.5980
Bohicon Cotonou 0.2000 0.0880* 0.2680 0.2420
Bohicon Glazoue 0.1930 0.0300** 0.1850 0.1320
Bohicon Nikki 0.1750 0.1740 0.9570 0.8680
Cotonou Glazoue 0.0530 0.0110** 0.0980 0.1340
Cotonou Parakou 0.2620 0.0610* 0.2600 0.2840
Ketou Parakou 0.9280 0.1250 0.4650 0.1570
** indicates significance at 5%
* indicates significance at 10%




For the market pairings in which we found linear cointegration, we proceeded to test for 
threshold cointegration. The null hypothesis is linear cointegration and the alternative 
hypothesis is non-linear cointegration or threshold cointegration. Table 3 shows results 
pertaining to threshold cointegration. The left half of the table – labeled Bivariate – presents 
p-values with respect to SupLM test results for threshold effects. For comparative purposes Integration in Benin Maize Market 
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the right half of the table – labeled Univariate – presents p-values with respect to Hansen 
(1996) threshold autoregressive test results applied to the error-correction terms as in Balke 
and Fomby (1997). Both sets of results include the case where β  is estimated and the case 
where  β  is set equal to unity. P-value results are shown for one lag, with respect to each of 
the bivariate TVECM’s. The p-values were computed by a parametric bootstrap as in Hansen 
and Seo (2002) using 1000 simulation replications. The univariate models ( 1 = β  and β  
estimated), and the bivariate models  ) 1 ( = β  reject the presence of threshold cointegration at 
the 5% level between all market pairs. However, there is evidence of threshold cointegration, 
for five of the bivariate models (β  estimated). Hansen and Seo similarly found stronger 
evidence of threshold cointegration using their SupLM test in comparison to the univariate 
threshold autoregressive test. They noted that given the restrictive nature of the univariate 
specification, the power of the univariate test is undoubtedly reduced in some settings.  
For those market pairings where we found threshold effects, we also analyzed the 
threshold cointegration results by comparing the estimated threshold parameters to observed 
market transaction costs. Table 4 lists estimated threshold parameters along with observed 
transaction costs for the one lag bivariate models (β  estimated). The sign on the threshold 
parameter provides some intuition as to the direction of trade flows between markets. For 
example, with respect to the Bohicon-Cotonou model, the negative threshold estimate of -40 
and the cointegrating vector estimate, β , of 0.9, would suggest that a trade inducing regime 
would occur, with trade flowing from Bohicon market to Cotonou, when 
40 9 . 0 − ≤ − Cotonou Bohicon , in other words when the price in Bohicon market is more 
than 40 CFA below the price in Cotonou market. 
 
Table 4: Estimated Cointegrated Vector, Threshold and Actual Transaction Costs
Estimated Estimated  Actual
Cointegrated Vector  Threshold  Transaction
Market pairings βγ Costs
Azove Bohicon 0.7 23.5 37.2
Bohicon Cotonou 0.9 -40.0 40.6
Bohicon Glazoue 0.8 11.4 42.0
Cotonou Glazoue 1.2 2.1 47.3
Cotonou Parakou 0.6 54.1 55.4
 
 
Several discussion points arise from the above results with regard to the estimated 
cointegration vectorβ  and the estimated transaction costs compared with the actual 
transaction costs. With respect to theβ  estimates, which may be thought of as price 
transmission elasticity estimates, the results are mixed. Theβ  estimates range from 0.6 to 
1.2, and the higher the value ofβ , the more responsive the market is to price movements. 
The greater price response is obtained with Cotonou-Glazoue  with a β  estimate of 1.2. 
These two markets are highly related in term of trade flow, favored by the good condition of 
the roads between them. The same characteristics are observed for the other markets pairs Valerien O. Pede and Andrew M. McKenzie 
 
142 
with relatively high values of the cointegrating vectorβ . However, Cotonou-Parakou shows 
a relatively smaller cointegrating vector, indicating weaker price responsiveness. This may be 
explained by the large distance between the two markets.  
A priori we would have expected threshold estimates to exceed observed transaction 
costs, because the observed transaction costs are likely to be under-estimates of actual 
transaction costs. However, in absolute value terms, the threshold estimates are actually lower 
than the observed transaction costs. It is also interesting to note that the estimated threshold 
levels and the observed transaction costs are close in absolute terms for two of the market 
pairs: Bohicon-Cotonou and Cotonou-Parakou. 
Next, we report the bivariate model’s short-run price dynamics between the 5 market 
pairings that exhibited threshold effects. Table 5 presents price responses with respect to 
error-correction term  ) ( 1 β − t w  parameter estimates. The error-correction terms, which 
represent the estimated cointegrating relationship (lagged one week), capture price responses 
to perturbations from long-run equilibrium between markets. Error-correction parameter 
estimates reported in column 3 illustrate price reactions to long-run disequilibria in the typical 
regime. Recall that the typical regime occurs when relative price differences between markets 
are less than threshold transaction costs. Thus, the typical regime represents the case where 
there is no arbitrage trading-mechanism to return prices to their long-run equilibrium level, 
and hence within this regime we would not expect prices to be cointegrated or to observe 
error-correction effects. In general our results are consistent with these assumptions; error-
correction parameters are typically small in magnitude and insignificant at conventional 
significance levels. Only two exceptions are observed (Cotonou price response with respect to 
Bohicon-Cotonou  market pairing, and Glazoue price response with respect to Bohicon-
Glazoue market pairing). 
In contrast, error-correction effects for the a-typical regime are in general large and 
significant with respect to at least one of the market prices in each of our market pairings. 
Again, these results are in line with our apriori expectations which assume that within this 
regime, market prices will adjust to large perturbations (in excess of threshold transaction 
costs) in long-run equilibrium. In addition, each of the significant error-correction induced 
price responses is intuitively appealing in terms of market integration theory. For example, if 
we consider the case of Bohicon and Cotonou – two likely trading partners – results show that 
when the price in Bohicon is relatively lower than the long-run equilibrium price differential 
between the markets, we observe a positive price reaction in the Bohicon market the 
following month. Note that in this case a large negative error-correction value (that exceeds 
threshold value) in combination with the negative parameter estimate (-0.27) induce a 
positive price reaction to adjust market prices towards their long run equilibrium relationship. 
Figure 2 illustrates periods when the error-correction value exceeds the threshold and 
transaction cost levels, which occurs 10% of the time (Table 5). 
Thus, on balance we find strong supporting evidence for threshold effects, in the form of 
economically intuitive short-run price dynamics, for each of our five market pairings. It 
appears that threshold cointegration techniques are able to explain price behavior for at least 
some of Benin’s important maize markets. Threshold transaction costs in Benin may take 
many different forms. For example, the organizational structure of some of the markets might 
in part account for threshold costs. The trade barriers represented by traders’ association 
lengthen the marketing chain between consumers and farmers and introduce additional costs Integration in Benin Maize Market 
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and inefficiencies to the marketing system. The lack of integration between markets in typical 
regimes may be explained by the fact that the full market opportunities are not exploited by 
traders due to the existence of barriers. The lack of empirical evidence of threshold effects for 
all of our market parings may at first seem puzzling. However, this may be attributed to the 
fact that threshold transaction costs are so high for some of these markets that we simply do 
not observe enough a-typical price observations to estimate threshold levels. For example, the 
strongest barrier is found on the Ketou market, where we found no evidence of threshold 
effects. In this market not only is entry regulated, but the buying price is also set by the 
wholesaler’s body, and the non-resident traders are obliged to buy at the price set by the local 
traders association.  
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Eicker-White standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
** indicate significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Although the Benin government has attempted to shift towards a free market 
environment, the organizational structure imposed by the traders’ associations still represents 
a remaining barrier, which is at odds with the government’s free trade objectives. Therefore it 
would not be an exaggeration to say that the presence of these informal traders’ associations 




Figure 2. Error Correction Value in terms of CFA 
per kilogram for Bohicon and Cotonou Markets 
The determination of price is heavily influenced by the trader’s associations rather than by a 
true auction type market that we normally associate with free trade. This market environment 
is consistent with our empirical results, and we may conclude that our threshold model, at 
least to some extent, is able to capture these actual trade barriers. 
The results presented in this article pertain to the period studied: 1998-2001. Therefore, 
our conclusions cannot be generalized to more recent times. However, the maize market 
environment has not basically changed in terms of conducts of traders since 2001. The 
marketing system has been rigidly established for several years, and the various trades 
practices seem to be commonly accepted among traders. Therefore, as our threshold results 
indicated, policies aiming at reducing transaction costs should rather be considered by the 
Benin government.  
CONCLUSION  
The present study applies the two-regime threshold cointegration model developed by 
Hansen and Seo (2002) to analyze integration in Benin maize markets over the period 1998-
2001. We found strong evidence of threshold effects for five of our market pairings. In a 
similar vein to the threshold model, we did find some evidence of long run market integration 
with respect to the linear cointegrating model. This leads us to conclude that there is evidence 
of long run integration over our study period, but short run inefficiencies prevail. In the 
absence of very large price differentials, price adjustments necessary to return markets to their 
long-run equilibrium levels fail to materialize.  
In contrast to our results, Lutz et al. (2006) find no evidence of threshold effects, 
although they do find Cotonou, Bohicon, Parakou, Azove, Glazoue and Nikki to be linearly Integration in Benin Maize Market 
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cointegrated as a system. Consistent with our results, Lutz et al. (2006) report slow price 
adjustments to discrepancies from the long run for all markets, even in the post-reform 1998-
2001 period. Thus, we agree with Lutz et al. (2006) that price adjustments between markets 
over the 1998-2001 period were sluggish. Our threshold results clearly support this 
conclusion, as they empirically demonstrate that markets will only respond quickly to large 
price discrepancies – exceeding threshold levels. Given that our estimated threshold levels do 
a reasonably good job of explaining observed transaction costs, future policies designed to 
lower transactions costs could be effective at further promoting market integration. Although 
the MIS has played an important role in enhancing price discovery, we would argue that 
further reform targeted at removing wholesaler association trade barriers is a necessary step to 
better integrate Benin maize markets. 
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ABSTRACT 
The world has witnessed an unparalleled increase in trade liberalization over the last 
few decades. These have been accompanied by increasing concerns over economic 
growth and distributional impacts emerging from trade agreements. An applied literature 
has emerged to address ex-ante effects at both macroeconomic and household levels. This 
article contributes to this literature by analyzing the case of Bolivia, which is about to 
initiate negotiations of a trade liberalization agreement with the US. We combine a 
computable general equilibrium model and a micro simulation approach to provide 
insights into whether the Bolivian economy and its households would win or lose from 
trade liberalization. The article indicates that Bolivia’s efforts to reach a trade agreement 
with the US would pay off. However, an absolute trade liberalization scheme would not 
be the best option for the Bolivian poor. Sector specific measures in the form of 
protection to sensitive commodities would ensure that expected benefits would be more 
evenly distributed across most Bolivian households. Negative impacts from the 
elimination of US trade preferences to Bolivia and failure to sign a trade agreement with 
the US, suggest that a strong protectionist trade policy and limited trade relations have to 
be avoided if economic growth and household wellbeing are to be improved. 
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International trade has grown substantially in the last few decades. Supporters of free 
trade assert that this growth has provided important opportunities for countries to benefit from 
new market niches, improve efficiency, promote innovation in technology and management, 
encourage technology transfer, and enhance productivity growth, which in turn has 
contributed to the economic wellbeing of countries.  
Others perceive that international free trade has not contributed to economic development 
and, in some cases, has worsened inequality, unemployment and poverty particularly in rural 
areas of developing countries (Berthelot, 2002). The perception of some developing countries 
is that they are left out of the benefits emerging from increased and freer international trade 
(Thomas, 2003). For example, as stated in the 2001 Zanzibar Declaration, trade ministers of 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are concerned at the marginalization of LDCs in the 
multilateral trading system as manifested in their insignificant share (0.4%) of world trade 
(WTO, 2001). 
Bolivia stands on the threshold of negotiating an important trade agreement. Bolivia and 
the United States are expected to initiate trade talks towards a trade liberalization agreement 
in late 2008. This agreement might provide many potential gains, but also stirs concern 
among critics of free trade. A free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States, a country 
with significantly higher export capacity compared to Bolivia, is an issue of concern to 
Bolivian policy makers, the production sector, and civil society in general because of the 
asymmetries between these two countries. The US is Bolivia’s most important trading partner 
and, thus, the stakes are high. The Bolivian National Institute of Statistics (BNIS, 2005) has 
estimated that about 60% of the Bolivian population is poor and the agreement could also 
have significant implications for poverty in Bolivia. 
Yet, the sparse literature on trade agreements between these two countries indicates that 
no specific research has been carried out to estimate the economic implications that such a 
trade agreement would exert over the Bolivian economy and the economic wellbeing of its 
households. This article aims to fill this gap in knowledge. It does so by analyzing the multi-
sectoral effects of trade liberalization using a computable general equilibrium model and 
computing corresponding price index changes at the household level. 
BACKGROUND 
Historically the Bolivian economy has relied on exports of natural resources, being one of 
the world's top five producers and exporters of tin and with the second-largest reserves of 
natural gas in South America. The agro-industrial sector, especially soybean production and 
exports, has also had an important impact on the Bolivian economy, becoming the second 
most important sector after mineral and natural gas extraction. Yet Bolivia is one of South 
America's poorest countries, with regional disparities in wealth distribution. 
Bolivia had an estimated GDP of USD 26 billion in 2004, with a growth rate of 3.6% 
during the last five years. Bolivian exports and imports were USD 3.1 billion and USD 2.3 
billion in 2006, respectively. Bolivian tariffs are uniformly set at 10%, with capital equipment 
imports charged at 5%. For ten years between 1994 and 2003 the Bolivian trade balance 
experienced deficits, reaching its peak in 1998 with a trade deficit of USD 1.1 billion. This Would a Free Trade Agreement Between Bolivia and the United States … 
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deficit has only been reversed in the last few years (2004 to 2006) due to the higher exports of 
natural gas to Brazil and Argentina. 
In general, Bolivia has historically had few trading partners, geographically located in the 
Americas. From 1994 to 2006 five countries (United States, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and 
Colombia) represented between 33% and 71% of total Bolivian exports, with the US 
historically being the most important trade partner.  
The US has been a critical partner for the Bolivian economy, not only in terms of 
exchange in manufactures and food donations, but also in terms of preferential trade 
treatment. Under the 2002 Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA), 
the US has provided preferential duty-free treatment to Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru 
on eligible articles exported to the United States. Relevant articles for Bolivia included 
textiles and apparel, which entered the US duty free and free of quantity limitations. In 2005, 
Bolivia exported to the US about 54% of its total exports under the ATPDEA.  
The US long-term vision has been to operate the ATPDEA as a bridge to a FTA, which 
would imply that trade preferences the US has given to Bolivia through the ATPDEA will be 
superseded by a more comprehensive FTA. This FTA would provide permanent duty-free 
status to a wider range of commodities and would mean a ‘two-way avenue’ trade 
relationship, where both trading partners would reduce and eliminate most import tariffs.  
However, recent empirical literature (e.g. Soludo et al. 2004; Berthelot, 2002) referring to 
new FTAs completed by developed (including the USA) and developing countries reveals 
concerns on the ability of FTAs to increase welfare of the poor. Yet, the debate is currently 
leaning to economists advocating for more integration and less trade restrictions, though 
critics doubt on the capacity of ordinary people to reap benefits from FTAs. The economic 
effects emerging from a prospective trade agreement between Bolivia and the US is a subject 
that has received almost no attention in terms of research efforts. Just a handful of empirical 
studies with slight references to trade agreements have been found, which are grouped here 
into two broad categories as follows: one studying macroeconomic effects from domestic 
policies and structural reforms (Thiele and Wiebelt, 2003; Jimenez et al. 2005; Klasen, 2005), 
and another focused on sectoral effects emerging from exchange rate shocks (Barja et al. 
2004; Jemio and Wiebelt, 2003). 
The focus of these studies varies across papers, covering the effects of structural reforms 
and external shocks over the Bolivian economy, including poverty issues at the macro and 
micro-economic levels. However, no explicit study estimating the economic effects emerging 
from an FTA between Bolivia and the US on Bolivian households has been found. In this 
context, this article is the first empirical reference for Bolivia in terms of an applied macro-
micro simulation technique for the estimation of changes in economic wellbeing from 
prospective trade reforms between Bolivia and the United States. 
METHODOLOGY 
Macro-micro simulation approaches consist of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
models that simulate economic shocks (e.g. trade reforms) that produce changes in domestic 
macro-variables (e.g., commodity prices, returns to factors of production, GDP, imports and 
exports and terms of trade), coupled with micro-simulation approaches that evaluate the 
effects of such macro-variable changes at the household level. In general terms, all macro-Roberto Telleria, Carlos Ludena, Bhavani Shankar et al. 
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micro simulation approaches aim to answer the key question of how trade reforms affect the 
wellbeing of different household groups. Elements or variables affecting the wellbeing of 
households can be very diverse and go beyond economic considerations, as trade reforms also 
affect the social, cultural and political aspects of households. Referring strictly to economic 
considerations, macro-micro simulation approaches have been designed to study certain key 
variables that directly affect the livelihoods of households, which are grouped here into five 
categories as follows: 
 
1.  Domestic price and sources of income: the domestic commodity price is a very 
important variable to understand how trade reforms affect households. Domestic 
prices alter the value of the consumption bundle, affecting households’ expenditures. 
On the supply side, trade reforms affect the prices that producers get for their 
products, affecting their livelihoods. In this case, micro-simulation approaches have 
been formulated to capture the way in which price changes influence the 
consumption basket of households. ‘Sources of income’ refers to income emerging 
from factors of production. These are skilled and unskilled labor, capital, land, 
transfers, etc. Trade reforms may affect returns to factors of production and, thus, 
affect the financial resources of households. To study these sources, micro-
simulation approaches have concentrated on the analysis of employment, in 
particular the remuneration of unskilled labor, as this is the most plentiful resource 
from poor households (Ferreira Filho and Horridge, 2005). 
2.  Transmission of world prices: approaches have been developed to consider the extent 
to which local prices vary relative to international prices. In this case, CGE models 
generate changes in prices which are applied to household databases considering that 
there might be differential impacts by geographical areas depending on their market 
integration level. For example, in Mexico price transmission has been estimated to be 
high for areas with a high level of market integration, and low for areas isolated from 
markets (Nicita, 2005). Micro-simulation approaches have been formulated to reflect 
the extent to which changes in international prices are transmitted to local prices and 
their corresponding effects on household expenditure and income sources. 
3.  Labor markets and factor productivity: trade reforms might also affect the 
productivity of factors of production. In this case, macro-micro simulation 
approaches have been developed to study how trade reforms influence the movement 
of workers between sectors. Bussolo et al. (2005), for example, have studied how 
trade reforms affect the movement of workers from a relatively low-wage 
agricultural sector to higher wage non-farm jobs. In this kind of micro-simulation 
model, the analysis of agricultural labor productivity is of primary interest. 
4.  Tariff revenues: a recent IMF (2005) study points out that researchers have ignore 
the problem of the loss in government revenues when trade reforms take place. To 
overcome this problem, macro-micro simulation approaches have been designed to 
estimate the amount of tariff revenue losses (if any), the mechanisms to replace such 
tariffs, and the impacts that such replacement might have on household welfare. For 
example, Emini et al. (2005) used a micro-simulation model to estimate welfare 
impacts of different tax options (value added tax, direct taxation) to replace the loss 
in tariff revenue emerging from trade reforms. Would a Free Trade Agreement Between Bolivia and the United States … 
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5.  Subsistence consumption (own agricultural production used for family consumption 
only): In least developed countries an important segment of the consumption bundle 
usually comes from auto-consumption. However, trade reforms may have no impact 
on such consumption. For such cases, approaches have been designed to assess the 
share of the consumption bundle which is not sensitive to price changes (Arndt, 
2005).  
 
A cross-cutting issue in all these categories is the so called ‘policy baseline’ setting. This 
refers to updating tariff information (or leading-up trade reforms) before examining the actual 
trade reform that it is intended to analyze. This policy baseline setting is needed when a major 
trade reform takes place in the country or region of interest. Given that Bolivia has 
experienced important trade-policy reforms in the last 20 years, we updated the policy-
baseline (explained below) before the actual trade policy scenarios were conducted.  
As described above, the macro-micro approach generally consists of using a CGE model 
to simulate policy shocks whose results are used by a micro-simulation model that, in 
combination with a household database, allows analysis of the effects of such policies at 
household-group level. For social and economic policy analysis this technique has the 
advantage of producing results that can be evaluated at the household level (Cockburn, 2001). 
In this article, we follow the lead of Ianchovichina et al. (2002) and use the GTAP model 
(Hertel, 1997) as the macro-simulation model, while the micro-simulation approach uses 
Laspeyres price indices for income and expenditures. 
The GTAP model is a standard, static, multi-region, multi-sector general equilibrium 
model which includes explicitly treatment of international trade and transport margins, global 
savings and investment, and price and income responsiveness across countries. It assumes 
perfect competition, constant returns to scale, and an Armington specification for bilateral 
trade flows that differentiates trade by origin. It also assumes a fixed factor endowment and 
full factor use.  
In this article we used the GTAP database, version 6.2, which represents a snapshot of the 
world economy in the year 2001. The results of this model for all variables are expressed as 
relative changes from the original GTAP database. That is, scenario results are percentage 
changes from the base case scenario. The macro-micro approach has been applied in three 
stages (figure 1): 
The first stage is to set a pre-simulation (or pre-liberalization) scenario where, based on 
the household database, values of the consumption basket and income levels are estimated for 
each household category. The second stage is the simulation of trade liberalization scenarios 
using the GTAP model. The results of such simulations are then analyzed against key 
macroeconomic indicators of the Bolivian economy. The third and final stage is to use the 
results from the general equilibrium model (percentage changes in prices of commodities and 
sources of income), to estimate money metric estimations of changes in households’ spending 
and revenues through the combined use of Laspeyres price indices for income and 
expenditures. Then, we compared both the pre- and post-liberalization scenarios and analyzed 
the impacts of trade reforms on households’ economic wellbeing. 




A)  Bolivian household aggregated by 
geographic, factor and income categories; 
B)  Estimation of consumption basket by 
household categories. 
Pre-liberalisation scenario 
(estimated consumption basket 
values and income levels) 
GTAP Model and 
Database 
GTAP results analysed against 
key macroeconomic indicators of 
the Bolivian economy.  
GTAP output results in terms of 
percentage changes in prices of 





1. Post-liberalisation scenarios 
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2. Updating Bolivian household 
database with GTAP results. 
Trade liberalisation scenarios. 
Micro-simulation output results 
Comparison between the pre and 
post-liberalisation scenarios.  
 
Figure 1. Macro-micro simulation stages 
MODIFICATIONS TO THE GTAP DATABASE 
We modified the GTAP model in two main areas: 1) Inclusion of the 2004 Bolivian 
input-output matrix into GTAP, and 2) updated tariff information contained in the GTAP 
database. These two modifications are explained in the following paragraphs. 
Updating the Bolivian Input-Output Matrix 
The GTAP global database Version 6.0, released in 2005, corresponds to the global 
economy in 2001, capturing economic activity in 57 different industries of 87 regions and 
countries worldwide. The global GTAP database works with inter-industry flows, which are 
based on national Input-Output (I-O) tables. This database is constructed with contributions 
from an international network of institutions and individuals. Since the creation of the first 
version of the GTAP global database in 1993, improved versions have included more 
regions/countries and sectors. However, Bolivia was not included in any of these previous 
versions.  
Bolivia was included in the GTAP database for the first time by Ludena and Wong 
(2005), using data from the year 2000. This Bolivian I-O table was incorporated into the 
GTAP global database interim release 6.1. An updated Bolivian I-O matrix was transformed Would a Free Trade Agreement Between Bolivia and the United States … 
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into a GTAP format through a collaborative effort between Purdue University and the 
University of Reading (Ludena and Telleria, 2007). This matrix used data for the year 2004 
and was incorporated into the GTAP global database interim release 6.2 (May 2006).  
Updating Tariff Information in the GTAP Database 
The GTAP database version 6.2 does not include some trade agreements that Bolivia 
signed before 2001, year to which the GTAP database corresponds. Therefore, tariff updating 
was done by defining ‘sensitive’
5 products for each country included in the regional 
aggregation (described below) and with tariff information obtained from pre-2001 FTAs 
listed in Table 1: 
 
Table 1. List of Pre-2001 and Post-2001 Free Trade Agreements  
 
Pre-2001 FTAs    Post-2001 FTAs (2002-2006)   
Agreement Year  Agreement  Year 
Argentina – Bolivia  1996  Bolivia – US (ATPDEA)  2002 
Argentina – Chile   1996  Chile – EU   2003 
Bolivia – Chile   1993  Chile – US  2004 
Bolivia – Brazil   1996  Colombia – US  2006 
Brazil – Chile  1996  Colombia – US (ATPDEA)  2002 
Chile – Colombia   1993  Ecuador – US (ATPDEA)  2002 
Chile – Ecuador  1994  Peru – US   2005 
Chile – Peru   1998  Peru – US (ATPDEA)  2002 
Chile – Venezuela   1993     
Source: Durán et al. (2007). 
 
Since 2001, the economic environment (i.e., import tariffs from bilateral and regional 
trade agreements) has also changed and the economic world as presented in the 2001 GTAP 
database is no longer relevant. Therefore, we updated the GTAP database to include trade 
agreements signed between Latin American countries, which were relevant for Bolivia. For 
this update, we used the information on trade agreements signed between 2001 and 2006 
(Table 1). Such updating set 2006 as a new baseline year, upon which the intended trade 
agreement simulations between Bolivia and the US were conducted.  
SECTORAL AND REGIONAL AGGREGATION  
The 96 regions (or countries) and 57 sectors (commodity groups), available in the GTAP 
database version 6.2, were aggregated into 11 regions and 29 sectors. The regional 
aggregation criterion consisted of choosing countries that are important trade partners for 
Bolivia (Table 2). That is, the United States, South American countries and the European 
Union represented between 77 and 97% of total Bolivian exports to the world between 1994 
and 2006. 
 
                                                        
5 Sensitive products are less competitive products in international markets, and important for both domestic food 
security and employment generation. Roberto Telleria, Carlos Ludena, Bhavani Shankar et al. 
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Table 2. Sectoral and Country Aggregation of the GTAP Database, Version 6.2 
 
Sector Description  Country  Description 
Agriculture   1.  Bolivia  Bolivia 
1. Rice  Paddy rice  2. United States  US 
2. Wheat  Wheat  3. Argentina  Argentina 
3. Cereals  Corn, barley, other cereals 4.  Venezuela  Venezuela 
4. VegFruitNuts  Vegetables, fruit, nuts  5. Colombia  Colombia 
5. OilSeeds  Oil seeds  6. Brazil  Brazil 
6. OtherAgric  Sugar crops, plant-based fibers  7. Peru  Peru 
7. RawMilk  Raw milk  8. Chile  Chile 
8. Animal  Live cattle, sheep, pigs, wool  9. Ecuador  Ecuador 
9. Fishing  Fishing  10. EU25  EU (pre-2007) 
Mining    11. ROW  Rest of the World 
10. Gas  Gas     
11. Energy  Coal, oil     
12. Mining  Minerals nec     
Manufactures Intensive in Natural Resources    
13. Meat  Meat and meat products     
14. VegOilsFats  Vegetable oils and fats     
15. DairyProduct  Dairy products     
16. FoodProducts  Processed food, beverages, etc.     
17. Sugar  Sugar     
Manufactures Intensive in Labor    
18. Textiles  Textiles     
19. Apparel  Wearing apparel     
20. LeatherProdu  Leather products     
21. WoodProducts  Wood products     
22. OthLightManu  Paper products     
Manufactures Intensive in Capital    
23. PetroleuCoal  Petroleum, coal products     
24. ChemRubPlast  Chemical, rubber, plastic prod     
25. MetalsNec  Ferrous metals, Metals nec     
26. MetalProduct  Metal products     
27. MotorVehicle  Motor vehicles, transport equip.     
28. MachinEquipm  Electronic and machinery equip.     
Services      
29. Services  Electricity, gas dist., water, construction, trade, 
transport, communications, financial and 
business services, public admin. 
  
Note: nec = Not elsewhere classified. 
 
The 57 GTAP sectors were aggregated into 29 sectors (Table 2), grouped into six 
categories that use similar production factors. The reason for this grouping is that trade 
liberalization not only affects trade of commodities, but also the productive structure of the 
whole economy. Grouping sectors according to the similarity in the use of production factors 
facilitates the analysis of results.  Would a Free Trade Agreement Between Bolivia and the United States … 
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TRADE POLICY SCENARIOS 
Recent US trade agreements with Latin American countries (e.g., Central America and 
Dominican Republic, Peru, Colombia, and Panama) suggest that the United States has 
provided particular protection to some commodity groups considered as ‘sensitive’. These 
have been beef, sugar and dairy commodity groups, whose tariffs in Peru and Colombia’s 
FTAs will only be dismantled within 10–15 years after the agreements are implemented. In a 
prospective FTA between Bolivia and the United States, we assume that protection for these 
commodities will be maintained as in other FTAs. For Bolivia, sensitive commodity groups 
include rice, wheat, oil seeds, dairy products, textiles and leather products, to which Bolivia 
provides special protection when negotiating trade agreements. Three trade scenarios were 
defined as follows: 
 
1.  Scenario 1 − FTA (Bolivia–US full liberalization): in this scenario all Bolivian 
tradable products enter duty-free into the United States, and vice-versa. About 60% 
of Bolivian exports to that country already enter duty free under the ATPDEA. 
Therefore, this FTA considers an elimination of US tariffs for the remaining 40% of 
Bolivian commodities. In this case, we assumed that Bolivia removed tariffs on 
100% of US commodities. 
2.  Scenario 2 − Restricted FTA (with ‘sensitive products’): in this scenario, sensitive 
products are excluded from the trade liberalization treaty. Thus, it was assumed that 
the United States removes tariffs on about 30% of Bolivian commodities, while 
Bolivia would remove tariffs on about 75% of US commodities. 
3.  Scenario 3 − No ATPDEA (end of the ATPDEA): this scenario assumes that the US 
does not extend the ATPDEA beyond December 2008 (the date which the ATPDEA 
officially ends). Therefore, in this scenario it is simulated that the US increases tariffs 
to 60% of Bolivian products that previously benefited from the ATPDEA to levels of 
preferred country. Bolivia in this case does not change import tariffs to US products. 
This scenario implies that the FTA does not materialize, either because the trade 
negotiations fail, or due to lack of political will of the Bolivian and/or US 
government to convey a trade agreement. 
 
Each scenario represents a clear trade paradigm. That is, while the first represents 
complete free trade, the second reflects free trade but coupled with concerns over sensitive 
commodities, and the third scenario reflects a paradigm of protectionism or lack of political 
will to reach a trade agreement. 
MICRO-SIMULATION APPROACH 
We follow Ianchovichina et al.’s (2002) micro-simulation approach to evaluate changes 
in wellbeing at the household level. This simple approach calculates the upper bound of 
household expenditure change caused by price changes predicted by a general equilibrium 
model, using Laspeyeres’ index, defined as, 
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where PL is the change in price level, pi and qi stand for the price and quantity of commodity 
i. Both prices and quantities are indexed by time, where 0 denotes the base period, and 1 
refers to the post simulation period. This price index is normalized to a value of 100 in the 
base year, to indicate the percentage level of the price index in period 1 relative to the base 
year. The Laspeyres index overstates the increase in expenditure, as it does not account for 
substitution in consumption when prices change (zero elasticity of substitution). Thus, as 
pointed out by Ianchovichina et al. the Laspeyres index provides an upper bound 
measurement of the increase in expenditure, defining a worst case scenario. 
To measure changes in economic wellbeing, Ianchovichina et al. use GTAP’s private 
utility equation. The term ‘private utility’ is specifically used in this article to denote the 
difference between the Laspeyres index for income and the Laspeyres index for expenditures, 
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where  up(r) represents the percentage change in private utility in region r;  yp(r) is the 
percentage change in private household income in region r; CONSHR(i,r) is the share of i in 
total consumption in region r;  pp(i,r) is the percentage change in the demand price of 
commodity  i in region r;  INCPAR(i,r) is the income expansion parameter (elasticity) of 
commodity i in region r. If preferences are homothetic (i.e., a change in budget will allow for 
proportional changes in the demand of commodities) the INCPAR(i,r) equals 1 for all 
commodities, and therefore Equation 2 collapses into the difference between a Laspeyres 
price index for income an a Laspeyres price index for expenditures, 
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Equation (3) is the difference between the change in household income and the product of 
a consumption share times the percentage change in prices. In other words, this equation is a 
measure of economic wellbeing change, given that it computes economic change as the 
difference between changes in income and expenditures. In turn, household income is defined 
as the sum of the share in household’s endowments (skilled labor, unskilled labor, capital, 
land and natural resources), times the percentage change in price of these endowments, ps(r), 
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The Laspeyres price index provides a fixed-weight approximation of economic private 
utility emerging from a change in income sources and a change in cost of living. Given the 
large size of the 2002 Bolivian household database (5,746 household questionnaires) used in 
this research, three approaches were used to group the data, allowing analyzing the micro-
simulation results from several perspectives, including: 
 
a)  Earnings specialization: households were stratified according to their reliance on 
sector-specific factors of production (Hertel et al. 2004).  
 
Table 3. Sector-specific Factors of Production in Bolivian Household Survey 
 
Production factor  Number of questionnaires  % 
Agriculture  2,086  39 
Non-agricultural  614  11 
Capital  1,303  24 
Natural resources  764  14 
Diversified  623  12 
Total  5,390  100 
Note: 356 questionnaires were eliminated as no information on household head’s main economic 
activity was available. 
Source: Own classification based on the 2002 Bolivian household survey. 
 
b)  Income levels: households were grouped into six sextiles of income categories, 
ranking them from the poorest to the wealthiest groups. 
 
Table 4. Income Groups in Bolivian Household Survey 
 
Income group  Income Range(Bs/month)  Number of questionnaires  Share (%) 
I  <= 390  956  16.7 
II  390 - 695  950  16.6 
III  695 – 1,033  953  16.7 
IV  1,033 – 1,538  953  16.7 
V  1,538 – 2,547  953  16.7 
VI  2,547+  952  16.7 
Total    5,717  100 
Note: Due to missing data, 29 questionnaires were excluded. 
Source: Own classification based on the 2002 Bolivian household survey. 
 
c)  Geographical area: households were classified according to geographical regions, 
departments and rural/urban condition. 
 
Source: Own classification based on the 2002 Bolivian household survey. Household 
head income was used instead of total household income considering that the household 
database contains quite incomplete information on income of other household members, 
preventing the accurate estimation of total household income. In addition, contributions of 
other household members generally represent a small share of the total household income 
and, in most cases, such contributions come from occasional work. This also avoids further Roberto Telleria, Carlos Ludena, Bhavani Shankar et al. 
 
158 
discussions of the validity of other household income equivalencies, such as the well known 
‘adult equivalency.
6 
Table 5. Geographical Grouping of Households in Bolivia 
 
Region Department  Rural Urban Total  % 
1. La Paz  430  789  1,219  21 
2.  Oruro  239 297 536  9 
3.  Potosí  350 282 632  11 
Altiplano 
Sub-total  1,019 1,368 2,387  42 
4.  Cochabamba  373 538 911  16 
Valley 
5.  Chuquisaca  262 215 477  8 
6.  Tarija  199 277 476  8   
Sub-total  834 1,030 1,864  32 
7.  Beni  147 265 412  7 
8. Pando  95  48  143  3 
9. Santa Cruz  320  620  940  16 
Plain 
Sub-total 562  933  1,495  26 
Total    2,415 3,331 5,746  100 
Note: Bolivia is geographically classified into 9 departments. A department is equivalent to what 
would be a county in England, or a state in the US. 
MACRO RESULTS 
The results discussion focuses on the most important variables relevant to evaluate which 
trade reform is the most beneficial for Bolivia from both macro and micro simulation 
viewpoints. We begin our discussion with the macroeconomic results and later focus on the 
results at the household level. 
Aggregate Welfare Outcomes 
The complete liberalization scenario (FTA) would represent for Bolivia a net positive 
welfare effect of USD 7.2 million per year (Table 6). In the second scenario there is also a 
positive welfare effect indicating that the Bolivian society would be indifferent to 
implementing a restricted FTA and a transfer of USD 5.6 million per annum. The model 
results set the last scenario as the worst case for Bolivia, indicating that the end of unilateral 
trade preferences (no ATPDEA) would result in a net loss of USD 4.1 million per year. For 
the United States, the trade liberalization scenarios represent a net positive welfare effect of 
USD 19.8 and 19.5 million per year respectively, with the third scenario representing a 





                                                        
6 Szekely et al. (2000) have found out that estimations of total household income under ‘adult equivalency’ methods 
can be very sensitive to assumptions about the existence of economies of scale in consumption, approaches for 
treating missing and zero earnings, and different adjustments to deal with income misreporting. Would a Free Trade Agreement Between Bolivia and the United States … 
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Table 6. Aggregated Welfare Changes for Bolivia and US 
 
Bolivia US 


















Change in EV (million USD) 7.2  5.6  -4.1  19.8  19.5  0.8 
Change in GDP (%)  0.572  0.434 -0.317  0.001  0.001  0.000 
EV = Equivalent variation is a welfare measure (in monetary terms) of the simulated policy 
scenario. 
 
The Bolivian GDP would increase annually by 0.57% and 0.43% under Scenarios 1 and 2 
respectively, and decrease by 0.32% per year under Scenario 3. US GDP would increase by 
negligible amounts (0.001% per annum in the first two scenarios, and no increase in the third 
scenario). This result was expected given that Bolivia is a minor trade partner for the US, and 
thus a change in the trade flows with Bolivia is of minor impact on the US economy.
7 These 
results provide the first indication as to which of the three scenarios would be the most 
advantageous for Bolivia in terms of economy-wide enrichment. 
The size of changes in welfare and GDP under the first two scenarios, though positive, is 
not considerable. In fact, such changes suggest quite moderate gains resulting from the trade 
reforms. This is because the trade policy measures simulated consisted on lowering import 
tariffs to just 40% of all Bolivian commodities exported into the US (the remaining 60% 
already enters duty-free under the ATPDEA). Also, Bolivia has maintained relatively low 
protection measures to US products, with tariffs uniformly set at 10%, with exemptions on 
capital equipment (5% tariff), and books and publications (2% tariff). Moreover, the use of 
the Armington structure in the GTAP model tends to display, when one country reduces its 
tariff rates, reduced terms of trade effects and small resource reallocation across industries. 
For those reasons, the removal of such low and limited tariffs would not generate large 
changes in GDP or aggregated welfare. 
Changes on Exports 
The overall Bolivian exportable production of labor-intensive manufactures would 
increase in the first and second scenarios, and decrease in the third one. That is, as US import 
tariffs of these manufactures are reduced, the US substitutes towards labor-intensive 
manufactures from Bolivia relative to other countries. 
Bolivian exports of other sectors such as agriculture, mining, capital intensive 
manufactures and services under Scenarios 1 and 2 would decline, as implied by negative 
values in Table 7. This decline in exports is because most of these commodity groups were 
already tax-free in the pre-reform scenario and, thus, the change in prices of these Bolivian 
commodities in the US markets only slightly changed. Additionally, the aggregate 
commodities import price into the US would not change because the share of Bolivian exports 
into US markets is relatively insignificant. 
 
                                                        
7 US imports from Bolivia in 2005 were worth about USD 308 millions, which represented just 0.02% of total US 
imports. Roberto Telleria, Carlos Ludena, Bhavani Shankar et al. 
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Agriculture -3.4  -2.6  1.3 
Mining -2.4  -1.9  1.1 
Manuf. intensive in natural resources  21.4  -2.8  1.6 
Manuf. intensive in labor  20.5  21.2  -22.4 
Manuf. intensive in capital -3.2  -2.5  1.6 
Services -2.9  -2.4  1.2 
 
In the third scenario, the Bolivian exports of labor intensive manufactures substantially 
decreased (-22.4% per year). The reason behind this is found in the tariff reform under 
Scenario 3, which assumed that trade preferences the US gives to Bolivia are eliminated. This 
would cause tariffs of Bolivian labor-intensive manufactures to increase, making these 
products more expensive in US markets. This is reflected by the substitution effect, which 
implies a substitution of Bolivian manufactures by cheaper and more competitive suppliers of 
these products. 
Considering the expansion in Bolivian exports to the US in some commodity groups and 
the contraction in other groups, in overall terms, Bolivian exports to the US would grow 
annually by 14.2% and 11.1% in the first and second scenarios respectively, and would 
decrease by 5.8% per year if the ATPDEA is eliminated (Table 8).  
This growth in the first two scenarios would occur at the expense of export reductions to 
other countries (ranging between -3.0% and -0.6% in the first scenario, and between -2.3% 
and -0.5% in the second one). In the third scenario, Bolivian exports to the US would 
decrease, while exports to other regions of the world would increase in modest percentages, 
ranging between 0.3% and 1.5%. The structure of Bolivian exports would not experience 
abrupt changes in comparison with the pre-simulation scenario (Table 9). That is, Bolivia 
would continue exporting products with a relatively low degree of transformation (such as 
mining products that include natural gas) and goods with a relatively high content of natural 
resources.  
 




















United States  35.5  14.2  27.8  11.1  -14.4  -5.8 
Argentina -2.0  -3.0  -1.5  -2.3  1.0  1.5 
Venezuela -2.2  -1.2  -1.7  -1.0  1.0  0.6 
Colombia -1.9  -1.5  -1.5  -1.2  0.9  0.7 
Brazil -1.6  -0.6  -1.2  -0.5  0.7  0.3 
Peru -1.2  -2.0  -0.9  -1.6  0.5  0.9 
Chile -0.7  -2.5  -0.6  -2.0  0.4  1.2 
Ecuador -0.4  -1.6  -0.3  -1.3  0.2  0.8 
EU -4.6  -1.9  -3.7  -1.5  2.1  0.9 
ROW -5.3  -1.3  -4.2  -1.1  2.5  0.6 
Total 15.7  1.0  12.1  0.8  -5.2  -0.3 
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Agriculture  95  5.8 93 5.7 94  5.7  95 5.9 
Mining  467  28.7 466 28.4 466  28.5  467 28.9 
Manuf. int. in nat. resources  340  21.0 345 21.0 337  20.6  343 21.1 
Manuf. intensive in labor  209  12.9  235  14.3  237  14.5  195  12.0 
Manuf. intensive in capital  287  17.6  279  17.0  281  17.2  291  17.9 
Services  227  13.9 222 13.6 223  13.6  229 14.2 
Total 1,625  100.0  1,641  100.0 1,637  100.0  1,620 100.0 
Changes on Imports 
The reduction of import tariffs between Bolivia and the United States would increase the 
demand for imports from the US at the expense of imports from other regions (Table 10). 
Under a full FTA (Scenario 1), the value of Bolivian imports from the US would grow 
annually by 46%. This growth would be at the expense of reductions in imports from other 
sources. Given that Brazil and Argentina hold such large shares in the structure of Bolivian 
imports, these two countries would suffer the most from trade diversion. The large increase in 
Bolivian imports from the US overcomes the reduction of Bolivian imports from other 
sources, yielding a net increment of 2.3% in the value of total imports. 
Under a restricted FTA (Scenario 2), the substantial growth in the value of Bolivian 
imports from the US (43%) would also reduce imports from other countries of the world, 
yielding a net increase in the value of total imports of 2.1%. If the ATPDEA is eliminated 
(scenario 3), Bolivia would import less from all countries included in this regional 
aggregation, resulting in a net reduction in the value of total imports of 0.5%. These changes 
in imports are explained by the difference between these scenarios. That is, when comparing 
the first and second liberalization scenarios, the second one imposes quantitative restrictions 
for sensitive products, which lower the possibilities of increasing the exchange of  
 




















United States  125.3  46.3  116.7  43.1  -1.1  -0.4 
Argentina  -11.8  -4.3  -10.1 -3.7  -1.0 -0.4 
Venezuela  -0.9  -5.4  -0.9 -5.5  0.0 -0.2 
Colombia  -2.1  -4.4 -2.1  -4.5 -0.2  -0.5 
Brazil  -21.6  -5.8  -21.0 -5.6  -1.8 -0.5 
Peru  -4.2  -4.1 -3.8  -3.7 -0.5  -0.5 
Chile  -5.4  -3.3 -5.2  -3.2 -0.9  -0.5 
Ecuador  -0.3  -4.4  -0.3 -4.0  0.0 -0.6 
EU  -17.9  -6.3  -18.2 -6.4  -1.4 -0.5 
ROW  -16.9  -4.8  -16.3 -4.6  -1.9 -0.6 
Total 44.2  2.3  38.8  2.1  -8.8  -0.5 
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commodities. In the third scenario, US import tariffs for some Bolivian products actually 
increase, which further restricts the possibilities of exchanging products between both 
countries. Considering sharper increases in imports relative to exports, the Bolivian trade 
balance would experience a deficit of about 1.4% and 1.3% under Scenarios 1 and 2 
respectively, while a positive (although negligible) trade balance of 0.12% would occur under 
Scenario 3 (results not shown here). 
Under Scenarios 1 and 2, Bolivia would reduce tariffs to US commodities, lowering US 
imported supply prices. This would make US products more competitive and provide an 
incentive to Bolivian firms, households and government to increase their imports of 
intermediate products and goods for final consumption. Sensitivity analyses were conducted 
to evaluate changes in the Armington elasticities values, which are key elements in the 
determination of the trade results.
8 Simulations indicated that regardless of whether the 
Armington elasticities increased or decreased, the results would not change in qualitative 
terms. That is, gains in both welfare and GDP were always higher in Scenario 1 in 
comparison with Scenario 2, while Scenario 3 represented in all cases the worst case for 
Bolivia. 
MICRO RESULTS 
This section turns to the micro-simulation results to investigate the impact of the three 
trade scenarios on the different type of households in Bolivia.  
Market Price Changes by Type of Trade Reform 
Table 11 shows that prices of commodities decline under the first two scenarios, and 
increase under the third one for most sectors. These results were expected given that the first 
two scenarios reduce import protection tariffs, which would push down domestic prices and 
promote wider competition from abroad. However, results show that such reductions in tariff 
protection would not produce large reductions in domestic prices, but moderate ones because 
of the relatively low rates of protection in Bolivia. Under the elimination of the ATPDEA, 
changes in most commodity prices would be positive, though negligible. That is because in 
this scenario Bolivia does not change its protection tariffs, while the US increases import 






                                                        
8 A dynamic model would have led to further insights evaluation of tariff elimination for sensitive products 
over time. However, the dynamic GTAP model and database do not include Bolivia as an individual 
country (the dynamic model is not based on version 6.2 of the GTAP database that was used in this 
research, but on version 5.0, with base year 1997). This database limitation does not allow evaluating the 
specific impacts of a FTA on the Bolivian economy. In addition, the focus of our research was to use the 
macro-micro approach to evaluate poverty effects. For that, we would like to know the “cumulative” 
poverty impacts of trade liberalization, for which the static model serves our purpose.  Would a Free Trade Agreement Between Bolivia and the United States … 
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Agriculture      
Rice -0.03  -0.00  0.00 
Wheat -1.27  -0.00  0.00 
Cereals -2.04  -2.04  0.00 
Vegetables, Fruits and Nuts  -0.69  -0.69  0.00 
Oil Seeds  -0.01  -0.00  0.00 
Other Agriculture  -0.74  -0.73  0.00 
Raw Milk  -0.00  -0.00  0.00 
Animal -0.59  -0.59  0.00 
Fishing -0.02  -0.02  0.00 
Mining      
Gas -3.38  -3.38  -0.00 
Energy -0.95  -0.95  -0.00 
Mining -1.90  -1.90  0.00 
Manufactures intensive in natural resources      
Meat -0.95  -0.95  0.00 
Vegetable Oils and Fats  -0.09  -0.09  0.00 
Dairy Product  -0.26  -0.00  0.00 
Food Products  -0.51  -0.50  0.00 
Sugar -1.04  -1.03  0.00 
Manufactures intensive in labor      
Textiles -0.62  -0.00  0.00 
Apparel -0.78  -0.78  0.00 
Leather Products  -0.44  -0.00  0.00 
Wood Products  -1.22  -1.22  0.00 
Other Light Manufacturing  -1.09  -1.09  0.00 
Manufactures intensive in capital      
Petroleum and Coal Refinement  -0.11  -0.11  -0.00 
Chemical, Rubber and Plastic -0.88  -0.88  0.00 
Metals Nec  -1.00  -1.00  -0.00 
Metal Products  -0.93  -0.93  0.00 
Motor Vehicles  -1.43  -1.43  0.00 
Machinery and Equipment  -2.69  -2.69  0.00 
Services      
Services 0.00  0.00  0.00 
Production factors      
Land -0.27  -0.41  0.15 
Unskilled Labor  1.07  0.90  -0.40 
Skilled Labor  1.08  0.91  -0.38 
Capital 0.95  0.78  -0.34 
Natural Resources  -1.85  -1.68  0.86 
 
The trade policy scenarios on the income side result in mixed effects for Bolivian 
production factors (bottom part of Table 11). While there are price reductions in returns to 
land and natural resources under Scenarios 1 and 2, there are increases in returns to all other 
production factors (i.e., unskilled labor, skilled labor and capital). In the case of the third 
scenario, results are the opposite. That is, there are positive changes in returns to the use of 
land and natural resources and negative returns to unskilled labor, skilled labor and capital.  
These results are mainly explained by the way in which we modeled changes in demand 
for some endowment factors in the GTAP model. That is, we assumed that land and natural 
resources were sluggish factors, meaning that these are sector specific and do not move Roberto Telleria, Carlos Ludena, Bhavani Shankar et al. 
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between sectors. Results show that demand for both land and natural resources decreased in 
the first two scenarios implying, in the face of a very inelastic supply curve, a reduction in the 
price of land and natural resources. In the third scenario, there is an increase in the demand 
for land and natural resources, which leads to an increase in their relative prices.  
With regard to unskilled and skilled labor and capital, they are assumed to be mobile 
factors, with a more elastic supply curve. There is an increase in the demand for these factors 
under the first two scenarios, which increased their prices. The opposite occurs in the third 
scenario, where demand for these three production factors is reduced, leading to a reduction 
in their relative prices. 
Changes in Income and in Expenditures by Production Factor 
Overall results of the impacts of the trade reforms on households’ private utility by 
production factor indicate that, under the first two trade liberalization scenarios, private utility 
would increase for households depending on all production factor categories, except for 
agriculture-dependent households (Table 12). If the ATPDEA is eliminated (Scenario 3), 
private utility would increase only for agriculture-dependent households, and decrease for all 
other factor-dependent households. The rise in private utility in all production factors (except 
agriculture under Scenarios 1 and 2) is explained by increased returns to production factors, 
as reflected by Laspeyres index for income’s values greater than 100, and by reduced 
commodity prices that reduce households’ expenditure on their consumption bundle (reflected 
by values of the Laspeyres index for expenditure lower than 100).  
Private utility was projected to be, for most production factors, somewhat higher in 
Scenario 1 than Scenario 2. This is because returns to factors of production (i.e. unskilled 
labor, skilled labor and capital, bottom part of Table 11) tend to grow at a faster rate in 
Scenario 1 relative to Scenario 2. In the third scenario, the drop in private utility for all 
households, except Agriculture, is explained by declines in returns to their factors of 
production, which were not compensated by changes in the cost of the consumption bundle. 
This would result in a decline of net income and hence a reduction in private utility.  
 
Table 12. Impacts of Trade Reform Scenarios on Household Private Utility by 
Production Factor 
 
Laspeyres index for income  Laspeyres index for 
expenditure 
Private utility (percentage 
change)  Production 

















100.65 100.49  99.33  99.36  99.37 100.00  1.30  1.12  -0.67 
Capital 100.86  100.69 99.49  99.36 99.38  100.00  1.50  1.32 -0.51 
Natural 
resources 
101.00 100.83  99.65  99.36  99.37 100.00  1.64  1.46  -0.35 
Diversified 100.86  100.69  99.48  99.36 99.38  100.00  1.50  1.32 -0.52 Would a Free Trade Agreement Between Bolivia and the United States … 
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Changes in Income and Expenditure by Income Level 
Table 13 summarizes results of household private utility by income level, showing that as 
a consequence of the full trade liberalization (Scenario 1), private utilities of household heads 
included in the income categories III, IV, V and VI would increase, while the private utility of 
the two poorest households would decrease. Under the restricted FTA scenario, the private 
utility of all household groups (except the poorest income group) would increase. Meanwhile, 
under Scenario 3 (no ATPDEA), only private utility of household heads belonging to the 
poorest income category would increase, while private utilities of the rest of the income 
groups would decrease. An interesting finding emerging from this household classification 
criterion is that private utility for the first two scenarios decreases for the poorest households 
and increases for the better off household groups, widening the income gap in a country 
where income is already badly distributed (UDAPE, 2006). 
The results of the third scenario indicate that households belonging to the poorest income 
group would be better off as a result of the end of the ATPDEA. However, this group 
represents only a fraction of the whole sample population (table 4), and considering that more 
than half of Bolivia’s population is estimated to be poor (60% according to official Bolivian 
sources), it is not convenient to consider the end of the ATPDEA as a good policy option for 
the Bolivian society as a whole. Such termination would make worse off households in 
income categories II, III and IV, where the majority of the Bolivian poor are. In addition, 
almost all household included in the poorest income group are farmers, whose food 
consumption is significantly satisfied (25% on average) with own agricultural production. 
Such production is not entirely subject to changes in prices of agricultural commodities, and 
thus their food security is more certain relative to the poor living in the peri-urban and urban 
areas of Bolivia (who are mostly in income categories II to IV).  
 











I <=  390  -1.03  -0.88  0.34 
II  390 – 695  -0.58  0.40  -0.22 
III  695 – 1,033  1.64  1.45  -0.37 
IV  1,033 – 1,538  1.66  1.47  -0.38 
V  1,538 – 2,547  1.68  1.50  -0.38 
VI 2,547+  1.70  1.52  -0.38 
Note: Income levels are expressed in Bolivianos per month (Bs/month). For the first income 
category 390 Bs/month (or less) and considering the average exchange rate in 2002 (1 USD = 
6.9 Bolivianos), this corresponds to 56 USD/month. 
 
Own production is not only important in Bolivia; Arndt (2005) found that in 
Mozambique roughly half of all measured consumption was supplied by own production. He 
found that households operating on this type of subsistence basis were less integrated into the 
domestic economy, so the possibility of them being influenced by changes in domestic prices 
was reduced. Considering that most household groups would benefit under Scenarios 1 and 2, 
where the majority of the Bolivian poor are included, the termination of trade preferences Roberto Telleria, Carlos Ludena, Bhavani Shankar et al. 
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provided by the US to Bolivia (Scenario 3) would not be the best option for the Bolivian 
society as a whole.  
CHANGES IN INCOME AND IN EXPENDITURE  
BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION 
Another perspective is given by analyzing private utility results classified by 
geographical location. For this, we positioned private utility results according to a one-percent 
positive or negative threshold approach, as follows: 
 
•  Winner (W): a household is a ‘winner’ if the average household private utility 
increases by more than 1%; 
•  Marginal Winner (MW): a household is a ‘marginal winner’ if the average household 
private utility increases by less than 1%; 
•  Loser (L): a household is a ‘loser’ if the average household private utility decreases 
by more than 1%; 
•  Marginal Loser (ML): a household is a ‘marginal loser’ if the average household 
private utility decreases by less than 1%. 
 
We only discuss the first two scenarios, as the third one has been found to be 
disadvantageous for Bolivia (Table 14). Under Scenario 2, the benefits that a Restricted FTA 
would accrue to household groups would be more evenly distributed. Not many ‘winning’ 
households were projected in this scenario (just 2), and just one ‘marginal loser’ household 
area was projected. The majority of the household areas (15 in total) were projected to be 
‘marginal winners’, meaning that they would benefit from a restricted FTA, but those benefits 
would be smaller than in Scenario 1, and more equably distributed across more household 
group areas.  
Scenario 2 implies that the distribution of trade benefits between urban and rural areas 
narrows at least in the poorest region of Bolivia. That is, rural and urban households of the 
poorest region of the country (the Altiplano region comprising La Paz, Oruro and Potosí) 
benefit from the Restricted FTA. This situation was not projected to happen under Scenario 1, 
but on the contrary under this scenario more benefits would go to urban households and less 
to rural ones. A large share of total population in the Altiplano region live in rural areas (46% 
on average or 1,533,000 people), indicating that impacts are important in terms of total 
number of households involved. 
More than half of total population of Chuquisaca and Potosí (‘Losing’ areas under 
Scenario 1) live in rural areas (55% or 332,000 people in Chuquisaca, and 65% or 503,000 
people in Potosí), implying that Scenario 1 of trade liberalisation would negatively affect 
large numbers of people in Chuquisaca and Potosí. Also, a large share of total population in 
Oruro and Tarija (‘Marginal losers’ under Scenario 1) live in rural areas (39% or 265,000 
people in Oruro, and 34% or 433,000 people in Tarija), indicating that Scenario 1 would also 
be detrimental for rural households in these two departments. 
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Table 14. Mapping of Impacts of Trade Reforms in Bolivia under Scenarios 1 and 2 
 
Scenario 1 FTA  Scenario 2 Restricted FTA 
Situation 
Urban Rural  Urban  Rural 
Winner (W) 
5: Cochabamba, La 
Paz, Pando, Beni and 
Santa Cruz 
1: Beni 





4: Oruro, Potosí, 
Chuquisaca and Tarija 





Paz, Oruro, Pando, 
Potosí and Tarija 
8: Beni, Chuquisaca, 
Cochabamba, La Paz, 
Pando, Potosí, Santa 




2: Oruro and 
Tarija 
0  1: Oruro 
Loser (L)  0 
2: Potosí and 
Chuquisaca 
0 0 
Total 9  9  9  9 
Note: 18 household areas correspond to Bolivia’s nine departments split in rural and urban areas. 
A department is a first-level political division in Bolivia. A ‘household area’ refers to a 
geographical location where the average household is ‘winner’, ‘loser’, ‘marginal winner’ or 
‘marginal loser’. 
 
These findings suggest that the complete liberalization of the economy (Scenario 1) 
would result in broad-based increases in utility for some household areas, while the sector-
specific measures (Scenario 2) would yield smaller but more complete economy-wide 
benefits for most household areas. From an economy-wide and benefit-distribution point of 
view, Scenario 2 seems to be the most expedite and beneficial for Bolivia. The worst scenario 
is the elimination of trade preferences from the US, where most Bolivian households would 
experience reductions in private utility. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The general conclusion of this research is that Bolivia’s efforts to reach a trade agreement 
with the US would pay off. While the FTA scenario was identified as the most profitable 
trade setting for the Bolivian economy as a whole, a restricted FTA, which considers sensitive 
commodities, was found to be the most prudent and advantageous trade setting for the 
Bolivian society as benefits would be distributed across more household groups. Meanwhile, 
the end of US trade preferences to Bolivia under the ATPDEA would be the worst case for 
both the Bolivian macroeconomic performance and the economic wellbeing of its households. 
A key reason why a restricted FTA is preferable to a complete FTA is because of the 
disparity in benefits distribution under a full FTA. That is, under this scenario many Bolivian 
poor would lose, while the better off households would win. This outcome would further 
worsen income distribution in Bolivia, a country with a large income gap between the rich 
and the poor. The restricted FTA would provide a more even distribution of trade benefits for 
more households, and thus appears a better option for Bolivian society as a whole. 
The main implication of this research is that Bolivia should not remain apart from the 
processes and economic dynamism that characterize the current wave of trade liberalization. 
Protectionist trade policies and end of trade relations with the US have to be avoided if 
economic growth and household wellbeing are to be improved. Bolivia has to advance with Roberto Telleria, Carlos Ludena, Bhavani Shankar et al. 
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caution and based on a negotiation strategy that provides protection to certain commodities, 
while strengthening major exporting sectors. 
Additionally, the Bolivian government with the help of international institutions and 
donors should implement domestic policies to compensate losers of trade liberalization. Such 
policies should include income transfers, especially for those sectors hardest hit by trade 
liberalization. An example of such a program is PROCAMPO, a program for the poor in 
Mexico to help them cope with increased competition from the US and Canada, and help 
them transition from, for example, traditional staple production to high value added products. 
Other programs, already implemented in many developing countries include direct income 
transfers and directed subsidies to poor households. At the same time, such policies should 
not have major impacts on domestic prices and consumption decisions of other population 
segments, and should not put an additional burden on Bolivia’s budgetary restrictions and 
economic goals. 
Extensions for further research could include incorporating price transmission and 
replacement of tariff revenues. Both would involve estimating how much of the changes in 
international prices would be transmitted to domestic urban and rural markets and how 
governments would need to increase domestic taxes (such as VAT or income taxes) to 
compensate for fiscal deficits resulting from lost tariff revenue, bearing in mind the lack of 
institutions and market mechanisms in developing countries to do this (it might be difficult in 
developing countries to collect taxes because of limited capacity of people to pay taxes; 
therefore, investigation on the extent to which governments will be able to collect more taxes 
to replace loss in tariff revenues might be needed). The micro-simulation approach used in 
this research has the virtue of being operational across a wide range of household surveys that 
contain information on prices and quantities of commodities and production factors. It has 
been implemented with data on about 5,700 households, and could readily be applied to other 
surveys (and countries) that contain solely information on prices and quantities. This 
approach resolves, in a computationally explicit way, the evaluation of the economic 
wellbeing impacts of trade policy reforms. 
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